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This dissertation analyzes contracting relationships between large-scale corpo-
rate retail and small farmers in Nicaragua between 2000 and 2008 and estimates
the effects of participation this new market on household income and invest-
ment in productive assets. This research addresses three issues of central impor-
tance in the changing context of world agriculture: what are the determinants of
small-scale farmers’ participation in new markets evolving amid globalization?
How do farmers choose among market opportunities, given that market selec-
tion now implies a varying set of investments and transaction requirements, and
what are the consequences of their choices both for near-term household wel-
fare and for investments in technologies and asset stocks with the potential to
transform future income dynamics? Finally, what can be learned about modern
marketing channels from the significant share of farmers who exit supermarket
supply chains?
The research in this dissertation validates both optimism and caution with
respect to the potential of supermarket supply relationships to improve farmer
welfare and stimulate productive investment. The evidence here indicates that
farmers who enter the supermarket supply chain benefit from the insurance
the contract provides against the significant volatility of the traditional market
horticulture output price. Contracted farmers both experience significant pos-
itive effects on incomes and make significant investments in productive assets
and irrigation. However, we conclude that the location of supermarket procure-
ment basins is strongly determined by community access to roads, markets, and
year-round water, suggesting that modern agri-food marketing channels may
exacerbate extant rural geographic inequalities or create new ones.
We find an extremely high rate of exit from the supermarket supply chain,
evidence that discontinued suppliers warrant considerable more attention in
future analyses of participation in and welfare effects of modern agri-food mar-
kets. We also find that farmers own participation decision is influenced by
neighbors’ experience and exit from the modern channel. Finally, we should
remain prudent with respect to predictions of the long-term sustainability of
estimated income and asset returns attributable to participation. Given the sig-
nificant involvement of NGOs and the relatively early stage of the Nicaraguan
supermarket sector, it remains to be seen what the regional equilibrium effects
will be for the agricultural sector as more farmers enter these markets.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20 years, international trade negotiations and agricultural pol-
icy reform in the developing world have dismantled many of the government
controls on agricultural markets, opening new commercial spheres for farm pro-
duction and new choices for farmers. Calls have come from both the private
sector and leading international development agencies to build a new regime of
poverty reduction strategies around emerging markets, and a large number of
market-led initiatives have already taken shape.
How do farmers choose among market opportunities, given that market se-
lection now implies a varying set of investments and transaction requirements,
and what are the consequences of their choices for household welfare? An-
swering these questions is of utmost importance to understanding how some
agricultural producers are able to make the transition out of poverty in the con-
text of new, dynamic markets. Under the protected market system, a producer’s
expected output price distribution was independent of crop quality and trans-
action scale. Now, questions of producer crop quality and scale capacity are
fundamentally connected to poverty, as a producer’s access to more lucrative or
more stable marketing channels is a function of his ability to supply a product
of a particular standard according to a stipulated scale and schedule.
An emerging literature (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Goldsmith, 1985; Ho-
effler, 2005; Singh, 2002; Winters et al., 2005; World Bank, 2007) explores the
possibility that collaborations between the private sector and developing world
smallholders might be mutually beneficial, solving regional credit, transporta-
tion, insurance, and market incentive problems while opening new opportuni-
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ties for international and domestic businesses. Development economists have
remained largely silent regarding emerging trends to privatize development
work, projects that have been historically the domain of public institutions and
NGOs.
This dissertation analyzes one such relationship between large-scale cor-
porate retail and small-farmers and the ramifications of this new market for
questions of household technology adoption and investment in and returns to
productive assets. We study the participation dynamics and welfare effects of
sourcing relationships between supermarkets and small farmers in Nicaragua
between 2000 and 2007. This research addresses three issues of central impor-
tance in the changing context of world agriculture: what are the determinants of
small-scale farmers’ participation in new markets evolving amid globalization?
If small farmers do participate, what are the effects not merely on incomes but
also on investments with the potential to transform a household’s future income
dynamics such as technology adoption and productive assets? And what can be
learned about these modern agri-food marketing channels from the significant
share of farmers who exit supermarket supply chains? Which farmers choose
the volatility of the traditional market over the possibilities and requirements of
the supermarket channel?
The research in this dissertation validates both optimism and caution with
respect to the development potential of supermarket supply relationships. The
evidence here indicates that farmers who enter the supermarket supply chain
benefit from the insurance the contract provides against the significant volatil-
ity of the traditional market horticulture output price. Contracted farmers both
experience significant positive effects on incomes attributable to the supply re-
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lationship and make significant investments in productive assets and irrigation.
However, the location of supermarket procurement basins and household par-
ticipation is strongly determined by access to roads, markets, and year-round
water, suggesting that modern agri-food marketing channels may exacerbate
extant rural geographic inequalities or create new ones.
We find an extremely high rate of exit from the supermarket supply chain,
evidence that discontinued suppliers warrant considerable more attention in
future analyses of participation in and welfare effects of modern agri-food mar-
kets. Finally, we should remain prudent with respect to predictions of the long-
term sustainability of estimated income and asset returns attributable to par-
ticipation. Given the significant involvement of NGOs and the relatively early
stage of the supply relationships and the Nicaraguan supermarket sector, it re-
mains to be seen what the regional equilibrium effects will be for the agricultural
sector as more farmers enter non-traditional markets.
This introduction serves three purposes. First, we contextualize our research
within broader trends that suggest the beginnings of a fundamentally new ap-
proach to development strategy, an approach establishing firmer connections
between corporate and smallholder profit motives and a sustained reduction
of rural poverty in the developing world. Second, reviewing the recent liter-
ature on supermarket expansion and operations in the developing world we
argue that within emerging intellectual and political trends promoting market-
led development, supermarket relationships with smallholders suggest an op-
portunity for rich debate as well as a need for additional careful research by
agricultural and development economists. Our findings are summarized in the
final pages of this introduction.
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1.1 Background: Market-led agricultural development
Proponents of private-sector development initiatives argue that the rural poor
stand to profit from free, global markets, and that market mechanisms will get
incentives right, promoting investment and attacking the manifold causes of
poverty with efficiency and efficacy (Prahalad and Hart, 2004). Supporters also
cite the endemic nature of world poverty, the declining levels of official devel-
opment assistance (ODA) to agriculture and the sustained failure of many gov-
ernments to come to the aid of their own people: problems of chronic misman-
agement, political stalemate, or corruption (World Bank, 2004).
In addressing market failures faced by smallholder agricultural production,
increasing the involvement of the private sector would seem a strong option
for developing countries, which might thereby access expertise, resources, and
integrated management systems, all without taking on the risks and expense
of market research, development, and distribution as government functions.
Compounding this apparent advantage is the possibility of external funding.
Publicly financed international aid and philanthropy dedicated to agricultural
development is becoming more scarce. A 2005 IFAD discussion paper reports
that the percent of ODA has been declining – over the past two decades the real
value of aid to agriculture in the late 1990s had fallen to 35 percent of its late
1980s level (Audinet and Haralambous, 2005). In the early 1980s, lending for
investment in the agricultural sector comprised 30 percent of total World Bank
lending; by 2000 the share of lending to agriculture had decreased to 7.9 percent
(Audinet and Haralambous, 2005). At the same time, there has been widespread
consolidation in the retail and processing sectors of the global food system, and
a corresponding consolidation of capital and investment in research, marketing,
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and development.
Multinationals including DuPont, Monsanto, Pioneer Hi-bred International,
Nestle´, Wal-Mart, and Unilever, as well as a large number of domestic,
developing-world corporations, are increasing commercial activity with the
world’s smallholder producers, developing solutions to the multiple market
failures pervasive in small-scale agricultural production. Though private sec-
tor development represents an emerging trend in the worlds community of in-
fluential development groups, the effects that such collaboration might have
on smallholder production, prices, and market participation as yet unknown
and untested by proponents. Similarly, analyses from the corporate sector lack
transparency and are generally based on weak research methodology. Evidence
is largely anecdotal and claims of effects and successes unsubstantiated. More-
over, data on the participation in and effects of these initiatives are proprietary
and often difficult to access.
There is considerable diversity in the degree to which these early private-
sector development players are facilitating the economic terms of the market
interaction with poor producers. At one extreme, the projects resemble clas-
sic government development models, with agribusinesses offering improved
seeds, agrichemicals and fertilizers, agricultural extension, credit and market
access to participant farmers. Other projects affect considerable producer be-
havioral responses through market presence alone, as price margins orient local
incentives with regard to adoption of a particular technology or crop. Still oth-
ers establish relationships with intermediary nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) who aggregate production quantities and negotiate contracts and lo-
gistics. In Nicaragua, supermarkets that originally offered inputs provision to
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farmers have subsequently retreated from interlinked factor and product mar-
ket contracts in the face of farmer default and side-selling and the entry of NGOs
providing farmers with access to the requisite training and inputs.
What makes these seemingly disparate initiatives analytically similar is that
(1) their long term welfare outcomes depend in part on the dynamism and
volatility of the market and are therefore unknown and (2) they involve ques-
tions of market access and participation explicitly in an analysis of poverty
dynamics, introducing the possibility that farmers may be sorted, or are sort-
ing, for participation based on some set of heterogeneous wealth or production
characteristics. For example, if an inverse relationship between farm size and
productivity is a valid assumption (Bardhan, 1973), smallholders would be ex-
pected to have some productive advantage by virtue of the scale of their opera-
tions. But what are the implications of an emerging system of relationships with
large, concentrated buyers in which convenience, and scale assurances matter
in markets?
Profit maximization on the part of firms working in developing markets
suggests that contracts will be offered to those farmers most likely to succeed,
adding a new dimension to the analysis of welfare effects of technology and
market adoption. Economic analysis concerned exclusively with productivity
would be missing an important component, namely, the value that production
can generate in the marketplace through higher prices linked with quantity.
Producers who can afford investments in the inputs, labor or land required to
achieve higher production capacity would consequently secure higher prices.
One key idea here is that producers with higher levels of initial wealth would
now experience locally increasing returns in markets with endogenous prices as
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functions of farmer asset level, credit access, or scale of production.
Research questions evolving from such initiatives are intriguing, and they
require a departure from conventional thinking on agricultural production and
marketing in developing countries. With the right products and the right pay-
ment structure, will resource and liquidity constrained producers demand and
pay for those services long provided (at least in part) by governments, includ-
ing better market information, superior agricultural inputs, agricultural credit
and insurance, storage capacity, price stability, and irrigation technologies? Can
markets adequately serve the needs of producers and can the market mecha-
nism lead to the adoption of socially optimal production technologies?
Certainly, government and NGO agricultural development regimes have of-
ten favored selective criteria for program participation, with access accruing to
those who are better connected politically or well-positioned socially within a
community. But unleashing the private sector on the challenges of development
requires that we be especially careful and accurate with respect to identifying
populations of likely beneficiaries and also of losers in any given arrangement,
and possible social outcomes. If the private sector is to be explicitly woven
into poverty alleviation strategies, two coordinated questions are of relevance:
Which farmers will have access to these new market opportunities? How can
we understand the effects of these projects on market participation and poverty
reduction? My research in Nicaragua examines such questions in the context of
a new addition to farmers’ output market choice set: an unprecedented nation-
wide system of supermarkets.
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1.2 Supermarkets: Developing world trends
The significant recent growth of supermarket retail in Latin America, Africa,
and Southeast Asia (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002; Reardon et al., 2003; Weath-
erspoon and Reardon, 2003) has implications for the structure and prospects of
traditional agricultural markets and production. Academics and policy mak-
ers concerned with poverty in the developing world have watched the rapid
growth of modern food retail and sourcing with both excitement and trepi-
dation. Supermarket chain expansion implies the emergence and expansion
of new high-value agricultural output markets for the labor intensive crops in
whose production small farmers might compete competitively, but how will
they be included in this structural transformation?
We review briefly the literature about the growth of these supermarket sys-
tems, a literature that falls into three general classifications. A first, foundational
collection of papers establishes the growth of supermarkets across regions or
countries. A second set of papers investigates the effects of this emerging pres-
ence on the structure of particular agrifood sectors within countries. A third
round of studies surveys groups of participant and non-participant producers
to study the association of participation with measures of productivity and well-
being.
1.2.1 Macro trends in supermarket expansion
Thomas Reardon at Michigan State University has generated a considerable
body of research documenting the recent and strong growth of the food re-
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tail market share claimed by supermarkets in the developing world. Reardon’s
“rise of supermarkets” series of papers argues that over the past 10 -15 years
supermarkets in many developing countries have transitioned from once-niche
markets for the metropolitan rich to increasingly major players in domestic food
retail. This first wave of papers document a widespread trend: Africa (Reardon
et al., 2003); Latin America (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002); Central and Eastern
Europe (Swinnen and Maertens, 2007); China (Dinghuan et al., 2004). These
studies rely on detailed industry surveys and interviews with chains and buy-
ers conducted by the research teams for information about in-country growth
and operations and chain-specific policies.
Early studies described a striking pattern of overall growth with significant
regional variation in the depth and rate of growth trends. For example, su-
permarkets have emerged in Latin America from a negligible presence in the
early 1990s to claim a 50-60% share of the total Latin American food retail
market,1 a market transition that took nearly five times as long in the United
States (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002) In Southeast Asia, supermarkets emerged
as a market presence between five and seven years later than in Latin America
but their growth over the past ten years in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Chinese urban areas and South Korea has been much faster (Rear-
don and Timmer, 2007). Widespread supermarket penetration of food retail is
not ubiquitous in the developing world, however, in many countries, particu-
larly in sub-Saharan Africa, supermarket’s share of food retail remains minimal
(Humphrey, 2007; Muendo and Tschirley, 2004).
The country-level supermarkets diffusion literature argues that the rapid
1The supermarket share of the fresh fruit and vegetable market often grows more slowly
than the share of the total food retail market but the gap closes as the overall share grows.
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spread of supermarkets is likely to increase with the growth of domestic
demand-side drivers: rising incomes and urbanization, increased opportunity
cost of time (particularly of women), and reduction in consumer transactions
costs through improved transportation networks. A major supply-side factor
has been an increased openness among developing world governments to for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in retail (Reardon and Timmer, 2007).
A second wave of research documents the structural transformations at a
regional level, investigating the effects of the “rise of supermarkets” on within-
country production sectors, documenting the factors that distinguish supermar-
ket procurement networks from traditional markets. This research describes the
evolution of procurement networks and value chains: dairy in Poland (Dries
and Swinnen, 2004), the horticulture system in Kenya (Neven and Reardon,
2008) and Central America (Berdegue´ et al., 2005; Jano and Mainville, 2006). As
in the macro diffusion studies, researchers concerned with the structural impli-
cations of regional diffusion rely on case study evidence: industry interviews
occasionally bolstered with farmer group discussions or surveys.
The regional diffusion literature describes fundamental differences in or-
ganization, supporting institutions, and coordination between traditional and
supermarket-driven channels, suggesting that differences in channel prices,
schedules of payment, credit access, standards, monitoring, technology de-
mands and extension services may be important determinants of participation,
as well as determinants of welfare effects.
The national and regional literature describes significant differences distin-
guishing the operations of supermarket channels from traditional spot markets.
Supermarket chains maintain product grades and standards through stream-
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lined and integrated rural buying operations. These procurement systems elim-
inate intermediate transactions and require supplier conformity with stricter
product quality or process standards, a minimum scale of transaction, or some
combination of these. Supermarket buyers generally partner with a specialized
wholesaler or contract directly with farmers.
In contrast, the traditional spot market system generally involves many frac-
tured operations and duplications of effort: a rural middleman/trader pur-
chases products from farmers and sells to a wholesaler who then sells through a
regional wet market or directly to a retailer. Traditional systems are often infor-
mal, non-contracted, and characterized by direct sale with payment at the time
of transaction. Products sourced through the traditional chain and sold in small
shops, central markets and wet-markets tend to be commodities with minimal
differentiation. Producers rarely know the final destination of their crop nor
do final buyers know the source of the product and there is little coordination
between final consumer and grower.2
Structural market transformation initiated by supermarkets reveals one
overriding motive: supermarkets want farm products of a particular quality
and adequate volume, produced by specific agricultural practices; they also
prefer transactions conforming to a pre-determined scale and schedule. In con-
trast to the traditional spot-marketing channel, supermarkets supply produc-
tion guidelines; to ensure quality, they may also monitor production and post-
harvest handling techniques. Participation in a modern marketing channel and
access to its relatively more remunerative opportunities, therefore, can repre-
sent some investment in time or capital resources on the part of producers in
2Transport and search costs as well as risk and information flows along the channel will vary
depending on the product sourced and the region and extent of operations.
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order to meet product quality and transaction requirements. The third broad
category of the recent supermarkets literature has examined these investment
pressures and opportunities at the level of the participant household.
1.2.2 Micro-level studies
The final, empirical microeconomic class of supermarket studies have exam-
ined the effects of supermarket-driven agrifood market transformations. This
group of papers examines the behavior, welfare, and operations of smallholder
producers adopting and operating in supermarket supply chains. These re-
searchers have been concerned with two primary research questions: establish-
ing household determinants of participation and estimating the welfare effects
of participation.
Given that understanding the determinants of participation is arguably at
least as interesting as estimating the welfare effects of inclusion, few studies
have given sufficient careful attention to the question of participation; generally,
selection into a supermarket procurement channel is estimated as the requisite
first stage in an estimate of welfare or technology effects. A probit model is
used on the sample of suppliers and comparison non-supplier group to deter-
mine factors influencing participation. These participation estimates generally
rely on proxies for explanatory variables drawn from technology adoption mod-
els. For example, Neven et al. (2009) include lagged land ownership and farm
size to capture risk-sensitivity, education to capture access to financial capital
and human capital, and lagged presence of an irrigation system as a proxy for
physical capital. Hernandez et al. (2007), Balsevich et al. (2005), and Dries and
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Swinnen (2004) use similar variable sets: the grower’s age, the grower’s years
of education, family size, a dummy indicating whether the grower is equipped
with transportation, distance in kilometers from the farm to the nearest paved
highway, lagged dummies indicating membership in a growers association and
irrigation, and lagged variables for farm size, and livestock holdings.
This research suggests that small farmers are included in supermarket sup-
ply chains, but inclusion is confined to those who are already well-capitalized,
those with irrigation and access through established producer associations act-
ing as distribution networks. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) find that the prob-
ability of participation in contract farming in Senegal is higher for households
with more land and labor. Hernandez et al. (2007) find irrigation is a key de-
terminant of participation for tomato growers in Guatemala; Neven et al. (2009)
find that the likelihood of a farm participating in the supermarket channel in
Kenya is higher for larger farms and for those with drip or overhead irrigation.
Balsevich et al. (2005) find that this likelihood of participation in supermarket
tomato procurement channels in Nicaragua increases for producers that are in-
volved with a producers’ association but decreases with off-farm income and
grower’s age.
In existing studies, there are at least two potential problems with the treat-
ment of small farmer participation in supermarket supply chains. First of all,
there has been no analysis as yet of the determinants of participation at the
country level, that is, how supply chains and procurement basins are geograph-
ically situated within a country or region. Nor has there been research into
how geographic characteristics such as community access to infrastructure and
water interact with a household’s own assets and endowments to influence par-
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ticipation. In particular, availability of adequate water to promote year-round
cultivation of horticulture is likely to jointly determine participation and out-
comes and it is critical to understand such a determining factor, both in order
to control for it in welfare estimations and to be able to identify what areas are
and are not likely candidates for future inclusion into supermarket procurement
basins.
A second gap in the literature has to do with the duration of these supply
relationships and also with their termination. To our knowledge, no research
has yet examined whether the tenure of a farmer’s supply relationship influ-
ences welfare outcomes. Nor has any work yet looked at the experience of dis-
continued suppliers, those that leave the supply chain. Understanding welfare
outcomes conditional on duration of the relationship, however, provides insight
into the way that supply contracts with supermarkets evolve and the way that
effects can be expected to endure should the marketing relationship end.
For example, the probit estimations of participation determinants cited
above use a binary participation variable, so producers either sell into a super-
market procurement channel or they don’t. Modeling the participation as a 0/1
variable is akin to modeling technology adoption as a dichotomous decision.
The interesting question, however, from either a development or a microeco-
nomic perspective is not merely who joins a particular marketing channel, but
how long they participate and whether they exit. Why do participants join and
then drop out? Is the threshold for participation the same as the threshold for
exit? Is adoption “reversible”?
Market exit is a potentially important source of information about market
adoption and several case studies suggest that channel disadoption is preva-
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lent. In their comparative study of supply chains for supermarkets in Bangkok
and Nanjing, Ruben, Boselie, and Lu (2007) find that the retailer TOPS in Thai-
land began with 250 producers in 1998 but had scaled back to 60 growers by
2002. Similarly, a case study of the Brazillian supermarket sector found that
61,000 small dairy farmers were dropped as suppliers by supermarkets between
1996 and 2000 and a study of a Guatemalan tomato grower’s association found
that the 330 participant producers in 2000 had shrunk to 30 by 2001 (Jano and
Mainville, 2006).3 If we are interested in the dynamic, long-term effects of par-
ticipation we must also be concerned with these patterns of participation, the
constant supply chain entry and exit of farmers.
Regarding the welfare effects of supermarket supply relationships with
small farmers, research has found that technology-channel correlates suggest
capital-intensive technologies associated with the supermarket channel are as-
sociated with both higher revenues and higher costs. Hernandez et al. (2007)
find roughly equivalent profit rates across Guatemalan tomato farmers who
supply supermarkets and those who do not; participants are found to have
higher yields but report considerable overuse of pesticides and fungicides and
higher expenditures on chemicals. Balsevich et al. (2005) find that suppliers
have profits per unit of land nearly 50 percent higher than traditional markets
but that participant production costs (per unit of land) are 38 percent higher
than for non-participants. Neven et al. (2009) estimate comparable cost per
unit of output and overall productivity across the channels; supermarket chan-
nel participants in their Kenyan sample have between 60 and 70 percent higher
average land and labor productivity, 40 percent higher gross profit margins and
3The ASUMPAL producers transitioned in 2000 from producing for the wholesale market to
contracting with McDonalds of Guatemala. The contract specified quality standards, delivery
timing, packaging, and quantity, requiring large producer investments including drip irrigation,
greenhouses, delivery trucks, packing sheds.
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rapid growth – an on average doubling in their scale of operations between 2000
and 2005.
Results from several studies raise the possibility that longer or more frequent
production cycles are associated with supermarket participation. Balsevich et al.
(2005) find that growers accessing supermarkets plant an average of 0.6 more
cycles in a year than traditional growers. Neven et al. (2009) find that supermar-
ket purchase agreements for suppliers with long-term supply agreements are
often year round, and they suggest that the essential participation limitation of
traditional rainfed producers is their inability to produce year round. Minten et
al. (2009) find that higher welfare for Malagasy participants due to the shorter
lean periods is associated with more supermarket contracts, but that participant
producers also report shorter lean periods than non-participants before partici-
pation.
With regard to this literature, one additional dimension requiring develop-
ment is the mechanism through which supply relationships transform welfare.
Analysis of the effects on productivity cited are an excellent foundation for this
analysis, but the existing research makes a number of critical and untested as-
sumptions about the ways in which the remunerative potential of supermarket
supply chains compare with traditional marketing channels. For example, no
paper has addressed whether the terms of exchange for small farmers – both
level and variance – are better or worse with modern versus traditional retail.
Moreover, the analysis has been confined to study of the average payoff, with
little attention to variability in payoff. A number of works have posited that su-
permarkets reduce output price variability but have lacked data to test whether
variability is reduced and by how much.
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Extrapolation of the supermarkets research to address broader questions
of development economics and policy depends on understanding the specific
pathways through which supermarket supply relationships affect participant
welfare. The analysis of technologies by channel choice (Balsevich et al., 2005;
Herna´ndez et al., 2007) explores one possible mechanism, but other plausible
candidate mechanisms that we explore include: increases in prices in the su-
permarket supply chain, increased market price stability permitting increased
investment in production and increased quantities, increases in productivity,
and increased credit access.
1.3 Dissertation summary and outline
This research provides a contribution to a nascent field within agriculture and
development economics: the study of market participation patterns. Public
policies, founded on accurate information and solid theory, could assure that
new market forces will benefit at least a portion of the smallholders in develop-
ing countries. In the evolution of any such policy, one major question is which
smallholders might be capable of acting as entrepreneurs, profiting from new
private institutions of production and marketing.
The Green Revolution increased producer output per hectare, fertilizer-
responsive, high-yielding varieties shifted the major source of growth from in-
creases in crop area to increases in production per hectare. The next agricultural
revolution may come through innovations in markets, shifting the major source
of growth in farm income from increases in production per hectare to increases
in value of production per hectare. As in the early years of the Green Revolu-
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tion, there are many concerns about the welfare effects of these market trends for
small farmers but little clear evidence as to what these effects will be. This dis-
sertation provides crucial evidence at the critical early stages of development.
This dissertation makes four primary contributions to the nascent literature
on supermarkets and smallholders in the developing world. First,our research
in Nicaragua is the first to establish that the supply contract functions as a form
of insurance against traditional spot market horticulture output price volatil-
ity. Chapter 2 uses unique data on negotiated prices collected from Nicaraguan
farm cooperatives supplying supermarkets to study the effect of supermarket
supply agreements on producers’ mean output prices and price stability. We
find that prices paid by Nicaragua’s domestic supermarket chain approximate
the traditional market in mean and variance. In contrast, we find that mean
prices paid by Wal-Mart are significantly lower than the traditional market but
that Wal-Mart systematically reduces price volatility compared with the tradi-
tional market. We find some evidence, however, that farmers may be paying
too much for this contractual insurance against price variation.
Chapter 3 demonstrates for the first time the geographic determinants of
supply chain placement. We show that geographic and natural resource endow-
ments are significant predictors of community inclusion in a supermarket pro-
curement basin. Our research suggests that, with respect to welfare effects es-
timations attributing income or asset changes to participation in supply chains,
the placement effect of supply chains may be at least as important as the selec-
tion effect at the household level. Our findings reinforce that smallholder access
to new market opportunities may be limited not just by pre-supermarket asset
positions or liquidity, but by access to water, infrastructure, markets, and nat-
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ural resource endowments. Conditioning on supply chain placement, we esti-
mate the welfare effects of supply relationships on participant and exiting farm-
ers. We use instrumental variables analysis to control for the farmer selection ef-
fect and also to estimate the effect of supplier arrangements with supermarkets
on a set of welfare variables including household per capita incomes, irrigation,
and productive assets. Our approach is the first to instrument for three dimen-
sions of participation in supermarket supply chains: current supplier status,
tenure of farmer participation in the supply chain, and discontinued supply re-
lationships. We find positive statistically and economically significant effects on
participant farmer incomes, productive assets, and irrigation. We find evidence
of a growth effect, larger effects on incomes and productive assets accruing to
farmers with longer tenure supply relationships. Our evidence suggests that
these income and productive asset increases are retained by farmers who exit
the supply chain. In addition, we find a significant positive level effect on ir-
rigation investment for current suppliers and a corresponding negative effect
on the irrigation investment of exited farmers. We use household survey data
to investigate three candidate mechanisms that might drive positive effects on
household income, irrigation, and productive assets: the supermarket supply
agreement loosens the liquidity constraint; the supermarket supply agreement
increases agricultural productivity; or the relationship spurs farmer investment.
We find evidence that the supply contract is associated with increased farmer
access to credit. This credit, combined with the price insurance of the contract,
permits and promotes increased farmer investment in horticulture.
Accumulating evidence suggests that farmers learn from one other in the
adoption of agricultural technologies (Conley and Udry, 2010; Foster and
Rosenzweig, 1995; Maertens, 2009; Moser and Barrett, 2006; Munshi, 2004). The
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final chapter of this dissertation examines whether similar social learning dy-
namics apply to the case of market participation. Chapter 4 analyzes the de-
terminants and dynamics of farmer exit from the supermarket supply chain.
We use a simple lifecycle model to explain supermarket supply chain participa-
tion and exit patterns and we hypothesize that farmers learn about the relative
profitability of a new marketing channel from their neighbors’ experience in the
supply chain and from neighbors’ exit. Our model therefore incorporates own
experience, own exit, neighbors’ experience, and neighbors’ exit from super-
market supply chains into a conditional logit model to test whether farmers’ ob-
servation of these variables influence a his decision to participate in subsequent
periods and to estimate whether some farmers pay a price for experimentation
with the new market opportunity.
Results from a fixed effects conditional logit model estimating the likelihood
of participation in supermarket supply chains among Nicaraguan farmers sug-
gest that neighbors’ exits from the supermarket supply are significant negative
influences on a farmer’s own decision to participate in the new market while
observation of neighbors’ accumulating experience in the supply chain is a sig-
nificant positive determinant of farmer’s participation. However, observing a
neighbor’s exit is a significantly more powerful signal than observing another
year of neighbor experience. Observing a neighbor’s exit is significantly more
influential for farmers who are already supplying the supermarket compared
than for farmers that have not yet entered the supply chain.
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CHAPTER 2
TRADE-OFFS FOR SMALLHOLDERS SUPPLYING SUPERMARKETS:
PRICE MEAN AND VOLATILITY
2.1 Introduction
Supply relationships between supermarket chains and small farmers in the de-
veloping world represent a key intersection of current critical dimensions of eco-
nomic theory and policy: participation of the rural poor in regional and global
markets; possibilities for rural entrepreneurship in developing world contexts;
and contract negotiation between small, constrained growers and large, well-
capitalized buyers to resolve idiosyncratic market failures.
This paper uses data from Nicaraguan supermarket contracts to analyze
market relationships emerging between farmers and supermarkets. The con-
tracts we examine are negotiated by three Nicaraguan farmer-cooperatives and
vary both over supermarket chains and over time. Using these data we can es-
tablish for the first time how supply agreements affect farmers’ output price dis-
tributions compared with the traditional market and how contract terms change
over time. The resulting analysis offers a new perspective on potential payoffs
to participation in supermarket supply chains for farmers.
Research has focused both on understanding whether and why supermar-
kets source from small farmers and on establishing welfare effects of supply
relationships on small farmers. Considerable research has anticipated (Bar-
rett and Reardon, 2000; Blandon et al., 2009; Gibbon, 2003; Key and Runsten,
1999; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002) and identified (Boselie et al., 2003; Dolan and
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Humphrey, 2000; Reardon et al., 2003) the exclusion of small farmers from super-
market supply chains. Other findings suggest that small farmers are included
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009) or find that inclusion is confined to those small
farmers who are relatively well-capitalized with non-land capital such as irriga-
tion (Herna´ndez et al., 2007), or who gain access through established producer
associations (Balsevich et al., 2005).
Most of the research analyzing participation in supermarket supply chains
also considers the welfare effects of that participation. There has been less rig-
orous analysis as yet of the way that supermarket supply relationships affect
participants’ mean output prices and price stability. Typically, the approach has
been to compare average returns per kilogram, perhaps controlling for quality,
between farmers supplying to supermarkets and those not. The extant liter-
ature does not empirically test for increased farmer mean profit or decreased
marketing risk under contractual relationship with a supermarket. For exam-
ple, in their study of supermarket suppliers in Senegal, Maertens et al (2008)
write “small farmers...reduced production and marketing risks” (p.5). Similar
assumptions can be found in Swinnen (2007), Boselie et al (2003), Kirsten and
Sartorius (2002), Neven and Reardon (2008), and Swinnen and Maertens (2007).
Two important gaps thus exist in the literature. First, no paper has addressed
whether the terms of exchange for small farmers – both level and variance – are
better or worse with modern versus traditional retail. Second, while there has
been measurement of the average payoff over channels using farm data, the ro-
bustness of these findings has not been validated over time, over contract types,
or chains. Moreover, the analysis has been confined to study of the average
payoff, with little attention to variability in payoff. A number of works have
22
posited that supermarkets reduce output price variability but have lacked data
to test whether variability is reduced and by how much.
Building on the insights of existing research, we use historical prices negoti-
ated between supermarkets and farmers to analyze for the first time the average
payoff and payoff variability of supermarket channels compared with the tra-
ditional market. We find that prices in La Colonia, the domestic chain, approx-
imate the traditional market in mean and variance. In contrast, we find that
mean prices paid to suppliers of Wal-mart supermarkets are significantly lower
than the traditional market. Instead, we find that Wal-Mart supply agreements
represent significant reductions in price risk to farmers over the traditional mar-
ket. Deriving farmers’ implied relative risk aversion from these contracts, we
find some evidence that farmers may be paying too much for this implicit insur-
ance against price variation. Our findings, which support the extant hypothesis
in the literature that supermarkets decrease output price variability, add new
evidence to the current debate regarding supermarkets in the developing world
as agents of change and economic stimulus.
This study uses data collected from two primary sources. First, we gathered
from three farmer cooperatives detailed records of the historical prices negoti-
ated with supermarkets. Figure 2.1 presents the sequence and coverage of the
price data from cooperatives. Several of the supply relationships are ongoing;
arrows in the figure indicate supply relationships that continue past the period
of data coverage. Second, we use historical (January 2001–June 2008) traditional
market weekly price data from the Nicaraguan government Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Forestry (MAGFOR) office.
Because our analysis compares crop prices across marketing channels, we
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have given careful consideration to possible quality differences between mar-
kets. Based on interviews with supermarket buyers and traditional market
wholesalers as well as considerable time spent observing transactions in whole-
sale markets and supermarkets, we have found that supermarkets in Nicaragua
purchase the premium share of a farmers’ production for the horticultural crops
studied here. Our results indicate that the mean supermarket purchase share of
farmers’ total production is close to 70 percent. The 70 percent supermarkets
purchase is carefully culled: for example, Wal-Mart follows a tightly-guarded
manual of product-specific quality standards, codifying required attributes such
as variety, size, coloration, cleanliness, damage, and weight. La Colonia follows
a similar quality selection process. In contrast, traditional market wholesalers
purchase nearly 100 percent of a seller’s production, buying all size grades, dis-
carding only damaged or extremely small vegetables or fruits.
Because supermarkets purchase less than 100 percent of the farmers’ produc-
tion and because that share is carefully edited to meet chain-specific standards,
our analysis assumes that mean product quality in the supermarket channel is
at least as high as the traditional channel. Because we compare a product in the
supermarket chain with quality at least as high as the traditional market, our
finding that mean prices in the supermarket chain are not significantly higher
than in the traditional market is made even stronger.
The next section provides context: critical features of the Nicaraguan tradi-
tional and modern horticulture markets, the population of horticulture produc-
ers, and the operations of the two primary supermarket chains operating in the
country. The third section analyzes the mean and variance in output price, com-
paring supply agreements between farmers and supermarkets in Nicaragua to
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Figure 2.1: Schematic of time periods of farmer cooperative supply rela-
tionships covered by our data.
the traditional wholesale market. A fourth section derives coefficients of farmer
relative risk aversion to evaluate the mean/variance trade-off for a producers’
cooperative in the Wal-Mart supply chain. The final section concludes.
2.2 Fresh fruit and vegetable production in Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s population of horticulture producers constitutes a tiny share of
total farmers. According to the country’s 2001 agricultural census, while 76
percent of landholding farmers grew basic grains including maize, beans, and
sorghum, only 2.14 percent cultivated tomatoes, 1.23 percent green peppers,
and 0.25 percent cabbage (MAGFOR, 2001).
Statistics on irrigation suggest the existence of dual production structures in
Nicaragua’s tiny horticulture sector; approximately one-third of 2001 horticul-
turalists were equipped with production and price risk-mitigating irrigation.
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Moreover, the population of irrigated horticulturists in the 2001 agricultural
census was split between large growers (19.6 percent) and small and medium
growers with less than seven hectares (17.2 percent).
This production dualism defined by irrigation is critical to producers’ expe-
rience in seasonally volatile horticulture output markets. Rainfed Nicaraguan
horticulture farmers generally produce one or two seasons of crops each year
and sell their harvest in a regional spot market or to a buyer at the farmgate.
Nicaraguan small farmers without irrigation describe a volatile boom-bust cy-
cle of fresh fruit and vegetable farming driven primarily by output swings in
the market. The farmer without irrigation, cold storage, or means to move per-
ishable product quickly to another zone must sell when there is a local glut and
suffer the price drop. Thus, farmers without irrigation are likely to be more con-
cerned about price variability than those with irrigation who can sell in times of
high prices and benefit from price variation.
Dualism in the Nicaraguan horticulture production sector therefore suggests
a potential tension in supermarket contract adoption. While the supermarket
is likely to prefer irrigated farmers who can offer the retailer steady supply
streams throughout the year, those with irrigation and capacity have less in-
centive to adopt the contract given that they are already playing the market,
riding out the ups and down of the output price. Conversely, rainfed horticul-
ture farmers struggling to manage high price volatility will have more incentive
to adopt the supply contract but are likely to be hindered by a lack of productive
capacity.
A third-party program funded by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) has emerged in Nicaragua to equip small farmers with
26
the liquidity and irrigation systems to permit an intensive farming schedule and
to begin to resolve this contracting asymmetry. In June, 2006 USAID contracted
with four multinational NGOs to begin working with farmers on a three-year,
$20 million project (USAID and Nicaragua, 2006) designed to meet the needs of
supplying supermarkets in Nicaragua.
These intermediary NGO programs seem to have obviated supermarkets’
distinction between farmers with irrigation and without. We observe that farm-
ers adopting supply contracts in this analysis are largely those likely to value
the price stability associated with the contract and the capacity building facili-
tated by the NGO: small farmers without irrigation before the program. The 54
suppliers who are members of the three cooperatives included in this analysis
are overwhelmingly drawn from the rainfed horticulture sector. Table 2.1 dis-
aggregates supplier farmers according to their 2001 landholdings and irrigation
in the year before supply chain entry; mostly small farmers (77.8 percent) and
mostly without irrigation (88.9 percent).
Table 2.1: Supply cooperative farmers’ landholdings and irrigation in the
year before joining the supermarket supply chain.
Without irrigation With irrigation Total
Small farmer (0-3.5 hectares) 36 5 41
Medium farmer (3.5-7) 4 0 4
Large farmer (> 7 hectares) 5 4 9
Total 45 9 54
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2.2.1 Supermarkets in Nicaragua
Two companies dominate Nicaragua’s supermarket retail: La Colonia is a 10-
store (2008) family-owned national chain that has operated in Nicaragua since
the late 1960s; and Wal-Mart Central America, which acquired a controlling
stake in Corporacion de Supermercados Unidos’ (CSU) 380 Central American
retail outlets in April 2006. As of May 2009, Wal-Mart had expanded CSU’s 33
retail stores in Nicaragua to 52 Nicaraguan outlets.
Wal-mart’s two Nicaraguan chains are Palı´, a group of discount grocery
stores positioned to compete directly with traditional markets and La Union,
an upscale chain catering to wealthier consumers in Managua and Leo´n. Be-
fore 2002, the number of supermarkets had remained steady for many years
with the majority of stores confined to Managua, the country’s political and
economic capital. Figure 2.2 graphs the number of supermarket retail outlets in
Nicaragua, increasing steadily since 2000. The number of retail outlets outside
of Managua has recently exceeded the number of stores in the capital.
In Nicaragua, supermarkets’ sourcing strategies are increasingly reliant on
small farmers. Since 1998, Nicaragua’s supermarkets have shifted their pro-
curement networks away from a dependence on imports and traditional market
wholesalers. Figure 2.3 graphs the yearly population of small farmers supply-
ing La Colonia and Wal-mart since 2000.
The two retail groups have developed distinct procurement strategies. La
Colonia relies heavily on a network of traditional wholesalers as well as ap-
proximately 50 preferred small farmers working alone or in one of two producer
cooperatives. Because La Colonia has no warehouse, the company holds min-
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Figure 2.2: Annual quantity of supermarket retail outlets in Nicaragua,
2000–2009.
imal inventory between purchases and suppliers daily transport fresh produce
to the chain’s headquarters in Managua.
Wal-Mart has taken a different approach to developing a domestic supply
chain in Nicaragua, using buyers to source products in rural areas rather than
relying on farmers to manage transport. Wal-Mart’s procurement division picks
up production from supplier farmers in the farmers’ field or community. As
Wal-Mart has extended procurement and retail into more remote regions, the
company has kept transport costs down by using supply trucks to backhaul
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Figure 2.3: Annual population of supermarket suppliers and exits in
Nicaragua, 2000-2008.
agricultural production to the central warehouses.
2.3 Small farmer outcomes: Price mean and volatility
Taking the contract choice as given, in this section we use data from traditional
markets and producer cooperatives to study how supply agreements between
small farmers and supermarkets affect mean price and price stability.
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Units of analysis: per kilogram prices at farmgate
Our analysis uses per kilogram farmgate prices to compare the traditional
and supermarket channels. Transaction sites vary by supply chain, so we equal-
ize prices at the farmgate by subtracting transport costs to comparison markets.
We describe briefly how the farmgate price series are constructed.
Because Wal-Mart picks up products sourced from farmers in farmer com-
munities well outside the capital city, we equalize transport costs between the
Wal-Mart farmgate prices and the Managua-sited transactions of La Colonia
and the traditional wholesale market. We subtract cooperative-specific trans-
port costs from the La Colonia and Managua traditional market prices.1 Once
we equalize transport costs, we can compare farmgate prices between our three
price series: traditional (Managua), Wal-Mart (farmgate), and La Colonia (Man-
agua).
Unless otherwise noted, prices are compared between supermarket and tra-
ditional market channels over equivalent time periods. That is, if a contract re-
lationship between a supermarket and a cooperative lasted between April 2005
and November 2006, the comparison traditional market price series is consid-
ered for the same period. Also unless otherwise specified, all prices in the paper
have been adjusted to July 1999 Cordobas. One January 2008 US$= 14.53 July
1999 Cordobas ($C). Computed farmgate prices are gross per kilo; we do not
1We have good comprehensive estimates for transportation costs that include the per mile
cost of the truck, gasoline, and driver generated using the Se´baco cooperative’s round-trip cost
for the trip between Managua and Se´baco (50 miles oneway) and the truck’s capacity. The
Se´baco cooperative rents the truck from a member of the cooperative and pays the cost of the
gasoline and the driver. All three cooperatives are located on a good road network, at varying
distances from Managua. We applied the per-pound/per-mile transport cost to each coopera-
tive’s mileage from Managua to generate cooperative-specific transport costs. The cooperatives
are at varying distances from Managua: Tomatoya is 70 miles away, Ocotal is 103 miles distant.
Roads between cooperatives and Managua are of consistent and decent quality.
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subtract production costs of the farm.
Non-transport related transactions costs
We have observed that farmers selling to supermarkets generally incur the
standard transactions costs of the traditional market in addition to the costs of
sorting, grading, cleaning, and packing production to meet supermarkets’ spe-
cific quality criteria. We therefore assume that non-transport related transac-
tions costs are at least as high in the supermarket channel as in the traditional
wholesale market. Significant qualitative and survey evidence motivates our
assumption. To begin with, both La Colonia and Wal-Mart demand signifi-
cant cleaning, selecting, and sorting of the product to meet stipulated quality
standards. These costs are not incurred in the traditional channel. Moreover,
as discussed in the introduction, while farmers can sell all of their production
in traditional markets with minimal loss due to quality grading, our data in-
dicate that farmers supplying supermarkets sell approximately 70 percent of
their production.2 Because the supermarket does not purchase all of a farmers’
production, farmers and cooperatives are generally in multiple markets, selling
product rejected by the supermarket to a broker at farmgate or to a wholesaler in
a local or regional market. This means that participant farmers generally incur
the transactions costs of two markets instead of one.
2This rate includes product rejection quantities; both La Colonia and Wal-Mart reject pro-
duce that does not meet specifications and supplier farmers in our household survey reported
per transaction crop rejection rates between 0 and 80 percent with an average per transaction
rejection percent over the 2000-2008 period of 5.8 percent.
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2.3.1 Supermarkets do not increase mean prices
Because supermarkets purchase a premium share of the farmers’ production
and require post-harvest processing beyond the demands of the traditional mar-
ket, we expect farmers selling to supermarkets to receive higher mean output
prices for their production. We can test whether mean per kilo prices in the
supermarket channel are significantly higher than in the traditional market by
matching data collected from cooperatives with traditional market prices over
corresponding periods. Because the two retail chains’ distinct procurement
strategies have important implications for the analysis, we evaluate the chains’
contract prices in turn.
Wal-Mart
The timing of the contract observations is valuable to understanding the se-
quence of Wal-Mart supply agreements. We observe two epochs of Wal-Mart
supplier relations: the Se´baco cooperative is an example of first-generation Wal-
Mart supply agreements and Ocotal a second-generation contract. The Se´baco
cooperative sold to Wal-Mart between April 2005 and November 2006 but left
the Wal-Mart relationship to supply La Colonia, providing us with an observa-
tion of a cooperative that operated in both supermarket channels and demon-
strated a preference for La Colonia over Wal-Mart. The Ocotal cooperative con-
tracted with Wal-Mart as the Se´baco cooperative left the supermarket in mid-
2006.
In the top half of Table 2.2 we compare mean per kilo farmgate prices be-
tween Wal-Mart and the traditional market using a standard t-test to test for
equivalence in means between the traditional market and supermarket farm-
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gate price distributions.
We find that, for both first and second-generation contracts, mean per kilo
prices for both salad and roma tomatoes are significantly lower selling to Wal-
Mart than the traditional channel for both cooperatives. The gap in mean prices
across the channels is striking and economically significant; the difference be-
tween Wal-Mart and the traditional market price (as a percent of the Wal-Mart
price) is between 34 and 54 percent.
Note that farmgate prices in Table 2.2 were negotiated and reported by co-
operatives assisted and at least partially financed by NGOs. These cooperatives
sell in bulk quantities via one group transaction to the supermarkets, reduc-
ing buyer coordination, quality assessment, and transport costs. Because of the
convenience, quality, and bulk quantity attributes they offer the supermarkets,
these suppliers are positioned to negotiate relatively a high price with super-
markets. Yet here we find the opposite.
La Colonia
In the bottom half of Table 2.2 we compare the La Colonia price series against
their traditional market counterparts for the Se´baco and Tomatoya cooperatives.
We find that La Colonia’s mean farmgate prices compare somewhat more fa-
vorably to the traditional market than Wal-Mart. La Colonia represents a mix of
both higher and lower mean farmgate prices than the traditional market. Over
the specified time periods3 we find: La Colonia’s mean lettuce farmgate prices
3If we test farmgate prices received by cooperatives from supermarkets against farmgate
prices in traditional markets for all dates between 2000-2007, and not merely for restricted dates
over which the cooperatives sold to supermarkets, our results do not change significantly. Using
the full series, we reject the hypothesis that traditional and supermarket means are equal for
green peppers (traditional market significantly higher for the full series) and salad tomatoes (La
Colonia significantly higher). All other results are consistent whether we use the full or reduced
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are significantly lower than traditional market sales; La Colonia’s mean salad
tomato and cabbage prices are significantly higher than the traditional market
channel; and we fail to reject the hypothesis of the equivalence of mean farm-
gate prices between the La Colonia channel and the traditional market for per
kilo roma tomato and small green peppers.
Table 2.2: Mean farmgate prices in Wal-Mart, La Colonia and the tradi-
tional market (2005-2007).
heightCrop Dates (mm/yy) ($C/kilo) ($C/kilo) p-value
Wal-Mart Traditional Wal-Mart
Se´baco co-op
Roma tomatoes 04/05-11/06 5.23 3.40 < 10−4
Salad tomatoes 04/05-11/06 6.68 4.41 < 10−4
Ocotal co-op
Roma tomatoes 06/06-05/08 6.33 4.24 < 10−4
Salad tomatoes 06/06-05/08 7.94 5.92 < 10−4
La Colonia Traditional La Colonia
Se´baco co-op
Roma tomatoes 04/06-12/07 6.40 6.30 p = 0.77
Salad tomatoes 04/06-12/07 7.88 9.99 < 10−4
Tomatoya co-op
Small green peppers 06/06-10/07 7.51 6.71 p = 0.09
Cabbage 06/06-10/07 1.57 2.60 < 10−4
Lettuce 06/06-10/07 5.57 4.85 < 10−4
Results in Table 2.2 demonstrate two general results. First, prices in the su-
series for the traditional market.
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permarket supply channel are not always significantly higher than the tradi-
tional market. Second, La Colonia offers a mean price that is a much closer
approximation to the traditional market while Wal-Mart compares relatively
poorly with the traditional market, paying suppliers significantly below parity.
These results are even more surprising given that prices in Table 2.2 are gross
of post-harvest production costs specific to the supermarket chain including
cleaning, selection, and packing. For example, Se´baco cooperative farmers who
sell to La Colonia contribute three percent of their sales proceeds for admin-
istrative services and weekly pay a team of ten women who select and clean
produce $C 100 apiece (2008 Cordobas). So the net supermarket farmgate price
is even lower than reported above. Again, because of the post-harvest process-
ing and selection costs incurred by the farmer cooperative we would expect a
significantly higher mean price. Yet this is not what we find.
Our analysis of supermarkets’ relative mean price raises two interesting
questions. Why might farmers accept a low price for a quality product if a
higher traditional market price was available? And why are mean farmgate
prices with Wal-Mart systematically lower than the traditional market relative
to La Colonia?
One explanation for the differences between the chains in Table 2.2 is the
difference in procurement structures distinguishing the Wal-Mart supply net-
work from the La Colonia system: Wal-Mart sends its trucks to the farmers’
community to source production while La Colonia suppliers make the trip to
the supermarket’s Managua headquarters themselves. Wal-Mart, therefore, can
exploit the existence of regional spatial market segmentation in horticulture by
assuming the transportation costs and logistical risks of sourcing the crop in the
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field.
Evidence that field brokers at farmgate pay a price below the extant whole-
sale market price less transport costs would suggest the presence of market seg-
mentation; an opportunity for Wal-Mart’s procurement and contracting. Table
2.3, which compares per kilo mean prices farmers reported receiving at farmgate
from traditional wholesalers, presents evidence to this effect. Surveyed farmers
were asked maximum, minimum, and most common (modal) price observed
for their most remunerative crop. A triangle distribution was used to infer the
mean of the regional farmgate wholesale price paid by field brokers. For com-
parison, we include corresponding Wal-Mart, La Colonia, and Managua mean
per kilo farmgate prices.
Table 2.3: Farmgate broker, Managua, La Colonia (LC), and Wal-Mart
(WM) price means (2005-2007).
Farmgate* mean Managua LC WM
Crop ($C)/kilo) n min max mode (est.) mean mean mean
Se´baco co-op
Indust. tomatoes 28 0.71 9.41 2.34 2.84 6.40/5.23 6.30 3.40
Tomatoya co-op
cabbage 32 0.20 3.17 1.10 1.16 1.57 2.60 -
lettuce 52 0.29 9.80 1.70 1.76 5.57 4.85 -
Ocotal co-op
indust. tomatoes 19 1.18 14.12 4.02 4.43 6.33 - 4.24
*farmgate min/max/mode reported by farmers in the 2008 household survey; n refers to the
number of regional observations for each crop
Evidence in Table 2.3 suggests the existence of asymmetries in Nicaraguan
horticulture markets in which local brokers sourcing at farmgate can pay a price
below the extant wholesale market price less transport costs. Significant mar-
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gins in Table 2.3 separate the per kilo prices farmers report receiving from tra-
ditional wholesalers at the farmgate and documented farmgate per kilo prices
(price less transport) in the Managua market. Wal-Mart mean farmgate prices
most closely approximate prices reported by farmers transacting with tradi-
tional buyers at the farmgate in Table 2.3. Note that we cannot use these data
to actually test for the presence of supernumerary profits and thus local market
power for either field brokers or Wal-Mart.
Evidence in Table 2.3 suggests the existence of spatial market segmentation
that might result from a lack of public or private transport to take crops to mar-
ket, credit to finance transport, information problems, or coordination failures
to bulk production with other farmers. The assumption that Managua per kilo
wholesale prices less transport costs should equal farmgate prices is based on a
further assumption: that farmers can transport the crop to Managua themselves
or that competition among farmgate traders bids away supernumerary-profit.
A failure in the capital markets for small farmers, however, increases the price
of transporting the crop if farmers cannot secure funds to purchase or rent trans-
portation. A second problem could stem from limited competition among far-
mgate wholesalers in rural output markets; regional wholesaler monopsonies
preserve trader marketing margins. Simultaneous failures in these two markets,
high opportunity costs of farmer time, or coordination failures among farmers
leave resource-poor small farmers to accept the low price offered by traders at
the farmgate.
Evidence of supernumerary marketing margins separating farmgate prices
from central markets in an environment of capital constrained farmers suggests
an opportunity for arbitrage by a well-capitalized intermediary like Wal-Mart.
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Reaching deep into the countryside, Wal-Mart’s supply network facilitates par-
ticipation by farmers who would otherwise lack the capital to transport product
to the central market in Managua. The company can therefore take advantage
of the significant price margins separating the city from the countryside, negoti-
ating a per kilo farmgate price better than what traditional farmgate wholesale
buyers offer rural farmers yet still significantly below the Managua price (less
transport costs). Of course, it may be that Wal-Mart assumes significant pro-
curement costs and earns no profit on the provision of procurement in farmers’
communities. However, Wal-Mart’s scale and efficiency imply bulk transport
costs significantly less than the cooperatives’ transport costs. These are possi-
bilities that we cannot test using our current data.
La Colonia’s transaction proximity to the Managua market explains why the
domestic chain’s prices tend to approximate or exceed the per kilo farmgate
prices estimated from the Managua market prices (Table 2.2). La Colonia cannot
take advantage of the spatial arbitrage opportunity because its suppliers come
to Managua to make semi-weekly deliveries. La Colonia suppliers are equipped
with trucks; they make habitual stops to sell excess supply at the Managua mar-
kets after delivering product to the supermarket.
2.3.2 Supermarkets stabilize output price
We examine in this section how per kilo farmgate price volatility differs across
supermarket and traditional channels. Our analysis of whether supermarkets
decrease output price volatility relative to the traditional market begins with
a comparison across channels using statistics on channel variances and coeffi-
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cients of variation. We then use first order stochastic dominance tests to more
systematically study the producer’s mean-variance tradeoff across traditional
and supermarket channels.
Significant price volatility is a serious concern for farm households. When
firms profit maximize, the convexity of the profit function implies a firm prefers
price volatility. But if household production and consumption decisions are
nonseparable and the household is income risk averse then residual uninsured
risk exposure can lead to inefficient production and investment as households
undertake costly measures to reduce exposure. A decrease in output price risk
can be expected to lead to improved efficiency in production and investment.
Data from farmer cooperatives and the traditional market support the hy-
pothesis that supermarkets reduce price volatility over the traditional market.
Table 2.4 reports the first and second moments of producer cooperative and tra-
ditional market price distributions using the price data analyzed in Table 2.2.
As in the analysis of mean prices across channels, we consider relative price
variance by supermarket chain in turn.
Wal-Mart
The first and second moments of the price distributions reported in Table 2.4
suggest that Wal-Mart’s suppliers negotiate a mean/variance tradeoff; a lower
mean per kilo farmgate price is paired with less volatile price for all Wal-Mart
crops and both first and second-generation contracts. Initial comparisons across
moments of distributions in Table 2.4 suggest that the Wal-Mart relationship
systematically dampens the volatility in farmgate per kilo prices compared with
the traditional channel, but the exchange for this tempering may be a reduction
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Table 2.4: Per kilo farmgate price mean and variance in supermarket and
traditional market channels.
Crop (units) Mean Variance CV
($C/kilo) (σ/µ)
Wal-Mart (WM)
WM Se´baco co-op roma tomatoes 3.40 0.66 0.24
Managua roma tomatoes 5.23 2.68 0.31
WM Se´baco co-op salad tomatoes 4.41 0.44 0.15
Managua salad tomatoes 6.68 5.82 0.36
WM Ocotal co-op roma tomatoes 4.24 1.68 0.31
Managua roma tomatoes 6.33 7.51 0.43
WM Ocotal co-op salad tomatoes 5.92 0.64 0.14
Managua salad tomatoes 7.95 7.94 0.35
La Colonia (LC)
LC roma tomatoes 6.30 4.96 0.35
Managua roma tomatoes 6.40 7.06 0.42
LC salad tomatoes 9.99 2.81 0.17
Managua salad tomatoes 7.88 8.94 0.38
LC peppers 6.71 7.25 0.40
Managua peppers 7.51 6.47 0.34
LC cabbage 2.60 0.27 0.20
Managua cabbage 1.57 0.14 0.24
LC lettuce 4.85 2.59 0.33
Managua lettuce 5.57 1.59 0.23
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in mean price. Coefficients of variation in the Wal-Mart channel are uniformly
lower than the traditional market.
La Colonia
As we found in our comparison of mean prices across channels (Table 2.2),
La Colonia exhibits trends that are both distinct from Wal-Mart and distinct
across crops. For example, the traditional lettuce market offers a more stable,
higher mean per kilo farmgate price; La Colonia exhibits a higher mean and
lower variance price for salad tomatoes; but cabbage prices are characterized
by a higher mean with the supermarket and slightly higher variance.
We can more systematically study the producer’s mean-variance tradeoff
across channel-specific price distributions by testing the stochastic dominance
of supermarket price distributions against the traditional market farmgate price
distribution. Each crop-specific pair of price distributions is characterized by
cumulative distribution functions FT and FS for the traditional and supermar-
ket channels, respectively. For all monotonically increasing utility functions,
distribution FS first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) distribution FT if
FS (x) ≤ FT (x) for all farmgate price levels, x. Using first order stochastic dom-
inance tests, distributions can be ranked according to their returns. The weak-
ness of the first order stochastic dominance test is that it is a partial ordering,
unable to rank distributions whose cumulative distribution functions cross.
For the stochastic dominance tests, we use all dates for which we have price
information for the traditional market. We include prices for all recorded dates
for the traditional market under the assumption that the full 2001-2008 series
better reflects the true intertemporal distribution of per kilo prices in the mar-
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ketplace. To compare 2001-2008 prices with the period of the supply relation-
ship we must assume both that the underlying price generating process is un-
changed and that farmers perceive the 2001-2008 distribution as a consistent
representation of the distribution of farmgate prices that they face.
Note that the comparison of per kilo prices below using stochastic domi-
nance tests (Table 2.5) should be treated as a best-case scenario in a comparison
of expected revenues across traditional and supermarket channels. The reason:
our analysis compares per kilo farmgate prices while a comparison of total rev-
enues would interact the price distribution under the supermarket with quan-
tities sold. Evidence from our household survey data and farmer interviews
suggest that supermarket relationships can introduce new areas of uncertainty
into the producer portfolio of marketing risks. We have discussed supermar-
kets’ tendency to purchase less than a farmer’s total production. Moreover,
supermarket agreements can increase a farmer’s risk of total loss should the su-
permarket renege on the sales agreement at the time of harvest through failure
to purchase or failure to pay. For example, our data suggests that the likelihood
of loss due to supermarket failure to make payment is significantly higher than
the traditional market; the reported annual incidence of supermarket payment
default is 1.3 percent, nearly double the traditional market incidence rate at the
farmgate and 14 times the payment default rate reported in regional markets.
Given that the supermarket represents an increase in both the probability of
buyer default and of rejections resulting from standards enforcement, the su-
permarket per kilo revenue distribution will always have a higher mass at zero
than the traditional markets. Therefore a dominance test comparing total rev-
enue distributions between the traditional market and the supermarket channel,
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the distribution of possible total revenue outcomes under the supermarket can
never first order dominate the traditional market.
La Colonia
Table 2.5 presents a summary of the results of stochastic dominance tests.
Figure 2.4 plots the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for both salad and
roma tomatoes for La Colonia and the first and second-generation Wal-Mart
contracts, illustrating the first order stochastic dominance tests in Table 2.5. All
price CDFs are plotted against corresponding traditional market CDFs. For each
comparison pair, FOSD indicates the market that first order stochastically dom-
inates. Comparisons in which there is no first order dominance are indicated.
As expected from results in Tables 2.2 and 2.4 La Colonia price CDFs in some
cases dominate and in others are dominated by the traditional channel.
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Table 2.5: Stochastic dominance tests comparing supermarket and tradi-
tional per kilo farmgate CDFs. For each comparison pair, FOSD
indicates the market that first order stochastically dominates.
Comparisons in which there is no first order dominance are in-
dicated.
Traditional Market Supermarket
La Colonia contracts
La Colonia roma tomatoes (Se´baco) FOSD
La Colonia salad tomatoes (Se´baco) FOSD
La Colonia peppers (Tomatoya) FOSD
La Colonia cabbage (Tomatoya) FOSD
La Colonia lettuce (Tomatoya) no first order dominance no first order dominance
Wal-Mart:
first-generation contracts
Wal-Mart roma tomatoes (Se´baco) FOSD
Wal-Mart salad tomatoes (Se´baco) FOSD
Wal-Mart:
second-generation contracts
Wal-Mart roma tomatoes (Ocotal) no first order dominance no first order dominance
Wal-Mart salad tomatoes (Ocotal) no first order dominance no first order dominance
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Wal-Mart
As with the mean price comparisons, the sequence of Wal-Mart supply
agreements is critical to interpreting the FOSD tests. Results in Table 2.5 and
the second row of Figure 2.4 indicate that traditional market first order domi-
nates the supermarket for Wal-Mart’s early first-generation contracts for roma
and salad tomatoes from Se´baco.
In the FOSD joint analysis of the first and the second moment of the price
distribution we see evidence of Wal-Mart’s contractual evolution with its sup-
pliers. In a departure from the earlier contracts, Table 2.5 and the bottom row of
Figure 2.4 demonstrate that the second-generation contracts for tomatoes from
Ocotal were not strictly dominated by the traditional markets; a cross in the
CDFs renders the test inconclusive.
In fact, the dominated nature of Wal-Mart’s first generation contracts may
explain the introduction of the second-generation agreements. Early Wal-Mart
supply agreements did not increase mean farmgate prices for the farmer relative
to the traditional market – indeed, our data indicates that these contracts were
stochastically dominated by the traditional market.
The second-generation of Wal-Mart contracts codified what had previously
been an implicit price insurance of the contract. Beginning in 2007, Wal-Mart
introduced supply agreements that explicitly provide farmers insurance against
price risks of the traditional market. The company also began moving NGO-
backed farmers and farmer cooperatives to year-round production agreements
featuring seasonal planting plans. In early 2008, farmers described three distinct
contract types, all contracts pegged to a reference traditional market price, an
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Figure 2.4: First order stochastic dominance tests for roma tomato and
salad tomato in La Colonia, and Wal-Mart first and second-
generation contracts.
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average at the time of sale of the prices in two Managua wholesale markets
and a regional market close to the farmer. The three contract types were: an
average-price contract in which Wal-Mart pays the average traditional market
price; a price-band contract in which Wal-Mart and the farmers fix an upper
and lower bound on the average traditional market price and Wal-Mart pays
the farmer the lower bound if the average falls below the lower bound and the
upper bound if the average market price exceeds the upper bound; and a price-
floor contract (introduced in 2008) in which Walmart and farmers fix a lower
bound on the average traditional market price and Wal-Mart pays the average
traditional market price less 15 percent or the floor price.
Wal-Mart and the Ocotal cooperative negotiated a price band contract in
2007. The minimum negotiated price for roma tomatoes was 3.50 C$/kilo and
the maximum 6.20 C$/kilo. The comparison means from the Managua whole-
sale market during this period was 5.02 C$/kilo and the reported mean far-
mgate price for roma tomaoes 4.43 C$/kilo (Table 2.3). Salad tomatoes had a
negotiated minimum price of 5.52 C$/kilo, and maximum at 8.27 C$/kilo; the
Managua comparison mean for salad tomatoes was 6.34 C$/kilo. The 2007 con-
tract also set minimum and maximum prices for sweet bell pepper, small green
pepper, jalapeno pepper, cucumber, and baby corn.
Both the price-band contract and the price-floor contract embed an insurance
contract; the supermarket eliminates some share of traditional market downside
price risk, truncating the lower tail of the traditional market price distribution.
Producers pay for the insurance in the form of a reduced mean price. The bot-
tom row of Figure 2.4 plots the CDFs for roma and salad tomatoes for the Oco-
tal cooperative for the tenure of their relationship with Wal-Mart through May
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2008. The two figures in the bottom row clearly illustrate the critical difference
between the banded Ocotal contracts and Wal-Mart’s supply relationships with
the Se´baco cooperative: the truncation of the bottom of the traditional market
distribution. Ocotal cooperative farmers reported in March 2008 that they pre-
ferred these insurance contracts to the traditional market.4
A critical question we address to in the next section is how much farmers
are willing to lower their expected mean price with the supermarket in order to
truncate their distribution of possible per kilo prices. Do farmers pay too much?
2.4 Estimates of relative risk aversion coefficients
We have established that a primary effect of a supply agreement for small farm-
ers is a reduction in price volatility. The contract reduces uninsured risk expo-
sure that can discourage investment and innovation and risk averse households
are expected to be willing to pay a premium to reduce risk exposure. House-
holds have heterogeneous risk preferences; in general, poorer households are
more risk averse and are willing to pay more than wealthy households to avoid
a monetarily equivalent risk. In the context of our analysis, a higher willingness
of poor households to pay to avoid price risk could provide another explanation
for the willingness of supermarkets to work with small farmers.
We can determine whether farmers adopting Wal-Mart supply contracts are
paying too much for the price risk insurance by using our data to compute the
4NGOs assist the cooperatives of this analysis with credit, irrigation, and technical assistance.
It could be that the value of such subsidies exceeds the loss of direct mean price difference,
creating an artificial net profit not visible to our analysis. This is an interesting critical area for
further study.
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farmers’ minimum relative risk coefficients that rationalize acceptance of the
contract. By comparing derived relative risk coefficients with coefficients that
have been estimated in the empirical risk literature we can assess the degree
of risk aversion implied by preference for the contracts over the wholesale mar-
kets. Derived coefficients that significantly exceed ranges in the literature would
imply that farmers are accepting a reduction in mean price which is too high.
Greater risk aversion is associated with a more curved utility function. The
coefficient of relative risk aversion, R at income Y , is the elasticity of marginal
utility at income Y . The dimensionless measure is defined as:
R(Y) =
−YU′′(Y)
U′(Y)
(2.1)
Newbery and Stiglitz’ (1981) Taylor series approximation of certainty equiv-
alent income gives an approximate definition of relative risk aversion: individ-
ual i’s relative risk aversion is equal to income times two times the risk premium
divided by the income variance.
Ri(Y¯i) =
Y¯i2ρi
σ2Yi
(2.2)
We assume that the traditional market price pt is characterized by variance
σ2t and the Wal-Mart supply channel price is characterized by σ2s , with p¯t > p¯s
and σ2t > σ2s . The risk premium, ρi, is equal to farmers’ annual quantity of
tomatoes transacted, Qi, times the difference in mean per kilo farmgate prices
between the traditional and supermarket channels. Thus ρi is the mean revenue
increment the farmer foregoes for the stability of the supermarket channel. We
use predicted 2007 household income for Y¯ , regressing measured 2007 income
on the household’s vector of assets, geographic controls, and demographic char-
acteristics to generate predicted income Yˆ . The variance σ2Y is the variance in
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income attributable to accepting the bet, the price variance in the higher-mean
traditional market, var(Qpt) Equation 2.2 can be rewritten:
Ri(Yˆi) ≥ Yˆi2Qi( p¯t − p¯s)Q2iσ2t
=
Yˆi2(p¯t − p¯s)
Qiσ2t
(2.3)
Equation 2.3 has an intuitive interpretation. The minimum relative risk aver-
sion rationalizing the investment in the supermarket supply chain is increasing
in the difference between mean prices and decreasing in the variance of the tra-
ditional market and the quantity transacted.
We use household survey data from Ocotal cooperative members who sell
to Wal-mart to compute farmer-specific coefficients of relative risk aversion. A
second estimate uses farmers who quit supplying supermarkets but continued
to grow roma tomatoes.
Table 2.6 presents computed ranges of coefficients of relative risk aversion
for farmers with positive 2007 predicted incomes for current suppliers and
farmers who left the supply chain (non-suppliers). Coefficient means are some-
what high given estimated coefficients generally range between one and three
(Chavas and Holt, 1996; Saha et al., 1994). The distributions of estimated co-
efficients suggest that some farmers’ adoption of supply agreements implies
implausibly large coefficients of relative risk aversion.
A second method to assess suppliers’ revealed relative risk preferences is
to fix R in Equation 2.3 and derive farmers’ implied willingness to pay for the
new distribution, given R. We assume R(Yˆ) to be equal to a range of values
and estimate the maximum per kilo risk premium (p¯t − p¯s), the maximum mean
price difference between the traditional and supermarket channels that ratio-
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nalizes the adoption of the Wal-Mart contract. This per kilo risk premium can
be thought of as the farmer’s willingness to pay for the insurance against price
volatility in the supply contract. We set R(Yˆ) = 1, 2, 3 – values that have been
estimated in the literature using a range of utility functions and specifications
(Chavas and Holt, 1996; Saha et al., 1994). Bellemare et al. (2009) adopt a sim-
ilar approach, pegging relative risk aversions coeffients in estimations of crop
cross-price risk aversion coefficients.
The bottom section of Table 2.6 presents results from the second, willingness
to pay method, in which we set values of relative risk aversion R and compute
farmer-specific limits on the per kilo mean price reduction between the tradi-
tional and supermarket channel. The true observed per kilo difference in mean
price between the traditional and supermarket channels is 2.03 C$/kilo. There-
fore, a computed maximum willingness to pay less than 2.03 C$/kilo suggests
that farmers at the assumed level of relative risk aversion should reject the con-
tract, given their risk preferences and the price mean implied by the contract.
The third and fifth columns of Table 2.6 indicate the percent of farmers (suppli-
ers and non-suppliers) for whom, given the assumed level of risk aversion, the
supermarket mean/variance reduction, represents an economically reasonable
choice over the traditional market.
Results in the lower half of Table 2.6 suggest that, over an established range
of farmer risk aversion, most current supplier farmers’ willingness to pay for
the price insurance is less than the contract’s 2.03 C$/kilo mean price reduction.
That is, established levels of relative risk aversion cannot explain the adoption
levels that we see.
As expected, as assumed coefficients of relative risk aversion increase in
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Table 2.6, the terms of the supermarket price distribution (specifically the re-
duction in mean price given the reduction in price variance) are attractive to a
larger share of both current participants and non-suppliers. Notice comparing
columns three and five that the terms of the supply contract are relatively more
suited to the non-suppliers – that is, a larger share of non-suppliers at all lev-
els of assumed relative risk aversion would accept the reduction in mean price
for the reduction in volatility it implied. Part of what drives the higher relative
suitability of the contract terms to the non-suppliers is that the derived max-
imum mean price reduction ( p¯t − p¯s) is decreasing in income. As a group, the
supermarket suppliers have significantly higher incomes than those not supply-
ing supermarkets in Table 2.6 and thus their maximum acceptable reduction in
mean price given an assumed level of risk aversion is relatively lower.
Evidence in Table 2.6 suggests some farmers pay a high price for price
volatility insurance in the Wal-Mart contract. Two possible explanations might
account for participant farmers’ estimated high willingness to pay for reduc-
tions in price volatility. First, our analysis may be picking up the difference be-
tween risk and loss aversion. In prospect theory, an alternative to the expected
utility model of choice under uncertainty, loss aversion implies that a material
loss has a greater negative effect on an individual’s utility than if the same dif-
ference were experienced as a gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1991). If farmers are loss averse, with a strong preference to avoid
sharp seasonal price drops, they might have a higher value for the insurance of
the contract than our analysis can assess.
A second possibility is that farmers perceive the probability of an extremely
low price in traditional markets to be significantly higher than reflected in the
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year-round data collected by the Nicaraguan government. We have shown that
farmers adopting supermarket contracts are generally without irrigation at the
time of adoption; their experience of horticulture markets prior to the supermar-
ket is seasonal. When farmers adopt supermarket contracts, they are generally
moving into year-round production and marketing for the first time.
Producers may base risk assessments on prior marketing experience, likely
limited to brief periods of seasonal production characterized by high price
volatility. Because traditional seasonal non-irrigated producers of horticultural
crops tend to harvest and plant within the same narrow window as one an-
other, they tend to be in the markets when prices are most volatile. If producers
remember these market gluts acutely, they may be willing to accept from the
supermarket contract a decrease in mean price in order to insure themselves
against what is, in fact, a relatively rare event, a price crash in a local or regional
market.
If this explanation holds, it would carry implications for the sustainability of
Wal-Mart’s contract structures and pricing over time. Farmers will update their
beliefs about the underlying price distributions over time, learning the true an-
nual price distribution as they switch to year-round cultivation, and their valu-
ation of the contract may change. Moreover, we find that by 2008, 83.3 percent
of the 54 supplier farmers in this analysis were equipped with some irrigation.
Given supermarkets serve as the spur to move to a more intensive production
calendar and investment in irrigation, and given that irrigation systems provide
farmers with the capacity to ride out seasonal price fluctuations, it is not clear if,
once equipped with irrigation, farmers will continue to value the supermarket
contract.
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2.5 Conclusions
Research into the consequences and possibilities of the expansion of supermar-
ket operations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has centered around establish-
ing the economic and institutional conditions under which supply relationships
between small farmers and supermarkets take place and documenting the wel-
fare effects of the inclusion and exclusion of smallholders. Research has not yet
addressed the mean and variance of the net price paid by supermarkets and
traditional markets nor examined the variation in price mean and stability over
different contract designs. Finally, no work has examined the cost of reduction
of risk in reduced means. Addressing these questions for the first time, our
analysis offers a new perspective on the payoffs to participation in supermarket
supply channels for farmers.
We find that La Colonia, Nicaragua’s domestic supermarket chain offers
farmers a market option similar to the traditional market in mean price and
price variability. Wal-Mart has pursued a different strategy. To draw in sup-
pliers, Wal-Mart initially employed a pricing method similar to field brokers’
prices, which were less than the wholesale market less transport and suggest
the existence of supernumerary profits. Wal-Mart took advantage of credit and
transport failures that led to this spatial market segmentation, offering terms
similar to traditional farmgate buyers. Early Wal-Mart supply agreements were
not welfare-improving for the farmer relative to the traditional market – indeed,
they were often stochastically dominated by the traditional market.
Beginning in 2007, Wal-Mart changed its supply agreements to provide
farmers insurance against the price risks of the traditional market. Farmers
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prefer these insurance contracts to the traditional market, and the supply agree-
ments now both provide access to those who did not have market access previ-
ously and address the price risk problem in traditional spot markets. However,
our analysis suggests that some farmers may be paying too much for this insur-
ance against traditional market price volatility.
Finally, our findings demonstrate that features of the traditional market in-
cluding spatial segmentation, output price variability, and competition among
regional wholesalers affect private contract outcomes. Improved understanding
of supply relationships between smallholders and supermarkets can bring new
insight into constraints in traditional agricultural markets and contribute to our
knowledge of the causes and persistence of rural poverty.
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CHAPTER 3
WELFARE EFFECTS OF SUPERMARKETS ON DEVELOPING WORLD
FARMER SUPPLIERS: EVIDENCE FROM NICARAGUA
3.1 Introduction
The significant recent growth of supermarket retail in Latin America, Africa,
and Southeast Asia (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002; Reardon et al., 2003; Weath-
erspoon and Reardon, 2003) has implications for the structure and prospects of
traditional agricultural markets and production. Academics and policy mak-
ers concerned with poverty in the developing world have watched the growth
of modern food retail and sourcing with both excitement and trepidation. Su-
permarket expansion implies the emergence and expansion of new high-value
agricultural output markets for the labor intensive crops in whose production
small farmers might compete competitively (Bardhan, 1973), but how will they
be included in this structural transformation?
Though early evidence suggests that farmers who participate in supermar-
ket supply chains experience higher, more stable incomes (Bellemare, 2009; Key
and Runsten, 1999; Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009),
significant debate continues over whether and how developing world small
farmers might benefit by transitioning from spot market sales with interme-
diary wholesalers to market transactions with supermarkets. What are the con-
ditions under which small, capital-constrained farmers can participate in these
new markets? How do the quality, quantity, and transaction specifications of the
supermarket sector require investments in production or post-harvest technolo-
gies that, given capital constraints, might exclude the poor? If small farmers do
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participate, what are the effects not merely on incomes but on investments likely
to change future income dynamics such as household technology adoption and
productive assets?
To estimate the distributional consequences of the market transition and to
design appropriate policy interventions, we must understand participation in
light of the welfare effects of being included or opting out. The bulk of the lit-
erature analyzing supply relationships between farmers and supermarkets in
developing countries has focused on the determinants of participation at the
household level, and on whether there has been exclusion based on farm size
or non-land assets.1 Some research has both anticipated (Barrett and Reardon,
2000; Blandon et al., 2009; Gibbon, 2003; Key and Runsten, 1999; Kirsten and
Sartorius, 2002) and identified (Boselie et al., 2003; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000;
Reardon et al., 2003) the exclusion of small farmers from supermarket supply
chains. Other findings suggest that small farmers are included (Bellemare, 2009;
Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2009) or find that
inclusion is confined to those who are already relatively well-capitalized with
non-land capital such as irrigation (Herna´ndez et al., 2007; Neven et al., 2009),
or those with access through established producer associations (Balsevich et al.,
2005). Most extant studies have used cross-sections, matching a group of farm-
ers supplying a particular horticulture crop to a supermarket with a group of
similar farmers selling the same crop into the traditional market system.
There has been less rigorous analysis as yet of the determinants of participa-
tion at the level of the nation nor has there been research into how geographic
characteristics such as community access to infrastructure and water interact
with a household’s own assets and endowments to influence participation.
1Reardon et al. (2009) provide an excellent summary on the current state of these debates.
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A second gap in the literature has to do with the duration of these supply
relationships and also with their termination. To our knowledge, no research
has yet examined whether the tenure of a farmer’s supply relationship influ-
ences welfare outcomes. Nor has any work yet looked at the experience of dis-
continued suppliers, those that leave the supply chain. Understanding welfare
outcomes conditional on duration of the relationship, however, provides insight
into the way that supply contracts with supermarkets evolve and the way that
effects can be expected to endure should the marketing relationship end.
Finally, extrapolation of supermarkets research to address broader questions
of development economics and policy depends on understanding the specific
pathways through which supermarket supply relationships affect participant
welfare. The analysis of technologies by channel choice (Balsevich et al., 2005;
Herna´ndez et al., 2007) explores one possible mechanism, but other plausible
candidate mechanisms include: increases in prices in the supermarket supply
chain, increased market price stability permitting increased investment in pro-
duction and increased quantities, increases in productivity, and increased credit
access.
The empirical challenge of estimating welfare effects attributable to partic-
ipation is the potential endogeneity of the observed outcomes. Welfare out-
comes measured as effects of participation may be jointly determined by ob-
servables influencing placement of the supply chain such as access to water
and infrastructure, or unobservables influencing household participation such
as entrepreneurial or management ability. Apart from Bellemare (2009), who
use an instrumental variables approach, all of the aforementioned studies use
Heckman two-step selection corrections, estimating channel participation in the
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first stage and welfare effect in the second. As Reardon et al. (2009) point out,
few of the existing cross sectional studies are able to control for participant asset
stocks and landholdings at the time the farmer entered the supply relationship;
thus there remains some interpretive ambiguity surrounding evidence on the
welfare effects of joining supply chains.
This research makes three primary contributions to the empirical literature
on the effects of the expansion of supermarkets in the developing world on
small farmers. We show that geographic and natural resource endowments are
significant predictors of community inclusion in a supermarket procurement
basin. Conditioning on this supply chain placement, instrumental variables
analysis is used to control for the farmer selection effect and also to estimate
the effect on a set of welfare variables (including household per capita incomes,
irrigation, and productive assets) from supplier arrangements with supermar-
kets. Our approach is the first to instrument for three dimensions of partici-
pation in supermarket supply chains: current supplier status, tenure of farmer
participation in the supply chain, and discontinued supply relationships. We
use a combination of instruments in our three first stage equations: the length
of the farmer’s longest relationship with buyers purchasing horticulture crops,
the length of time a farmer has grown a crop that is a non-basic grain nor a cash
crop, the distance from the closest retail outlet in the year 2000, and the amount
of land worked by the farmers’ parents.
We find positive statistically and economically significant effects on partic-
ipant farmer incomes, productive assets, and irrigation. We find evidence of a
growth effect, larger effects on incomes and productive assets accruing to farm-
ers with longer tenure supply relationships. Our evidence suggests that these
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income and productive asset increases are retained by farmers who exit the sup-
ply chain. In addition, we find a significant positive level effect on irrigation
investment for suppliers and a corresponding negative effect on the irrigation
investment of exited farmers. Farmers who joined the supply chain through
NGOs invest significantly higher levels of irrigation and productive assets.
Finally, household survey data is used to investigate three candidate mech-
anisms that might drive these positive effects: the supermarket supply agree-
ment loosens the liquidity constraint; the supermarket supply agreement in-
creases agricultural productivity; or the relationship spurs farmer investment.
We find evidence that the supply contract is associated with increased farmer
access to credit. This credit, combined with price insurance of the contract, per-
mits increased farmer investment in horticulture.
We begin with a description of the data and the critical starting asset and
irrigation positions of participant farmers. The third section presents a sim-
ple model to build intuition for our estimation of determinants of supply
chain placement and farmer selection. Section Four estimates the placement
model. Section Five explains the instrumental variables strategy and Section
Six presents the results from the welfare effect estimations. Section Seven ex-
amines three candidate mechanisms that might drive welfare effects. The final
section concludes.
3.2 Data
Because this research is designed to characterize and estimate the selection
mechanism, supply chain placement, and welfare effects of supply chain partici-
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pation at a national level, our strategy was to locate and survey all small farmers
who had sold to supermarkets in the country since 2000. Two retail groups dom-
inate Nicaragua’s domestic supermarket sector, the 10-store national chain La
Colonia and Wal-mart, with 46 Nicaraguan outlets. Michelson et al. (2010) and
Balsevich et al. (2005) describe the sector, the evolution of respective procure-
ment structures and the rapid growth in retail and sourcing in the Nicaraguan
supermarket sector since 2000.
Using interviews with current and former buyers, non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) working in agriculture, and farmers’ organizations, we com-
piled lists of communities and municipalities in Nicaragua defining supermar-
ket procurement basins. Nicaragua is made up of 153 municipalities (districts).
Of these, we determined that 73 contained communities where farmers either
had supplied supermarkets or might plausibly supply supermarkets due to
proximity to supplier municipalities or the primary road network.
Current and discontinued suppliers
We used our compiled lists of supplier communities to conduct a supplier
census, identifying all farmer supermarket suppliers of fresh fruits and vegeta-
bles. Teams began in communities where we knew supermarkets had sourced –
in these communities enumerators compiled names of current and past suppli-
ers and assembled names of additional communities where supermarkets had
purchased. If supplier communities named by interviewees were not already
included on our list, census teams visited these communities as well. Teams as-
sembled information including supplier name, supermarket(s) supplied, dates
of participation in the supermarket supply chain, and crops supplied.
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Upon the completion of the supplier census, enumerator teams returned to
all farmers located in the supplier census and conducted a detailed household
survey with the household head. All supplier farmers were surveyed.2 We
interviewed 425 farmers who had supplied supermarkets in Nicaragua.3
Non-supplier sample
As a comparison population for a welfare analysis of supermarket suppliers,
we need a representative sample of farmer households in regions of Nicaragua
where supermarkets source fresh fruits and vegetables – geographically and
agro-climactically plausible suppliers.
For this comparison sample, we draw on an existing panel, a collaboration
between the Nicaraguan Agricultural Ministry and the Food and Agriculture
2As a method of capturing the population of farmers supplying supermarkets, the census
technique has three potential sources of error. First, if supermarket sourcing strategies have ex-
perienced punctuated geographic changes since 2000 such that there is no overlap between the
source community regions in 2008 (the year of our survey) and the source communities before
2008, our technique will not adequately characterize the pre-2008 set of suppliers. We do not an-
ticipate this being a problem for two reasons. Limited regions of the country permit continuous
or semi-continuous production of fresh fruits and vegetables, effectively preventing the sort of
geographic discontinuity about which we might worry. We also benefit from the youth of the
supermarket trends in the country. Nicaragua’s “supermarket period” began relatively recently
in 2001 – using farmer recall data, we can plausibly capture the whole arc (thus far) of supermar-
kets’ strategies and small farmer involvement. A second potential error source is that farmers
must self-identify as supermarket suppliers. That is, for our method to have located a farmer he
must know that his production is going to a supermarket. What we term “passive participants”,
farmers unaware that they sell to intermediate wholesalers who then sell to a supermarket, will
not be captured by the census. Because Wal-mart designs its supply network to eliminate mid-
dlemen and purchase directly from the farmer, this is not anticipated to affect our accuracy in
capturing the Wal-mart supplier network. Finally, our strategy is more likely to capture farmers
with ongoing or periodic transactions with supermarkets rather than farmers engaged in infre-
quent once a year or twice a year sales to supermarkets. Since 2000 both supermarkets have
pursued a strategy of establishing sustained relationships with their suppliers. Farmers with
infrequent transactions are often of a seasonally demanded or supplied annual crop such as
papaya, mango, or sugar cane. A sample favoring active suppliers engaged in multiple transac-
tions with supermarkets potentially biases upward our estimate of welfare effects if we assume
that supply relationships become increasingly profitable, for example decreased costs through
improved coordination, through repeated interaction.
3Of these 425 surveyed households, 29 were incomplete, leaving us with 396 complete inter-
views.
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Organization (FAO), with observations in 1996 and 2000. The original 1996
study followed a nationally representative area-based sampling procedure in
which every piece of land in Nicaragua was given equal weight in the random
selection of 1,450 plots, excluding the departments of the Atlantic Coast and
all production units exceeding 500 manzanas (approx. 350 hectares).4 None
of these excluded areas are within supermarket procurement basins. In 2000,
researchers from the World Bank in collaboration with the University of Wis-
consin and a Nicaraguan NGO revisited the original 1,450 households. They
were able to locate 1,350 of the original households.
Because we needed a control group of representative potential suppliers
farming under similar agro-climactic conditions and with analogous proximity
to supply routes, we restricted our re-survey of the panel to only the munic-
ipalities in which we knew that farmers had supplied supermarkets or might
plausibly supply supermarkets because of proximity to primary road networks
and supply municipalities.
There were 640 farmers in the panel living in established or plausible supply
municipalities. We successfully located and interviewed 466 of these farmers.
Our attrition rate was 25.9 percent.5
4One Nicaraguan manzans is equal to 0.7 hectares.
5We were most successful locating and interviewing farmers living close to major roads.
A final potential sources of sampling bias: because we conducted a survey of farmers using
an area-based sample, our farmer sample will have a bias towards inclusion of farmers with
multiple plots. Because our control group therefore is biased towards larger farmers (farmers
with multiple plots) proximate to roads, our sample is likely biased towards farmers with a
higher proclivity towards participation in supermarket channels. Because our control is likely
to comprise wealthier farmers with higher market participation, it is a more suitable comparison
for our treatment group. Our results of effects on incomes and irrigation are only strengthened.
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3.2.1 Describing the suppliers
A first step toward understanding effects of participation in supermarket sup-
ply chains is establishing the circumstances of suppliers before they began sup-
plying. We have extremely rich recall data on supplier productive assets, market
participation, and production. In this section we use descriptives to character-
ize the production and market behavior of suppliers before they sold to the
supermarket and to build some intuition for the depth and breadth of a suppli-
ers’ relationships with supermarkets. Is the supermarket recruiting from a rel-
atively technologically sophisticated population of horticulturalists or are sup-
pliers drawn from the population of smallholders concentrated in basic grains
production?
Our sample consists of 466 nonsuppliers, 231 continuous suppliers and 152
discontinued suppliers who both entered and exited the supply chain between
2001 and 2008. Table 3.2.1 disaggregates the 396 suppliers by the supermar-
ket chain supplied and presents the mean relationship tenure, both by chain
and by whether the farmer exited the supply chain or was still a supplier in
2007. The mean supply relationship for suppliers still working with a super-
market in 2008 was a little over two and a half years and discontinued suppliers
a little more than one and a half years. Our samples of both current suppliers
and discontinued suppliers are dominated by farmers supplying Wal-Mart (or
Wal-Mart’s predecessor, Ahold).6 Few farmers supply multiple chains simulta-
neously, in fact Wal-Mart has policies actively discouraging its supplier farmers
from working with the company’s competition.
6The supermarket category Other in Table 3.2.1 is mostly the retailer PriceSmart, which has
one store in Managua. The category Multiple largely consists of farmers who moved from
supplying Wal-Mart to supplying La Colonia.
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Contracts are generally verbal agreements specifying quantities of specific
quality product to be purchased from the farmer by the supermarket buyer at a
future date or according to a future schedule. Prices at the date of the transac-
tion are often set explicitly or set with respect to reference traditional markets;
minimum prices are also often set, so the farmer knows the lowest possible price
that he will receive for his production. In the case of NGO-organized farmers, a
written contract is sometimes negotiated with the NGO for a specified aggregate
quantity and purchasing schedule.
Table 3.1: Mean duration of supply relationship, by supplier status and
supermarket chain
n Mean supply (s.d.) min max
relationship duration (years)
Wal-Mart
Current suppliers 168 2.70 (1.94) 0 7
Discontinued suppliers 144 1.67 (1.33) 1 7
La Colonia
Current suppliers 34 2.88 (1.95) 0 7
Discontinued suppliers 2 1 (0) 1 1
Other
Current suppliers 10 1.9 (1.29) 1 4
Discontinued suppliers 6 2.17 (2.40) 1 7
Multiple
Current suppliers 32 3.69 (2.01) 1 7
Discontinued suppliers 0
Total 396
Pre-supermarkets, suppliers are an extremely heterogeneous set, cultivating
a range of crops with a variety of technologies and production intensities. Ta-
ble 3.2 distinguishes between farmers who grew basic grains before supplying
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the supermarket, farmers who were already growing the crop that they would
ultimately sell to the supermarket, farmers that both grew basic grains and the
sourced crop before supplying, and farmers who grew neither (mostly coffee or
cash crops). One hundred thirty-two farmers grew basic grains but not the sup-
ply crop (33.3 percent of all suppliers) while 208 (52.5 percent) suppliers had
some experience growing the crop they were ultimately contracted to supply
to the supermarket. However, more than three-quarters of all suppliers (and
three quarters of all suppliers with some experience growing the sourced crop
before the contract) were rain-fed, without irrigation, prior to the supermarket.
Evidence in Table 3.2 suggests that, though more than fifty percent of suppliers
had some prior experience growing the supplied crop, many were not growing
at the scale or the frequency required by the contract. Farmers who grew ba-
sic grains and not the supply crop prior to the contract are mostly farmers who
entered the supply chain through NGO projects. Farmers in our sample have
supplied a wide range of horticulture including: tomatoes, lettuce, small green
peppers, cabbage, cucumber, onion, broccoli, fresh herbs, carrots, beets, green
beans, radish, etc.
Table 3.2: Supplier production and irrigation prior to supermarket supply
contract.
Basic grains Supermarket Both Other Total
only crop only
Irrigation before
becoming a supplier 32 28 24 11 95
No irrigation 100 84 72 45 301
Total 132 112 96 56 396
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Once these largely rainfed farmers enter the supermarket supply chain, nei-
ther their production nor their marketing behavior is exclusively concentrated
in the supermarket relationship. Data from 2007 suppliers indicate that the
majority supplied one crop to the supermarket while selling two crops in non-
supermarket markets and growing a mean of four crops. Discontinued suppli-
ers grow and market, on average, the same number of crops as current suppli-
ers. Table 3.2.1 presents the mean total number of crops grown and total num-
ber of crops sold by suppliers in 2007, disaggregated by the number of crops
the supplier sold to the supermarket in 2007. Non-suppliers grow and market a
significantly smaller number of crops than current or discontinued suppliers.
The crops gown by suppliers and the transaction frequency described in
this section suggest that farmers will need access to the resources, geographic
and household, to permit extended production schedules. A plausible selec-
tion model and empirical strategy therefore must consider place and household
characteristics simultaneously, a task to which we now turn.
3.3 Modeling farmer supermarket channel participation
To our knowledge, our data is the first to characterize a national population
of supermarket suppliers. These unique data allow us, for the first time, to
examine the place determinants of supply chains and the way that site charac-
teristics interact with household asset endowments. While previous research
has focused on the study of participation of a subset of supermarket suppliers
concentrated in the production of one or a small set of crops, our dataset of 396
suppliers and 466 non-suppliers spans a wide range of crops, geographic, and
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Table 3.3: Total crops grown and sold by suppliers in 2007, disaggregated
by quantity sold to the supermarket in 2007.
heightCrops sold to n Total crops grown Total crops sold,
supermarket (2007 mean) all markets (2007 mean)
Supplied 1 crop in 2007 156 4.32 2.29
Supplied 2 crops in 2007 54 4.72 2.78
Supplied 3 crops in 2007 20 6.45 3.70
Supplied 4 crops in 2007 1 14.00 5.00
Non-suppliers 466 2.74 1.40
Discontinued suppliers 152 4.08 2.62
Total farmers 849
agro-ecological conditions.7
Establishing household and community determinants is critical to welfare
effect estimation but interesting in its own right because we disentangle partici-
pation/eligibility at the community level from eligibility at the household level.
Participation in these opportunities is clearly not equally available to everyone,
even when our analysis is restricted to regions of established supermarket pro-
curement. Road and water access, in particular, matter a lot.
Because we consider the spatial and agro-climactic determinants of partic-
ipation in a new market opportunity, this work relates in context and intent
to the literature on geographic poverty traps. In the macro growth literature,
cross-country studies have examined the role of geography on the terms and
7Our nationally representative sample is limited to regions where we determined that super-
markets had been purchasing, so our characterization is already conditional on farmers living
in municipalities of established supermarket procurement activity.
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rates of countries’ economic development (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Gallup et al.,
1999; Sachs and Warner, 1997). Evidence on geographic poverty traps within
countries is relatively less developed. Jalan and Ravallion (2002) use household
panel and geographic data and a model of household consumption growth that
permits estimation of time-invariant geographic effects to establish the existence
of geographic poverty traps in rural China.
Our work contributes to the geographic poverty traps literature by study-
ing circumstances in which geographic externalities affect the returns to private
capital, investments by farmers in technologies that increase and stabilize pro-
duction. In the case of supermarket supply chains, adoption of technologies
and new markets may only pay if there are proximate roads and constant water
access.
3.3.1 Motivation
Two issues underlie our strategy for estimation strategy: nonrandom supply
chain placement and unobserved household selectivity effects that might influ-
ence both participation outcomes and the likelihood of individual participation.
This section lays out a simple analytical framework based on intuition gath-
ered from qualitative evidence on the placement and selection mechanisms that
guide supermarket channel participation.
Given that what is not observed is as important to an analysis of participa-
tion and welfare effects as what can be seen, it is useful to think in terms of
the sequence of the supply agreement. Figure 3.1 maps a simple chronology
of participation in which a supermarket sites its supply chain in community j,
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identifies and approaches farmer i (in community j) and farmer i accepts or re-
jects the supply agreement. Only if a farmer accepts a supply agreement do we
observe the duration and depth of that supply relationship.
We do not observe farmers who refused the supermarket supply agreement
offer.8 Note that the choice of community and farmer might be simultaneous;
they are separated in the figure for the purposes of exposition.
supermarket 
chooses supply 
community j
yes no
contract not observed
supermarket 
offers supply 
agreement to 
farmer i
yes
farmer i accepts 
the supply 
agreement
no
yes
contract observed
no
Figure 3.1: Sequence of decisions determining farmer supermarket chan-
nel participation.
Farmers enter into a supply relationship with a supermarket through a va-
riety of pathways. Some farmers enter through NGOs that prioritize transition-
ing basic grains subsistence smallholders into horticulture, some enter through
NGOs that set minimum landholding thresholds, others are incorporated when
a supermarket buyer driving a supply route extends an invitation to a farmer
with a healthy-looking field of tomatoes. The heterogeneity in entry pathway is
an important part of our identification strategy.
Interviews with Wal-mart supermarket produce buyers charged with meet-
8The sequence of observation mapped in figure 3.1 and the subsequent simple model can
accommodate the case in which the supermarket simultaneously chooses the farmer and the
community.
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ing weekly regional horticultural supply quotas indicate that buyers value two
primary attributes: farmers who are easily accessed by roads and telecommuni-
cations; and farmers with the agroclimactic and economic potential to provide
a year-round supply stream. Even an extremely well-capitalized farmer living
hours off of the primary road network would be a poor choice for a supplier if
the transactions costs outweighed the marginal benefit of his supply. Similarly,
a farmer living in a highly productive agricultural zone but lacking sufficient
liquidity and access to capital to fund a stable supply stream might not partici-
pate.
Preliminary analysis makes clear that suppliers are on the whole a selected
group characterized by the access roads and communications and to the finan-
cial and agro-ecological resources to permit stable, year-round output.
3.3.2 Analytical model
A simple model based on the preceding intuition informs the empirical spec-
ification. Participation of a farmer in a supermarket supply chain is expected
conditional on a set of community characteristics Z j and household characteris-
tics Xi j.
The supermarket buyer is looking for a supplier to provide quantity q of
a crop. He adds farmer i to his portfolio of suppliers if the marginal benefit
of adding the supplier exceeds the marginal cost of adding the supplier. The
marginal benefit of adding the supplier is a function of the per unit retail price,
pr, of the crop and quantity of units sourced, q, and price terms of the contract,
MBi j = k(pr, q).
73
The marginal cost of adding the buyer is the additional costs of negotiation,
transportation, and coordination. These costs are a function of the characteris-
tics of the community, Z j and the individual farmer Xi j: MCi j = C(Z j, Xi j)
The supermarket offers the supply contract consisting of a mean price, a
price variance, and a quantity ( p¯s, σ2ps, q) to farmer i if this contract generates
non-negative surplus for the buyer,
S i j = k(pr, q) −C(Z j, Xi j) ≥ 0. (3.1)
The likelihood of a supermarket offering a supply agreement to farmer i can
be written as a function of community and individual characteristics and a
threshold k˜, S (k˜,Z j, Xi j). Because k˜ can be treated as a constant in the short term
S (k˜,Z j, Xi j) can be written S (Z j, Xi j). We assume that the mean retail price is as
least as high as the contract price p¯r ≥ p¯s.
Conditional on being offered a contract, S (Z j, Xi j) ≥ 0, the farmer decides
whether to accept the supply agreement. Farmer i’s decision is derived from
expected utility maximization. Assume the farmer is an expected utility max-
imizer with a von Neumann Morgenstern utility function that is concave in
wealth. The household chooses consumption of an n-vector of production and
marketing inputs (x) to maximize expected utility:
maxxE[U(w0 + pi] (3.2)
where pi is profit:
pi = p f (x) − r′x.
With r′ representing a corresponding n-vector of input prices, w0 initial
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wealth and with a strictly concave production function f (.) and α a vector of
farmer preference parameters.
In the default, pre-contract case, p = p¯ + e represents stochastic output price,
with E(p) = p¯, E(e) = 0 and σ2p denotes the second central moment of the out-
put price distribution. The farmer expects price p in the traditional market and
ps in the supermarket. A previous paper on supermarket supply agreements
in Nicaragua could not reject the hypothesis that the traditional market and
supermarket pay equivalent mean prices (Michelson et al. 2010). Instead, the
contract was found to reduce price variance compared with the traditional mar-
kets. Therefore, assume equivalent means across traditional and supermarket
channels p¯ = p¯s but that the supermarket contract offers a lower output price
variance because it truncates the traditional market price distribution, σ2ps ≤ σ2p.
Assuming that utility and production technology functions are twice contin-
uously differentiable, it is possible to characterize the solution to the farmer’s
expected utility maximization:
xi = x∗i ( p¯, σ
2
p,w0, r, α), i = 1, ..., n, (3.3)
And characterize the resulting value of expected utility,
V(x) = V( p¯, σ2p,w0, r, α). (3.4)
The added production and/or marketing cost that the farmer incurs from
participation in the supermarket supply chain is written as a function of com-
munity characteristics Z j and household characteristics Xi j, c(Z j, Xi j). The value
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of farmer expected utility under the supermarket can then be written:
Vs(x) = V( p¯s, σ2ps,w0, r, α,Z j, Xi j). (3.5)
The farmer accepts the supply agreement if
Vs(x) ≥ V(x) (3.6)
Which can also be written:
D =

1 if V( p¯s, σ2ps,w0, r, α,Z j, Xi j) ≥ V( p¯, σ2p,w0, r, α);
0 otherwise.
To begin, assume that participation in the supermarket supply chain is cost-
less to the farmer c(Z j, Xi j) = 0. If the farmer is risk averse, then expected utility
with the supply agreement Vs will always be greater than expected utility with-
out the supply agreement because accepting the agreement reduces the variance
in the output price, and V(.) is decreasing in σ2p for net sellers (Sandmo, 1971).
However, costless participation in the supply chain does not appear to be the
norm. Farmers tend to increase expenditure related to post-harvest preparation
of the crop in accordance with supermarkets’ product quality and transaction
standards. Generally, c(Z j, Xi j) > 0. Once nonzero costs of participation are
introduced, acceptance of the supply agreement is determined by the farmer’s
degree of risk aversion (captured in α), his starting wealth, the vector of input
prices, the mean and variance of the supermarket price distribution ( p¯, σ2ps) and
the traditional market distribution ( p¯, σ2p), and the specific cost of participation
determined by his household and community characteristics.
D( p¯s, σ2ps, p¯, σ
2
p,wi0, r, αi, Xi j,Z j) (3.7)
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This simple reduced-form characterization of the choice function D(.), which
captures decisions by the firm and the farmer, suggests that both household and
community characteristics belong in our participation equation. For simplicity,
we assume that farmers face the same supermarket output price distribution
and input prices and that risk aversion is a function of individual period t = 0
wealth, wi0. We can rewrite D(.) as
P(Di = 1) = Φ(wi0, Xi j,Z j) (3.8)
Our specification is similar to Sadoulet and de Janvry (Sadoulet and de Jan-
vry, 1994), who derive input demand functions from the profit function that
are functions of output prices, input prices, risk factors, quasi-fixed capital, and
shift-factors like location.
The resulting specification Di(.) describes a potential tension regarding the
influence of initial household wealth, w0 on farmers’ participation in supermar-
ket supply chains. Risk averse households should be (and results in Michel-
son et al. 2010 suggests that they are) willing to pay some premium to reduce
price risk in the traditional output market. Theory suggests (Stiglitz and New-
bery, 1981) that poor households will be more willing to pay a fixed amount
to lessen the magnitude of a given risk than wealthier households, particularly
if access to credit to permit household consumption smoothing in the face of
unexpected fluctuations in income is increasing in wealth.We would expect the
poorest farmer households to most value the supermarkets’ partial insurance
against instability in output market prices. However, the poorest farmers are
likely to be those least equipped to meet the quantity, quality, and transaction
requirements of the supply contract. The net effect of starting wealth on partic-
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ipation, therefore, is not clear.
3.4 Supply chain placement
Our unique data permit the characterization of factors that have determined
entry into the supply chain at the national level since 2000. We use this date to
determine farmer participation in supermarket supply chains across the hetero-
geneous set of inclusion pathways and supplied crops.
In this section we run four models, over site and households separately and
then together. We observe 496 communities. Of these, 356 are non-supplier
communities, 49 are discontinued supplier communities (where at least one in-
dividual sold to a supermarket between 2000 and 2007 but in which all suppliers
had discontinued their relationship with the supermarket by 2008), and 91 are
current (2008) supplier communities in which at least one individual surveyed
in that community reported that he or she had sold a crop to a supermarket in
2007. Communities are defined administratively, by the name of the resident
community given by the farmer. Based on interviews with supermarket buyers
and intuition from the model in the previous section suggesting that commu-
nity characteristics influence supply chain placement through influence on the
fixed and per-unit costs of the transaction for farmer and buyer, we hypothesize
that several classes of characteristics may determine a community’s inclusion in
a supermarket supply basin.
First, communities without capacity to supply year round are regions of high
cost contracts because the fixed costs of the contract for the buyer are spread
over a smaller number of transactions and growing seasons. Therefore, vari-
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ables capturing agro-climactic possibilities for year-round cultivation including
the altitude, the depth of the water table, and whether the community has water
to support agriculture throughout the year are expected to positively influence
whether a community is contained within the supply chain basin and we expect
supply communities to have higher altitude (reflecting higher historical horti-
culture production in the country’s interior highlands), shallower depth of wa-
ter table (to permit easy well drilling for irrigation), and higher access to water
throughout the year for agricultural production.
In addition, supermarket buyers report a preference for farmers with whom,
whether because of proximity to main roads or access to communication tech-
nologies, they can maintain a flexible supply relationship – updating quantities,
prices, and timing in the week before a transaction. In our framework, these
are community attributes that would increase coordination and reduce the cost
of the contract to both parties. We therefore expect that variables capturing the
isolation of the community including distance to a paved road, distance to the
closest municipal market, distance to the closest supermarket retail outlet, will
be smaller for participant communities and should negatively influence com-
munity inclusion. Conversely, community cell phone access in 2007 should be
higher for included communities and is expected to positively influence supply
chain placement.
Finally, in 2005, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) initiated a partnership with four non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) operating in Nicaragua. The goal of this project was to facilitate small
farmer supplier relationships with supermarkets. A final variable likely to pos-
itively influence community participation in supermarket supply chains, there-
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fore, is the presence of these NGOs operations in the community’s municipality
in 2005.
Table 3.4 compares means for community altitude, depth of water table,
year-round access to water for agricultural production, distance to paved roads,
the closest municipal market, and the closest supermarket retail outlet, years
of cell-phone access, and 2005 municipal activity of the NGOs Save the Chil-
dren, Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Catholic Relief Services, and
Project Concern International in supply and non-supply communities. In com-
munities containing multiple households, responses were averaged across res-
idents. All variables are time-invariant or pinned to 2000 levels. We take the
full 2008 set of supplier communities and households and determine what 2000
(pre-supermarket) attributes predict supply chain siting and household partici-
pation.
On the majority of community characteristics related to accessibility and po-
tential for steady agricultural production in Table 3.4, current supply commu-
nities differ significantly from non-supply communities. One odd difference
between the groups in Table 3.4 is in participant distance to market. Contrary
to our expectations, participant communities are significantly further from mar-
kets than non-supply communities. All other differences are consistent with our
expectations.
Table 3.4 also demonstrates that there are significant differences between
current supply communities and in discontinued supply communities. In al-
titude, USAID NGO operations in the community municipality, and distance
to the closest supermarket retail outlet in 2005, current suppliers differ from
discontinued suppliers. It is interesting to note that we cannot reject the equiv-
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alence in mean distance to the closest supermarket across suppliers and non-
suppliers in 2000 but suppliers are located closer, on average, to a retail outlet
than both non-suppliers and discontinued by 2005.9 Several possible explana-
tions exist: Wal-Mart may have selected suppliers proximate to new outlets or
built outlets in spots proximate to suppliers or there may be regions or sub re-
gions whose characteristics jointly influence their desirability as locales for retail
and supply.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics for supplier communities, discontinued sup-
ply communities, and non-supplier communities.
Non-supply Discontinued supply Current supply
community communities community
(2008)
Altitude (log mts) 5.84 5.91 6.32a,b
Mean well depth (log mts) 3.48 2.96 3.21a
Distance to paved road (log km) 1.43 1.49 1.37
Distance to market (log km) 2.30 2.64 2.53a
Water year round (1=yes) 0.28 0.62 0.68a
Cellphone access in 2007 (1=yes) 0.65 0.63 0.77a,b
USAID NGO operations in
municipality in 2005(1=yes) 0.39 0.63 0.78a,b
Distance to closest supermarket retail outlet:
in 2000 (log km) 3.23 3.21 3.41
in 2005 (log km) 2.70 2.70 2.41a,b
n 356 49 91
Current supplier communities statistically significantly different at least the 10% level from:
aNon-supply communities
b Discontinued supply communities
9Significant growth has occurred in the number of supermarket stores in Nicaragua in the
last decade; in 2000 the two major companies had 24 retail outlets combined in the country but
by 2008 there were 60 stores. Most of the increase had been in Wal-Mart’s holdings, mostly
outside of Managua.
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Our theory suggests that both community and household characteristics in-
fluence household participation. Based on interviews with NGOs, buyers, and
intuition from the supermarkets literature (Balsevich et al., 2005; Herna´ndez
et al., 2007) and our model, several household characteristics are expected to
influence participation in supermarket supply chains. Given the costs and com-
plexity associated with standards and transaction requirements and given su-
permarket payment delays of between one and three weeks, it is anticipated
that farmer participation is positively associated with 2000 wealth, but the ef-
fect of wealth is difficult to predict, given that we have also hypothesized that
the price risk-mitigating terms of the contract are likely to be more attractive to
relatively poorer farmers. Farm size and land accumulation (between 1992 and
2000) are expected to be negatively associated with participation because larger
farmers in Nicaragua generally work in highly remunerative large scale cash
crops such as sugar cane, sesame, coffee, plantains, rice, sorghum, and peanuts.
Because supermarket buyers report a strong preference for farmers who can
provide steady, year round supply streams, a farmer’s irrigated landholdings
are expected to positively influence inclusion.
We include four variables related to farmer experience. First, we include a
farmer’s total farming experience. Second, we include a variable that captures
the years a farmer has grown a supermarket sourced crop. Supermarkets source
a wide range of crops in Nicaragua, and the variable measures the farmer’s
longest experience growing any supermarket sourced crop; the farmer need not
have ever sold the crop to a supermarket. For example, a non-supplier who has
grown tomatoes for five years and cucumbers for 15 would have a value of 15
for this variable while a supplier who has grown squash for 30 years for sale
in the traditional market and peppers for two years to in a supply chain would
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have a value of 30. The final two variables related to experience capture farmers’
experience in markets: the farmer’s longest-running relationship with the buyer
(at farmgate, regional market wholesaler, exporter, central Managua market)
of a non-supermarket crop (anything from beans to sugar cane to coffee) and
the farmer’s longest-running relationship with the non-supermarket buyer of a
supermarket crop. We expect total experience and length of relationship with a
buyer of a non-supermarket crop to be negatively associated with participation
while variables related to the production and marketing of supermarket supply
crops are expected to be positively associated with household participation in
supermarket supply chains.
Demographic characteristics include: age, gender, and education of the
household head. Research has established a relationship between household
head education and technology adoption, and we expect to find the same rela-
tionship. We use two variables to capture family labor availability in 2008: the
number of adults and children in the household. The effect of total family size
on participation is difficult to predict; family labor resources in what are gener-
ally labor-intensive crops would be positively associated with participation but
larger families are also often poorer, with more material demands and perhaps
less liquidity to finance intensive horticulture production.
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics for these wealth, demographic, and
experience variables. As in Table 3.4, we compare current (2008) suppliers with
both non-suppliers and discontinued suppliers. Assets are compiled into an
index using factor analysis, (Sahn and Stifel, 2000); we include details regarding
computation of the asset index in the first appendix. Incomes are not observed
in 2000 for current or discontinued suppliers, and are not included in Table 3.5.
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On the majority of household characteristics related to endowed wealth, ex-
perience, and and growing potential, current supplier households differ signif-
icantly from both and non-supply households and discontinued supply house-
holds. As expected, suppliers had significantly lower mean landholdings in
2000 and were significantly younger and with significantly less experience than
either non-suppliers or discontinued suppliers. Moreover, their longest market-
ing relationship for a non-supermarket sourced crop was significantly shorter
than either non-suppliers or discontinued suppliers. Surprisingly, current sup-
pliers had significantly lower 2000 indices than either non-suppliers or discon-
tinued suppliers for both productive assets and consumer durables.
Regarding household irrigation in 2000, household head education, and
production experience with a supermarket-sourced crop (before the supermar-
ket arrived), suppliers and discontinued suppliers are more similar to each
other than either group is with non-suppliers. We cannot reject the equiva-
lence in mean irrigation holdings for non-suppliers and discontinued adopters,
but these groups had significantly higher 2000 irrigation holdings than non-
suppliers. We find for education of the household head and years growing a
supermarket-sourced crop are similarly higher for current suppliers than non-
suppliers but we cannot reject the equivalence in means for these variables
across current and discontinued suppliers.
Table 3.6 reports the marginal effects at the sample mean of the probit regres-
sion for four related specifications. Models (1)–(3) use supplier as the depen-
dent variable, grouping current suppliers and discontinued suppliers in a sin-
gle group containing all farmers who have supplied supermarkets in Nicaragua
since 2000. We group current and discontinued suppliers together into total sup-
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pliers in order to characterize the determinants of community and household
inclusion, rather than tenure or retention. In Model (1) we regress only commu-
nity characteristics from Table 3.5 on supplier status of farmers. In Model (2)
we regress only household level characteristics on household supplier status.
Model (3) combines community and household characteristics to estimate our
choice function D(.) from section 3.3.2. In Model (3) we add four terms inter-
acting stocks of 2000 household wealth with whether a USAID-affiliated NGO
operated in the household’s municipality. We include these terms because we
hypothesize that NGOs use household material wealth as criteria for program
participation. Model (4) re-runs Model (3) but with current (2007) suppliers as
the dependent variable rather than total suppliers, grouping discontinued sup-
pliers with non-suppliers. In Model (4), therefore, we can examine whether the
same set of community and household characteristics has different effects on
supplier continued participation than on initial inclusion.
As hypothesized, results in Model (1) and (3) demonstrate that community-
level characteristics matter a great deal to supply chain placement: community
altitude, access to water year round, distance to the closest market, USAID NGO
operations in the community municipality, cell phone reception in 2008, and the
distance in 2000 to the closest supermarket retail outlet are significant predictors
of household inclusion in the first model. It could be that communities with this
intersection of characteristics also tend to have the kinds of capable suppliers
that interest supermarkets, so their robustness to the inclusion of household-
level wealth and experience variables is noteworthy. When we control in Model
(3) for household productive wealth, demographics, and experience, we find
that year-round community water access, NGO presence in the municipality,
altitude, and community distance to existing supermarket outlets remain four of
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the strongest predictors of household inclusion in supermarket supply chains.10
At the household level, several characteristics are clearly important. Most
critical are the farmer’s 2000 irrigation holdings, experience in markets and crop
production prior to the supermarket. The farmer’s longest running relationship
with a non-supermarket buyer of horticulture, tubers, or fruit and years grow-
ing a horticulture, tuber, or fruit crop before the supermarket are significant
determinants of participation in the supermarket supply chain.
When we join household and community characteristics in Model (3) to pre-
dict household participation, what does not seem to matter is nearly as interest-
ing as what does. Model (3) suggests a household-level endowments story, that
is, farmer access to the supply chain mediated by pre-supermarket irrigation
stocks, though not productive asset stocks apart from irrigation nor the com-
position of the household nor the education of the household head are signif-
icant in Model (3) though participants are overwhelmingly from male-headed
households. Consumer durables stocks in 2000 are a negative predictor of par-
ticipation, but NGO wealth interactions wash out this effect for farmers living
in municipalities where USAID-affiliated NGOs operated. Because NGOs are
likely to be operating in poorer municipalities, this result captures the differ-
ences across municipalities in household wealth; overall, participant farmers
are likely to have less material wealth, but within poor municipalities they are
likely to be relatively better-off.
Model (4) regresses community and household characteristics to try to iden-
tify the set of 232 suppliers who were still supplying the supermarket in
10Community characteristics (altitude, depth of water table, year round community water
access, NGO presence at the municipal level, distance to paved road, distance to market, years
of community cellular phone access, and the distance to the closest supermarket retail outlet in
2000) are jointly significant predictors of individual participation in Model (3).
87
Table 3.6: Community supply chain placement and household participa-
tion probit estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Supplier household Current
supplier
(2007)
Explanatory variables dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx dF/dx
Community altitude (log mts) 0.06*** 0.05* 0.06***
Depth of water table (log mts) 0.02 -0.01 -0.03
Distance to paved road (log km) 0.01 0.01 -0.04***
Distance to closest market (log km) 0.10*** 0.05 0.03*
Water year round in the community 0.59*** 0.50*** 0.22***
Cellphone access, 2008 (1=yes) 0.19*** -0.06 0.06**
NGO with USAID affiliation (1=yes) 0.41*** 0.59*** 0.17**
Distance to supermarket outlet in 2000 (log km) -0.22*** -0.17** 0.01
Productive wealth
Productive asset index, 2000 0.05 0.04 -0.04
Consumer durables index, 2000 -0.07 -0.40*** -0.19*
Landholdings, 2000 (mzs) 0.002 -0.004 -0.002
Land Accumulation, 1992-2000 (mzs) 0.002 0.002 0.001
Irrigation, 2000 (mzs) 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.02
Irrigation2 2000 (mzs) -0.06** -0.09*** -0.003
NGO/ wealth interactions
Productive asset index, 2000*NGO 0.001 -005
Consumer durables index, 2000*NGO 0.40** 0.13
Landholdings, 2000*NGO 0.001 -0.001
Irrigation, 2000*NGO 0.21 0.003
Demographics
Age of household head (years) 0.003 0.02 0.02**
Education of household head (levels 1-8)
Completion of primary school (0/1) 0.20* 0.13 0.09
Completion of secondary school (0/1) 0.30* 0.30 0.27**
Land Worked by Parents (log mzs) 0.02 0.05*** 0.03***
Gender of household head (1=female) -0.28** -0.20*** -0.12***
Kids in the household (age< 16) 0.02 0.02 0.01
Adults in the household -0.03** -0.02 -0.01
Experience (log years)
Farming experience 0.01 -0.04 -0.01
Longest relationship with non-horticulture buyer -0.08*** -0.06** -0.03**
Longest relationship with horticulture buyer 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.001
Years growing a horticulture/tuber crop (years) 0.05** 0.04 0.05***
N 849 849 849 849
Pseudo R2 0.354 0.404 0.578 0.386
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels,
respectively.
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2007. Notably, the primary determinants of continued participation in the sup-
ply chain are community variables. Though completion of secondary school
and consumer durables remain important, most of the household wealth vari-
ables and NGO/wealth interactions are not significant predictors of participa-
tion when we consider the determinants of lasting, continuous participation
(through 2008) in the supply chain.
Results in Table 3.6 are noteworthy in two respects. First, we find evidence of
the existence of corridors of higher economic potential, areas that, because they
are endowed with relative proximity to retail outlets, optimal growing condi-
tions, and year-round access to water are able to participate in new market op-
portunities. Areas without sufficient water resources or proximity to supermar-
ket backhaul routes are not included in supermarket supply chains. Individu-
als’ opportunities are shown in this case to be conditional on where they live.
Our work contributes to the geographic poverty traps literature by establish-
ing circumstances in which geographic externalities affect the returns to private
capital, investments by farmers in technologies that increase and stabilize pro-
duction.
Second, our results suggest that estimates of household welfare effects due
to adoption of new markets should be attentive to possible supply chain place-
ment biases in addition to individual selection biases, controlling for commu-
nity characteristics relating to isolation, water access, and climate. Model (4)
most closely approximates a standard supply chain impact evaluation study,
which often surveys a cross-section of current suppliers. Our results suggest
that, at least in this case, such a study would include significant placement bias
were it to exclude community-level water, transport, and isolation variables.11
11Because most existing supermarket impact estimates studies are matched cross-sections,
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Without controlling for both potential sources of bias, it is impossible to dis-
tinguish between participation determined by household-level endowments vs
geographic placement effects. Here we find that both explanations hold; that is,
households with year-round water access and irrigation in 2000 had a signifi-
cantly higher probability of supermarket channel participation.
Controlling for the potential bias in regional estimates of participation effects
requires that we understand the supermarket site criteria determining which
communities lie within supermarket supply basins. The problem for impact
evaluation arises if program placement depends on the relevant outcome vari-
able or if placement is not controlled for in the estimation. Pitt et al (1993)
termed the resulting bias “area heterogeneity bias”. For example, appropriate
targeting for health clinics might result in their being situated in locations where
health outcomes are initially poor, biasing downwards the estimation of effects.
Or public health resources might be captured by wealthier groups with better
than average starting health outcomes, biasing the results upwards. With the
placement of supermarket supply chains the potential bias is less ambiguous:
we expect to see inclusion in areas (because of road access, possibilities for year-
round cultivation) where participation in markets or welfare is initially higher.
Therefore, while results in Table 3.6 are interesting in their own right they are
also a necessary first stage in estimating the welfare effects of participation, the
task to which we now turn.
this bias generally is not a problem. The problem would result only in the application of such
estimates to broader population comparisons.
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3.5 Empirical strategy for estimating welfare effects
We study the effects of participation supermarket on 2007 per capita household
income. Research has demonstrated clear links between household productive
asset holdings and future poverty states (Barrett et al., 2006; Carter and May,
1999; Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Therefore, we
test for effects of participation on holdings and accumulation of several classes
of assets: productive assets, consumer durable assets, irrigation, and land.
Two issues underlie our estimation and data collection strategies: possible
bias in the welfare estimates due to non-random supply chain placement and
bias from non-random household participation in the supermarket contracts.
Thorough interviews with current and former supermarket buyers and suppli-
ers suggest that supermarket procurement basins are situated based on observ-
able characteristics related to transport, access, and year-round growing poten-
tial. Our data allows us to control for potential bias arising from non-random
placement of the supply chains. Regarding the household selection effect, the
expected sign of the bias in Nicaragua is unclear. Due to the involvement of
NGOs in mediating farmer participation, many farmers have been incorporated
into the supply chains with little prior experience in markets or production of
crops other than beans and maize. Because building the capacity of these farm-
ers likely takes some time, ordinary least squares estimates of welfare may in
fact understate the income or asset effects of participation.
The function describing supermarket effects on farmer income is assumed
to be concave in time: a fixed return from the transition to the new technology
and positive annual marginal returns that may decrease over time as the farmer
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runs into land or labor constraints. Income for supplier farmers can be written
as the sum of mean non-supplier farmer income, y∗ and the supermarket income
function, f (t|X):
ys = y∗ + f (t|X) (3.9)
For simplicity and empirical tractability, we deal in a linear approximation
of the true function of unknown functional form. The short tenure of supermar-
ket presence in-country and of farmer supply relationships in Nicaragua – all
surveyed supplier farmers have sold to supermarkets for six or fewer years –
suggest this is a reasonable assumption. We assume that the annual effect on
income of being a supplier to a supermarket is constant after the first year.
Figure 3.2 plots the income of three farmers, graphing the relationship be-
tween supermarket supplier income and mean non-supplier farmer income.
The parameter β1 represents the mean fixed effect on income productive assets,
landholdings, and accumulation due to the technology shifts implied by partic-
ipation. Farmers entering the supermarket supply chain adopt some measure
of production and marketing technologies. As described in Section 2, for some
farmers the transition implies a shift of production into horticulture from basic
grains; for farmers already producing some horticulture for sale, the supply re-
lationship may imply the cultivation of a new variety, the addition of a new crop
to an existing portfolio, or the adoption of irrigation to meet specific transaction
scale or timing requirements. There is expected to be heterogeneity in the tech-
nologies’ effect on incomes or assets depending on farmers’ initial production
and marketing technologies.
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Figure 3.2: Graph of the hypothesized relationship between supplier in-
come (ys) and non-supermarket channel farmer income (y∗) for
an example non-supplier, two current suppliers, and one dis-
continued supplier.
Figure 3.2 assumes that all farmers begin at mean income, E(y|X) = y∗ in year
t = 0 and that non-supplier mean income exhibits no annual growth trend. In
year one, farmer s1 joins the supermarket supply chain. In year two farmer s2
joins the supply chain. Farmer ns continues his production and market tech-
nologies as in period t = 0.
Participation in supermarket supply chains is generally modeled as a binary
condition; models assume that producers either sell into a supermarket procure-
ment channel or they do not. Yet there is significant variation in the degree to
which a farmer participates: how many years the farmer sells to the supermar-
ket, the percentage of his crop he sells to a supermarket, how concentrated his
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overall production is planted in crops he sells to the supermarket, the fraction of
his sales transactions that are conducted with the supermarket, etc. Variation in
the degree of participation suggests researchers may be throwing out important
information by reducing the channel choice to a dichotomous variable.
Rather than treat participation in the supermarket supply chain as a one-
time shock with the potential to shift household welfare, we can use information
about the tenure of suppliers’ supply relationships with supermarkets to test the
hypothesis that there exists an annual incremental welfare effect to being a su-
permarket supplier or whether the relationship represents a single, level-effect
to household income and asset stocks. In the macroeconomic growth literature,
some debate has centered around the dynamic effects of national saving, in-
ternational trade, or education on a nations’ rate of output or welfare (Solow,
1956; Young, 1991). We pose a similar question with respect to the effect of su-
permarket participation on welfare: what is the effect of a multi-year supply
relationship with the supermarket on participant outcomes? Adopting the vo-
cabulary from the growth literature, changes in variables that affect the steady
state level of output are said to have a level effect while those that affect the long
run growth rate of output are said to have a growth effect. Do positive effects
accrue to farmers with longer tenure supply relationships? Is there evidence
of a growth effect? The parameter α in Figure 3.2 captures this growth effect
of the relationship, the mean annual returns attributable to improved relation-
ships with the company over time due to larger orders, better pricing, increased
numbers of products supplied, etc.
Our household survey observes the income and assets of all farmers in pe-
riod t = 6. From these observations and knowledge of the start dates and tenure
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of farmers’ supermarket supply relationships β1 and α can be estimated.
Discontinued suppliers
Figure 3.2 adds an additional dimension to the estimation: not all suppliers
stay suppliers. In the set of 396 suppliers, 153 (39 percent) had exited the sup-
ply chain by 2007. Evidence from cases studying the structure and operations
of food industry procurement networks suggests some turnover in participant
producers, but generally this population shows up only peripherally in studies
of participation. For example, a comparative study of supply chains for super-
markets in Bangkok and Nanjing by Ruben et al 2007 reports that the retailer
TOPS in Thailand began with 250 producers in 1998 but scaled back to 60 grow-
ers by 2002. A case study of the Brazillian supermarket sector finds that 61,000
small dairy farmers were delisted between 1996 and 2000 (Farina, 2002).
In Nicaragua, our evidence demonstrates that suppliers who leave the sup-
ply chain tend to stay in the production of horticulture after leaving the chain;
only 13 out of 153 disadopting farmers no longer farmed horticulture by 2008
and the majority of disadopting suppliers still listed a supermarket-sourced
crop as the most remunerative crop in their (post-supermarket) 2007 produc-
tion portfolio. Important questions for theory and policy therefore involve how
and when producers make the decision to leave markets, not just who joins a
particular marketing channel. Here, we study the incomes and assets of dis-
adopters to estimate whether there are lasting effects to having been in a supply
chain that persist after exit. This might be the case if, for example, participation
in supermarket supply agreements are associated with increased investment in
irrigation or household productive asset stocks.
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Figure 3.2 includes the income path of a farmer who entered the supply chain
in year three and left the supermarket supply chain in year four, d34. The in-
come path of farmer d34 is stylized to facilitate interpretation in Figure 3.2. As
before, β1 represents the fixed effect of supplying a supermarket and α the an-
nual effect. The parameter β2 captures the income increment in t = 6 for dis-
continued supplier farmers compared with non-suppliers, while ρ captures the
fixed cost (or benefit) of exit – the mean fixed income difference between dis-
continued suppliers and those who remain with the supermarket. An intuitive
interpretation of parameter ρ is that it is the immediate decrease (increase) in
income that results from leaving the supply chain. Figure 3.2 shows a negative
ρ, implying there are costs to exit, but this need not be the case.
The analysis in the previous section demonstrated that supply chains are
situated based on a set of community level observable characteristics including
water access and relative isolation. The core equation to be estimated is:
Y = δ + β1S + αT + β2D + γ1Z + γ2X +  (3.10)
Where S is a dummy equal to one if the individual supplied a supermarket
in 2007, T represents the number of years that the farmer sold to the supermar-
ket, D is farmers who have exited form the channel. For controls, X represents
a vector of observable household wealth and demographic characteristics and
Z represents the vector of community characteristics demonstrated in the pre-
vious section to be significant determinants of supply chain placement. Epsilon
is the normally distributed error term. Predicted signs of the coefficients are:
β1 > 0, α > 0, β2 > 0. We can use β1, α, and β2 to derive an estimate of ρ, using
β1 + αT + ρ = β2.
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Ideally, we would observe supermarkets randomly selecting a set of farmers
as suppliers and then buying from them over randomly-determined intervals.
We would then compare income Y1t+1 for farmers randomly selected into the
supply chain and Y0t+1 for farmers randomly excluded from the marketing op-
portunity.
Conditional on supply chain placement and household observables, the cen-
tral empirical challenge is accounting for bias from household unobservables
determining selection into and out of the supply chain. The case for farmer-
level selection and exit on unobservables is plausible in a context in which both
supermarkets and small farmers act strategically to determine participation in
the supply chain. If supermarkets contract with farmers characterized by some
unobserved, uncontrolled for characteristic that is correlated with income or
wealth, estimates of the effect of the supermarket will be biased. The effect
attributable to supermarkets will be overstated because it will conflate super-
market effects with effects on incomes due to unobserved ability or initiative.
Another possibility is that the NGOs or buyers involve farmers with systemati-
cally less managerial experience or ability due to, for example, program criteria
to reach the poor (in the case of NGOs) or because more risk-averse farmer are
less likely to engage in contractual hold-up (in the case of buyers). In this case,
OLS estimates would underestimate the effect of the supermarket supply con-
tract.
For our coefficient estimates to be efficient and unbiased Cov(S , ) = 0,
Cov(D, ) = 0 and Cov(T, ) = 0 must hold. If, however, supermarket suppli-
ers are specially characterized by ability or initiative and if these variables are
omitted from the estimation, supplier status and tenure are endogenous. In this
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case, our equation should be written:
Y = δ + β1S + αT + β2D + γX + ( + u) (3.11)
where u represents the part of the error term that contains unobserved corre-
lates of supplier selection and placement andCov(S , u) , 0 and/orCov(D, u) , 0,
Cov(T, u) , 0. What this means is that β1, α, and β2 will describe both the effect
of supplying a supermarket and being high ability/high initiative. Estimates of
the effects of supermarket supply chain participation on farmer welfare must
credibly deal with this problem of supply chain placement and individual se-
lection bias. Our data offer a rich set of explanatory controls relating to farmer
experience, wealth, supply chain placement, and agricultural potential. Because
supply chain placement characteristics at the community level are observable
and (over this time period) invariant we can control for them. We find no ev-
idence that suppliers relocate strategically to communities in supply basins in
order to gain entry as suppliers, eliminating one possible confounding mecha-
nism.
We begin by estimating under the optimistic assumption that our rich set of
explanatory variables adequately control for all relevant observables and that
no unobservables jointly determine participation and welfare outcomes. We
can control for experience in production and markets, a host of productive as-
sets prior to supermarket entry, household labor supply variables and relevant
demographics.
The first column of Table 3.7 includes the OLS estimates regressing supplier
status on wealth, experience, demographic, and regional controls. In the second
column of Table 3.7, we control for the supply chain placement effect by adding
the set of community controls from the previous section. In both estimations, the
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mean effect of being a supplier on household per capita income is positive and
economically and statistically significant, an increment equal to nearly double
the mean per capita household 2007 income in the non-supplier sample, $480.80.
Notice that the estimate of per capita income effects decreases slightly when the
community access and agroclimactic controls are added.
Table 3.7: Results from OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions,
effect of being a current or discontinued supplier and tenure of
relationship on 2007 household per capita income.
Dependent variable: Per capita income (USD 2007)
OLS OLS IV
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1), level effect 853.96*** 817.88** 791.65
(326.71) (324.32) (637.57)
α1 Relationship tenure (years), growth effect 39.26 36.74 130.67**
(62.65) (64.20) (60.44)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) 425.24* 395.88* 774.79
(258.14) (234.00) (621.41)
Productive assets, 2000 439.93** 451.56** 400.05
(236.37) (224.26) (243.75)
NGO*Productive assets, 2000 792.23*** 799.26*** 825.81**
(284.83) (274.19) (367.01)
Community Characteristics n y y
n 849 849 849
R2 0.367 0.372
Note:
Standard errors are in parentheses. Errors are clustered at the community level and IV
standard errors (3) are bootstrapped. Household demographic, community, regional, and crop
controls are included regressors in all models.
However, even controlling for a rich set of household and community vari-
ables, household participation, tenure in the supply chain, and exit from the
contract relationship are likely endogenous to income and other welfare out-
comes including asset and land accumulation. The objective of this paper is
to obtain estimates of the effect of participation in supermarket supply chains
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on participant farmer incomes and assets that are unbiased by the presence of
individual selection into the channel. To achieve that goal requires a set of in-
strumental variables correlated with participation, supply chain tenure, or exit
but otherwise unrelated to welfare outcomes.
To correct for possible individual selection bias into the supply chain, in
tenure of the duration of the supply relationship, and exit from the chain, we
use instrumental variables to estimate the effects of participation in supermar-
ket supply channels on the set of 2007 income and asset welfare indicators. We
employ a combination of the following instrumental variables to instrument in
three separate first stage equations for current supplier status, tenure, and sup-
ply chain exit in our welfare effects estimations:
• Longest relationship with non-supermarket buyer of horticulture, tubers,
or fruit
• Years growing a supermarket sourced crop including horticulture, tubers,
or fruit, before the supermarket
• Area of landholdings worked by the household head’s parents
• Distance, as the crow flies, to closest retail outlet in 2000
• Year of entry into the supply chain, as an instrument for tenure in the
supply relationship for supplier farmers only
Table 3.8 presents the results from the three first stage equations instrument-
ing for 2007 supplier status and relationship tenrure and demonstrates that in-
struments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. In the first stage equa-
tion estimation (1a) we use a probit model to predict current supplier status. The
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first stage equation (1b) uses a count data model to predict tenure of the supply
relationship. We use a log-linear model and assume a Poisson error structure.
Tenure is instrumented conditional on having been a supplier, for this reason
n is equal to the set of 396 suppliers. The first stage estimation of exit from
the supply chain (1c) uses a probit model. Table 3.8 demonstrates clear correla-
tion of the instruments with the endogenous regressors. We test the suitability
of the instruments with a first stage F-statistic, testing the null hypothesis that
the coefficients on the instruments are jointly equal to zero. Table 3.8 presents
the results for these tests for each first stage regression. Small values, gener-
ally smaller than ten, of the first stage F-statistic imply failure of the assumption
that the instruments are correlated with the treatment. For each first stage re-
gression, the test statistic exceeds ten.12 Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present results from
the regression of instrumental variables on per capita income and household
changes in irrigation, and productive assets. Results in tables 3.9 and 3.10 pro-
vide strong evidence that the instruments are orthogonal to the errors in the
welfare equations.
3.6 Empirical results
Tables 3.7, 3.6, and 3.6 present results from regressions estimating the effect of
participation on per capita income, productive asset accumulation between 2000
and 2007 and changes in irrigation between 2002 and 2008. We find that partici-
pation in a supermarket supply chain has a positive and statistically significant
12The validity of instruments related to prior market and production experience stems from
the considerable heterogeneity in our data disrupting potential correlation between each in-
strument and welfare outcomes. Two dimensions are of special relevance: heterogeneity in
farmer supermarket supply chain entry pathways and heterogeneity in farmer production pro-
files (technologies and crops).
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Table 3.10: OLS regression of instruments on change in household irriga-
tion, 2002-2008, with full second stage regression controls.
Irrigation Irrigation
2008-2002 2008-2002
full sample suppliers only
n=849 n=396
Longest relationship with
horticulture/tuber/fruit buyer (years) 0.004 .
(0.003) .
Years growing a horticulture/tuber crop 0.01 .
(0.01) .
Land worked by household head parents (log mzs) -0.002 .
(0.01) .
Distance to closest retail outlet, 2000 (as the crow flies) 0.0002 .
(0.0002) .
Year of chain entry . -0.04
. (0.03)
HH demographics y y
Community characteristics y y
Crop controls y y
Region controls y y
NGO Interactions y y
Note: Standard errors included in parentheses.
growth effect on participant income and productive assets, evidence that in-
creases in the income effect of being in the supermarket supply chain accrue
to those who remain in the relationship for longer periods. The magnitudes of
these estimates are relatively large. Given that the mean supply relationship is
2.5 years duration, the estimated growth effect represents a total 2007 mean in-
come increase of $325 USD. As stated previously, the mean per capita income
for non suppliers in 2007 was $480.80. This income effect estimate is similar in
magnitude to what has been estimated elsewhere. For example, Maertens and
Swinnen’s (2009) study of export horticulture in Senegal estimates extremely
high income effects for suppliers: 50 to 130 times higher than average non-
participant income. The fact that the instrumental variables estimate of the
growth effect, α, is larger than the OLS estimate, is possible evidence of poor in-
struments. However, it is unclear, particularly due to the involvement of NGOs
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(sometimes favoring asset poor farmers) influencing participation, whether the
direction of the bias due to endogeneity is positive or negative. Moreover, given
that our first stage regressions for tenure in the supply relationship have high
F-statistics and good predictive power, this may be evidence of negative bias in
the OLS income estimates.
Results in Table 3.6 indicate that there is a significant level effect of being a
supplier on irrigation13 accumulation, a mean of approximately an additional
third of a manzana put into irrigation for current (2008) suppliers between 2002
and 2008. Relative to the base mean for suppliers of 0.26 manzanas irrigated
in the year 2000, an additional 0.3 manzanas nearly doubles mean household
irrigation holdings. Discontinued suppliers have a significantly lower invest-
ment in irrigation over this period. The mean total change in irrigation for non-
suppliers over this period is +0.03 manzanas. A level effect on irrigation for
current suppliers but not exited suppliers suggests the existence of a minimum
threshold investment required for continued participation in the supply chain.
Does a farmer’s production state prior to the supply relationship affect re-
turns to participation in the supermarket marketing channel? In all regressions,
we include terms interacting an indicator for whether the farmer grew only ba-
sic grains (maize, sorghum, beans, or rice) before entering the supply chain (in
2001 for non-suppliers) with all three participation variables (current supplier,
tenure of supply relationship, and discontinued supplier). We do not find that
farmers who grew only basic grains before supplying the supermarket experi-
enced significantly lower level or growth effects on irrigation, incomes, or pro-
13Model (5) of Table 3.6 re-runs Model (4) but excluding the top one percent of the irrigation
change distribution to test the sensitivity of the results to a small group of high-investment out-
liers. The distribution is not symmetrically trimmed because there are no farmers in the regres-
sion set that decreased their irrigation holdings over the observation period. In the discussion,
we refer to results in Model (5).
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ductive asset accumulation.
To study if participant welfare effects vary according to whether the farmer
entered the supply relationship through an NGO program, we include terms
interacting whether the farmer was assisted by an NGO with the participation
variables. NGO assistance in the supply chain has no significant level or growth
effect on income, but we do find that farmers assisted by NGOs had significantly
higher level accumulation of productive assets between 2000 and 2007 but a
decreased growth rate in productive assets, suggesting a bulk asset transfer or
facilitated acquisition through the NGO. We find the same pattern for irrigation
investment with the NGO: a high level effect and a negative growth effect.
We find no significant effects on land accumulation between 2000 and 2008,
consumer durables accumulation between 2000 and 2008, or livestock holdings
in 2008 for current suppliers, tenure of supply relationship, or discontinued sup-
pliers. The second appendix contains tables of results for these instrumental
variables and OLS regressions.
3.7 Discussion: Mechanisms
We have found a significant positive growth effect on income and productive as-
sets for farmers participating in supermarket supply chains and that estimated
effects persist after farmers exit the chain. We also find level increases in invest-
ments in irrigation for current suppliers and level increases in productive assets
for farmers assisted by NGOs. In this section, we consider three possible related
mechanisms driving income growth increases: the relationship increases agri-
cultural productivity; the supply relationship helps the farmer access credit and
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Table 3.11: Results from OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions,
effect of being a current or discontinued supplier and tenure of
relationship on asset accumulation, 2007-2000
Productive asset change
2007-2000 index
(1) (2)
Explanatory variables OLS IV
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1), level effect 0.25 0.11
(0.16) (0.21)
α Relationship tenure (years), growth effect -0.007 0.04**
(0.02) (0.02)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) 0.10 0.01
(0.12) (0.22)
Supermarket supplier*Basic grains before supplier -0.13 -0.002
(0.25) (0.23)
Relationship tenure*Basic grains before supplier 0.04 0.01
(0.06) (0.04)
Discontinued supplier*Basic grains before supplier 0.10 0.01
(0.20) (0.28)
Supermarket supplier*NGO assisted 0.16 0.41**
(0.21) (0.20)
Relationship tenure*NGO assisted -0.07 -0.09**
(0.05) (0.04)
Discontinued supplier*NGO assisted -0.12 0.01
(0.21) (0.35)
Productive assets, 2000 0.02 -0.001
(0.05) (0.06)
Consumer durables, 2000 0.15** 0.15**
(0.07) (0.07)
n 849 849
pseudo R2 0.277
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the community level. IV standard
errors in (2) are bootstrapped. Household demographic, community, regional, and crop controls
are included regressors in all models.
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Table 3.12: Results from OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions,
effect of being a current or discontinued supplier and tenure of
relationship on irrigation change, 2008-2002
Irrigation
change
2008-2002 mzs
(3) (4) (5)
Explanatory variables OLS IV IV
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1), level effect 0.32*** 0.44*** 0.35***
(0.10) (0.18) (0.12)
α Relationship tenure (years), growth effect -0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) 0.25 -0.49* -0.37
(0.13) (0.25) (0.28)
Supermarket supplier*Basic grains before supplier -0.003 -0.60* -0.28
(0.14) (0.32) (0.34)
Relationship tenure*Basic grains before supplier -0.02 0.12 -0.002
(0.03) (0.09) (0.03)
Discontinued supplier*Basic grains before supplier 0.14 0.13 0.30
(0.22) (0.31) (0.24)
Supermarket supplier*NGO assisted 0.80*** 1.33*** 0.78***
(0.22) (0.45) (0.28)
Relationship tenure*NGO assisted -0.11** -0.15** -0.07*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Discontinued supplier*NGO assisted -0.50** 0.02 0.25
(0.20) ( 0.41) (0.34)
Productive assets, 2000 0.02 -0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Consumer durables, 2000 0.04 0.06 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
HH demographics y y y
Community Characteristics y y y
Region controls y y y
Crop controls y y y
Top 1% of the distribution y y n
n 849 849 841
pseudo R2 0.228
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the community level. IV standard
errors (4) and (5) are bootstrapped. Model (5) drops the top one percent of the distribution
of changes in irrigation to verify that the results in Model (4) are not being driven by a small
handful of high-accumulation outliers.
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thus loosens a household’s liquidity constraint; or the relationship spurs farmer
investment in production.
The challenge is that evidence supporting any one or several of these mech-
anisms is likely to be plagued by the same issues of endogeneity and placement
and selection bias. For example, one might consider the significantly higher
bean and maize per hectare yields of supplier farmers evidence of increased
productivity spillovers in the supply chain. However, innately higher produc-
tivity of the farmers is likely correlated with entry into the channel in the first
place. In this section we begin to explore candidate mechanisms, largely with
qualitative evidence and descriptive statistics. The analysis in this section there-
fore is merely suggestive exploration to motivate future research on the precise
mechanisms through which supermarket channel participation increases sup-
plier incomes.
First, to demonstrate increases in productivity, one ideally would observe
farmers’ production and production systems before and after the supply chain
entry. Without such data, our instrumented regressions on 2008 irrigation hold-
ings and irrigation investment provide strong evidence that farmers invest in
the sorts of technologies that increase agricultural productivity (Table 3.6 and
Table 3.6).
Tables 3.7 and 3.7 disaggregate suppliers and non-suppliers by their pre-
supermarket landholdings and irrigation status. The top section of Table 3.7
presents data on whether supplier farmers had irrigation before they became
suppliers and the bottom half describes their irrigation status in 2008. In a pre-
vious paper we characterized a dualism in Nicaraguan horticulture production
and marketing (Michelson et al. 2010) defined by irrigation holdings and we
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found that the suppliers concentrated in cooperatives supplying supermarkets
were without irrigation before supplying the supermarkets and predominately
irrigated after, suggesting a technological transition strongly correlated with
participation in a supermarket supply chain. The top half of Table 3.7 is there-
fore a characterization of the agricultural production sectors from which super-
markets in Nicaragua draw suppliers. Only 23.9 percent of contracted suppliers
had irrigation when they began supplying the supermarket.
Table 3.13: Supplier landholdings and irrigation prior to supermarket sup-
ply contract and in 2008
Landholdings before becoming supplier
≤ 3.5 ha (3.5, 7 ha] >7 ha Total
Irrigation before supplying (y/n) 60 10 25 95
No irrigation before supplying (y/n) 193 52 56 301
Irrigation in 2008 111 22 43 176
No irrigation in 2008 144 40 36 220
Total 255 62 79 396
Table 3.14: Non-supplier landholdings and irrigation in 2000 and in 2008
Non-supplier landholdings in 2000
≤ 3.5 ha (3.5, 7 ha] >7 ha Total
Irrigation in 2000 1 4 2 7
No irrigation in 2000 242 59 158 459
Irrigation in 2008 2 4 10 16
No irrigation in 2008 238 60 152 450
Total 240 64 162 466
Table 3.7 presents the same information for non-suppliers’ irrigation status
in 2000 and 2008, by landholding class. We see evidence in these tables that
suppliers, particularly small farmer suppliers, are significantly outpacing non-
suppliers in investments in irrigation. Given that the mean age of suppliers
is significantly lower than non-suppliers, this might reflect a life-cycle effect,
that is, supplier farmers are younger and younger farmers are more likely to
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adopt new technologies. However, non-suppliers are less invested in irrigation
initially and the gap between suppliers and non-suppliers only widens between
2000 and 2008.
A liquidity constraint is defined as the inability of a household to borrow. If
the start-up costs to participation in a supermarket supply chain are non-trivial,
a borrowing constraint can effectively exclude low-wealth households. Second,
regarding whether the supply relationship affects farmer liquidity, permitting
increased investment in horticulture, we find that participation in a supermar-
ket supply is positively associated with 2007 credit received. Table 3.7 contains
descriptive statistics for the mean total credit borrowed by the household in
2007 and the mean number of credit sources. Respondents were read a list of
credit sources and asked whether, in the previous twelve months, any mem-
ber of the household had received credit from that source. The list of sources
included: private bank, credit or savings cooperative, producers’ cooperative
or association, unconventional bank, rural bank or agricultural lender, NGO
or project, government program, commercial trader, buyer, moneylender, other
area farmer, family or friend, or other. A much higher share of suppliers used
credit in 2007 than did discontinued suppliers or non-suppliers. Moreover, sup-
pliers had higher mean total credit, though not statistically significantly so, and
a slightly larger number of credit sources, on average, than non-suppliers.
We find a significant effect of the length of the supply relationship on 2007
credit when we instrument for current supplier status, supply chain exit, and
tenure. Table 3.16 presents the instrumental variables regression results. This
finding makes sense, given that some small farmer suppliers access credit
through NGOs facilitating the supply contracts; many small farmers operating
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Table 3.15: Descriptive statistics on credit, by 2007 supplier status
Current suppliers Discontinued suppliers Non-suppliers
Reported credit in 2007 (n) 171 67 119
Percent of group 73.7% 43.7% 24.8%
Credit borrowed
(USD 2007) 1544.98 1242.88 1013.82
(1376.16) (1446.05) (1462.42)
Credit sources, total 1.08 1.09 1.01
(0.32) (0.29) (0.09)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
independently of NGOs report that the supply agreement suffices to secure an
agricultural loan in regional banks and that credit worthiness likely builds over
time with the bank.
Table 3.16: Results of instrumental variables (IV) regression, effect of 2007
supplier status and tenure on 2007 credit.
Credit (2007 USD)
2007
Explanatory variables 2SLS
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1) 567.33
(537.77)
α Relationship tenure (years) 146.6*
(82.92)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) -331.39
(421.58)
Wealth controls y
HH demographics y
Community Characteristics y
Region controls y
Crop controls y
n 849
pseudo R2 0.157
Note: Errors are clustered at the community level and IV standard errors are bootstrapped.
Instruments are as in Section 3.6.
Finally, previous work established (Michelson et al. 2010) that though the
mean output prices paid by supermarkets in Nicaragua are not significantly
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higher than the traditional market, output prices paid by supermarkets exhibit
significantly less volatility than the traditional market. In some cases, the su-
permarkets verbally or contractually guarantee the farmers a minimum output
price. Qualitative interviews with farmers confirmed that this guaranteed min-
imum output price is a primary attractive feature of supply relationships. The
importance of the provision of the minimum price is some measure of insurance
against output price volatility.
A consistent finding of empirical work estimating effects of residual risk at-
tributable to imperfections in savings, credit, and insurance markets is that re-
sidiual uninsured risk can lead to inefficient under investment in technology
adoption and have costly effects on the household in the form of foregone out-
put (Sandmo, 1971).
A final hypothesis is that effects on participant incomes comes through in-
creasing production quantities at a more stable output price guaranteed by the
supermarket in concert with increased liquidity facilitated that the farmer can
access with the contract (through NGOs or regional banks willing to accept the
supply agreement as a guarantee of stable income source).
The story of increased incomes through increased output quantities in the
presence of decreased output price risk complements nicely conclusions from
existing studies that have suggested that longer or more frequent production
cycles are associated with supermarket participation. Balsevich et al. (2005) find
that growers accessing supermarkets plant an average of 0.6 more cycles in a
year than traditional growers. Neven and Odera (2009) find that supermarket
orders for suppliers with long-term supply agreements come in throughout the
year. Our contribution is to link findings on increased incomes explicitly to the
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reduction of downside output market risk.
3.8 Conclusions
The rapidly increasing presence of supermarkets in developing countries is a
well-established recent phenomenon with implications for international devel-
opment and poverty outcomes. As a supermarket chain’s domestic market
share grows, the company turns to regional producers to satisfy a steady de-
mand for fresh produce. This expansion of supermarket procurement channels
may mean exclusion or opportunity for small farmers. Supermarket buyers gen-
erally demand that suppliers satisfy chain-specific transaction requirements; in
exchange they offer incentives that might include guaranteed purchase volumes
or prices.
This research addresses a set of questions relevant for smallholders, policy-
makers, and development economists: what are the welfare effects on small
farmers of these new market opportunities? Could participation in new
supermarket-directed market channels offer a viable high-value agriculture op-
portunity for smallholders?
This research has made three primary contributions to the empirical litera-
ture on the effects of the expansion of supermarkets in the developing world on
small farmers. We show that geographic and natural resource endowments are
significant predictors of community inclusion in a supermarket procurement
basin. Conditioning on this supply chain placement, instrumental variables
analysis is used to control for the farmer selection effect and also to estimate
the effect on a set of welfare variables (including household per capita incomes,
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irrigation, and productive assets) from supplier arrangements with supermar-
kets. Our approach is the first to instrument for three dimensions of partici-
pation in supermarket supply chains: current supplier status, tenure of farmer
participation in the supply chain, and discontinued supply relationships. We
use a combination of instruments in our three first stage equations: the length
of the farmer’s longest relationship with buyers purchasing horticulture crops,
the length of time a farmer has grown a crop that is a non-basic grain nor a cash
crop, the distance from the closest retail outlet in the year 2000, and the amount
of land worked by the farmers’ parents.
We find positive statistically and economically significant effects on partic-
ipant farmer incomes, productive assets, and irrigation. We find evidence of a
growth effect, larger effects on incomes and productive assets accruing to farm-
ers with longer tenure supply relationships. Our evidence suggests that these
income and productive asset increases are retained by farmers who exit the sup-
ply chain. In addition, we find a significant positive level effect on irrigation
investment for suppliers and a corresponding negative effect on the irrigation
investment of exited farmers. Farmers who joined the supply chain through
NGOs invest significantly higher levels of irrigation and productive assets.
Finally, household survey data is used to investigate three candidate mech-
anisms that might drive these positive effects: the supermarket supply agree-
ment loosens the liquidity constraint; the supermarket supply agreement in-
creases agricultural productivity; or the relationship spurs farmer investment.
We find evidence that the supply contract is associated with increased farmer
access to credit. This credit, combined with price insurance of the contract, per-
mits increased farmer investment in horticulture.
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CHAPTER 4
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF NEIGHBORS’ PARTICIPATION AND
EXIT BEHAVIOR ON FARMER MARKET PARTICIPATION
4.1 Motivation
Theoretical and empirical research into the mechanisms of household technol-
ogy adoption has been increasingly focused on analyzing the role of social learn-
ing and mimicry. Considerable evidence now supports the hypothesis that so-
cial processes influence farmers’ experimentation with new agricultural meth-
ods and inputs (Conley and Udry, 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Maertens,
2009; Moser and Barrett, 2006; Munshi, 2004). The existence of social adoption
pathways for technology adoption has implications both for models of inno-
vation diffusion and for policies to promote the uptake of welfare-improving
technologies in the developing world.
Building on the insights of the technology adoption literature linking adop-
tion to social processes, this paper tests for the existence of social dynamics in
farmers’ decisions to participate in new agricultural output markets. Market
participation is a critical determinant of household poverty outcomes as well as
a natural methodological and theoretical extension of existing research on the
technology adoption process.
However, the social dynamics governing the adoption of a marketing con-
tract are likely to differ in important ways from those influencing the adoption
of a new high yielding variety of maize or cotton. In particular, the pecuniary
externalities on existing suppliers of a new entrant into a modern value chain
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may be both more significant and more immediate than the effects of a farmer’s
adoption of a high yielding crop variety in a context of well-integrated out-
put markets. In the case of supermarkets, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
likelihood of contractual hold-up by the supermarket rises as the number of
community suppliers increases.
A second dimension distinguishing participation in high value markets is
the relatively high observed levels of farmer exit from modern marketing chan-
nels (Jano and Mainville, 2006; Ruben et al., 2007). While some technology adop-
tion research has considered the phenomenon of disadoption (Moser and Bar-
rett, 2006; Neill and Lee, 2001; Reardon and Farina, 2000), these processes have
thus far been only minimally estimated and modeled. In the context of modern
markets, it remains to be explored what information a farmer’s exit might hold
for neighboring farmers.
This research uses a lifecycle model to explain supermarket supply chain
participation and exit patterns in Nicaraguan supermarket supply communi-
ties. We hypothesize that farmers learn about the profitability of a new mar-
keting channel relative to the traditional market from their own experience, but
also from their neighbors’ experience, in two ways. Farmers learn both from
neighbors’ accumulating experience and from neighbors’ exit. Our research
therefore incorporates own experience, own exit, neighbors’ experience, and
neighbors’ exit from supermarket supply chains into a conditional logit model
to test whether farmers’ observation of these variables influence the decision to
participate in subsequent periods and to estimate whether some farmers pay
a price for experimentation with the new market opportunity. Our method of
including neighbor exit and tenure as possible determinants of farmer market
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participation has potential application to a variety of technology and market
adoption cases.
Results from a fixed effects conditional logit model estimating the likelihood
of participation in supermarket supply chains among Nicaraguan farmers sug-
gest that neighbors’ exits from the supermarket supply are significant negative
influences on a farmer’s own decision to participate in the new market while
observation of neighbors’ accumulating experience in the supply chain is a sig-
nificant positive determinant of farmer’s participation. However, observing a
neighbor’s exit is a significantly more powerful signal than observing another
year of neighbor experience and this signal is significantly more powerful still
for farmers who are in the channel themselves rather than those that have not
yet entered the supply chain. Evidence of strategic delay on the part of farmers
suggests that we observe a social process rather than a firm-level roll out of new
contracts within a given village.
4.2 Literature review
Research into the role of social learning and diffusion in technology adoption
in the developing world is rooted in analysis of the adoption of high yielding
varieties (HYV) and associated productivity-increasing technologies. Accumu-
lating evidence suggests that social influences indeed play a critical role in the
uptake and spread of new technologies, whether through direct learning from
neighbors or mediated through social pressures. Early work by Narayan and
Pritchett (1999) in Tanzania established a strong positive relationship between
households’ social capital and use of modern agricultural inputs such as agro-
118
chemicals, fertilizer, and improved seeds. Subsequently, Isham (2002) found
that social affiliations in Tanzania influence farmers’ adoption of fertilizer and
Munshi (2004) identified that wheat growers’ HYV adoption during the Indian
Green Revolution incorporated the experience of neighbors. Foster and Rosen-
zweig developed an influential target-input model of HYV adoption (1995) and
their results further established the influence of learning from others and free-
riding on neighbors’ adoption in HYV rice and wheat in India. The research into
social networks and technology adoption has grown further nuanced. Maertens
(2009) distinguishes between social mechanisms, untangling the effects of social
pressures versus social learning in the adoption of Bt cotton in villages in central
India.
Significantly less attention has been paid to social processes influencing par-
ticipation in emerging modern output markets. How do farmers come to par-
ticipate in new output markets and what role might social networks and social
connectivity play in determining that participation? In some research the role
of a market is implicit, inextricable from the technology being adopted. For ex-
ample, Conley and Udry’s (2010) study of adoption of pineapple for export in
Ghana is simultaneously a study of market participation and technology adop-
tion. The authors find strong evidence that farmers learn about optimal input
allocation from their successful neighbors, but the marketing decision itself is
secondary and left largely in the analytical background.
A second gap in the literature concerns the need to incorporate disadoption
of technologies and markets into estimates and models of adoption and learn-
ing. Moser and Barrett’s (2006) study of the dynamics of smallholder adoption
of a system of rice intensification (SRI) in Madagascar identifies a strong influ-
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ence of learning from neighbors. The authors identify high rates of farmer exit
from the technology, a village-level mean disadoption rate of 40 percent over
seven years of exposure to SRI. They find that learning effects, captured by a
dummy variable representing farmer membership in a farm organization, are
a strong influence on both a farmer’s initial adoption decision and his later de-
cision to continue or abandon the technology. Lee and Neill (2001) study the
adoption and disadoption dynamics of an initially successful system of maize-
bean crop rotation in Honduras but there is no social component to their esti-
mation.
Market exit is a potentially important source of information about market
adoption and several case studies suggest that disadoption or exit from mod-
ern value chains and markets is widespread. We see a significant amount of
churning around participation in Nicaraguan supermarket supply chains (see
below) and researchers have documented farmer exit from modern output mar-
kets in other parts of the world including South Asia (Ruben et al., 2007), Brazil
and Argentina (Reardon and Farina, 2000), and Guatemala (Jano and Mainville,
2006).
Failure to account for exit from either a technology or an output market im-
plies an assumption that these choices are irreversible. Yet the large number
of exits observed in the dynamic process of market participation in Nicaragua
and elsewhere suggests that the superior technology assumption in target input
models built on Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) – that a new technology is an ab-
sorptive state – is not appropriate. Moreover, possible pecuniary externalities of
new entrants into a market on existing suppliers are not permitted by standard
household technology adoption models, which are purely partial equilibrium
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without externalities other than learning.
Our analysis allows for the influence of neighbors’ exit and experience on a
farmer’s decision to participate in a supermarket supply channel. Our method
and results raise interesting questions about the optimal sequence and level of
farmer market participation and exit. When high yielding crop varieties al-
low all farmers to benefit without concern for pecuniary externalities the pol-
icy question has generally been how to efficiently promote universal adoption.
Yet the same is not necessarily true for market participation; the case of mod-
ern markets is more ambiguous. How do farmers learn from one another’s
experimentation in markets? What are the optimal community-level adoption
dynamics? Can a farmer’s exit from a modern market have a net positive ex-
ternality in the community? Under what conditions might exit improve total
social welfare?
4.3 Lifecycle model
We use a simple model of lifetime utility maximization to analyze the farmer’s
market participation decision. Building on the insights of the social networks
and technology adoption literature, we expect that farmers learn about the prof-
itability of a new marketing channel relative to the traditional market not only
from their own experience, S it, and exit, Zit, but also from their neighbors in
two ways. Farmers learn both from neighbors’ accumulating experience in the
supply chain, S −it, and from neighbors’ exit, Z−it. We assume that these informa-
tional sources enter separately into the farmer’s decision problem and that the
farmer making a decision at the start of time t uses the realized experience, exit,
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and asset variables from the previous period, t − 1.
Beliefs about the profits from the modern marketing channel, pimt , are increas-
ing in S it and S −it and decreasing in Zit and Z−it. Neighbors’ experience and the
farmer’s own experience reflect learning about optimal input levels and invest-
ment in the contract relationship conditional on participation, as in Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995) and other subsequent papers, while neighbors’ exits Z−it re-
flect the probability that the profitability of the modern market is less than the
profitability of the conventional spot market, pim < pic, which would have in-
duced others to exit.
Our model and estimation take supply chain placement as a given. That
is, we do not model the determinants of the situating of supply chains and se-
quential selection of farmers. In each period, the farmer chooses whether to
participate in the supply chain or not, ait ∈ [0, 1], to maximize his utility u(.):
u(aitEpimt (S it, S −it,Zit,Z−it, Ait, Iit) + (1 − ait)pic) (4.1)
with ∂Epi
m
∂S it
> 0, ∂Epi
m
∂S −it > 0, and
∂Epim
∂Z−it < 0. The farmer’s period t uncertainty about the
profitability of the modern marketing channel relative to the traditional chan-
nel is a result of uncertainty over, for example, the optimal investment level in
a market with quality assessment, in post-harvest technology, negotiations, co-
ordination, etc. In comparison, at time t = 0 the distribution of the traditional
market is known as is the relationship of the central moments of the traditional
market distribution to farmer investment. As modeled in Equation 4.1, pic is
deterministic.
The farmer’s unconditional maximization problem can be written as the so-
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lution to the dynamic programming problem:
Vt(S it−1, S −it−1,Zit,Z−it−1, Ait−1, Iit−1) = (4.2)
maxasEt
T∑
s=t
θs−t(aspims (S is−1, S −is−1,Zis−1,Z−is−1, Ais−1, Iis−1) + (1 − as)pic)
where S it represents the farmer’s own cumulative experience, S −it−1 the farmer’s
neighbors’ cumulative experience, Zit the farmer’s own exit, Z−it neighbors’ cu-
mulative exits, Ait the farmer’s assets, Iit the farmer’s irrigation, and θ ∈ [0, 1]
the discount factor. Equation 4.3 can be rewritten using Bellman’s equation:
Vt(S it−1, S −it−1,Zit−1,Z−it−1, Ait−1, Iit−1) = (4.3)
maxait(1 − ait)pic + aitEtpimt (S it−1, S −it−1,Zit−1,Z−it−1, Ait−1, Iit−1)
+θEtVt+1(S it, S −it,Zit,Z−it, Ait, Iit)
The farmer’s choice of ait in period t both directly affects his utility in period
t through changes in period t profit and also affects the optimal choice of ait+1
in the next period through changes in expected future profitability due to an
increased stock of own experience, S it.
We can solve for the farmer’s optimal solution to the value function at t = 0.
The first order condition is:
∂Vt
∂ait
: 0 ≤ −pic + Etpimt + θEt(
∂Vt+1
∂ait
) (4.4)
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which at time t=0 can be written:
pic − Etpimt ≤ θ(V1(1) − V1(0)) (4.5)
Equation 4.5 tells us that in period t = 0 the farmer will adopt as long as the
expected difference in profits is less than the discounted value of the informa-
tion he gains from participation.
A coordination problem results if farmer’s own participation in time t, ait
(assuming that ait is continuous) is increasing in his own assets Ait or irrigation
Iit. If this is the case for all farmers ( ∂a−i∂A−i > 0 or
∂a−i
∂I−i > 0) then an individual’s
lifetime utility will be increasing in neighbors’ participation and asset and irri-
gation stocks. If these cross-partials hold, there will be incentive for farmers to
delay participation and free-ride on the accumulating experimentation of neigh-
bors, i.e. to engage in strategic delay.
The special challenge of moving from modeling technology adoption to mar-
ket participation is that the purchaser may be directly or indirectly determining
the entry or exit of community farmers. A central challenge in this and similar
work is whether we can distinguish between correlated outcomes. Here, we
must distinguish between the supermarket offering farmers in a community a
coordinated set of offers and the participation decision being mediated through
social learning or diffusion. The effect in the data that we see for both of these
phenomenon is correlated market participation.
Our model and estimation take the locations of the supply chains and farm-
ers as given. We observe the full set of participants in the villages and argue
that this set of farmers was free to enter or exit the supply chain at any time,
conditional on the annual expansion of the supermarket supply chain supplier
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network. This is a reasonable assumption in the case of Nicaragua, where su-
permarket managers pit six roving buyers against one another, using competi-
tion between regions to guarantee that weekly supply quantities are met at the
lowest prices possible. Under pressure to meet strict regional quotas, the sourc-
ing has been historically chaotic. Buyers often over-commit with suppliers and
a farmer in a supply community would be largely free to determine his own
entry into the marketing chain, once the buyer was purchasing in his village.
Our results therefore seem most likely to describe social processes rather than a
coordinated roll-out of contracting offers by the supermarket.
4.4 Descriptives and construction of variables
The data were gathered in Nicaragua between September 2007 and July 2008
in collaboration with the Nitlapan Institute at the Universidad Centro Ameri-
cana and funded by the Social Science Research Council and the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) Assets and Market Access Col-
laborative Research Support Program (AMA CRSP). Two primary supermar-
ket retail corporations operate in Nicaragua: the ten-store domestic chain La
Colonia, and Wal-mart International, which purchased a controlling share in
Dutch AHOLD’s Central American holdings in 2006. By 2009, Wal-Mart had 46
Nicaraguan outlets. Michelson et al. (2010) describe the sector, the evolution of
respective procurement structures and the growth in retail and sourcing in the
Nicaraguan supermarket sector since 2000.
Researchers collected household and community-level data for 397 supplier
households in 141 communities. The 397 surveyed supermarket supplier farm-
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ers comprise the small population of Nicaraguan farmers who supplied horti-
culture to the two primary supermarket companies over some period between
2001 and 2008. As a part of a comprehensive household survey, suppliers were
asked to recall their history of participation in the supermarket supply chain,
including the years that they entered and, if they had exited by 2008, the year
that they exited.
Communities are defined administratively. Farmers are grouped by the
name of the community where they gave their residence and these groupings
were confirmed by GPS coordinates taken at the time of the interview. We drop
from the sample any communities where only one farmer supplied the super-
market between 2001 and 2008, leaving 322 suppliers in 66 communities. The
supplier population in each community is defined as all suppliers who sold to
the supermarket between 2001 and 2008.
The first two rows of Table 4.1 presents the annual share of total commu-
nity participants supplying the supermarket and the annual share of commu-
nity participants that had exited, by year. The mean participant share increases
until 2006, plateaus in 2007, and decreases in 2008. The mean share of exits (as
a share of total community suppliers) is by construction cumulative and there-
fore increases steadily over the eight year period. By 2008, the mean exit share
is nearly half of all suppliers who ever joined the supply chain between 2001
and 2008. The estimations for the determinants of the decision to participate in
time t use the t−1 variables for neighbors’ and own experience and exits, assets,
and irrigation. For this reason the 2001 column is blank in Table 4.1. Very few
farmers participated in 2000 and we do not observe experience variables until
2001.
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Participation experience variables
We use four measures of experience in our model and estimations: own ex-
perience, own exit, neighbors’ experience, and neighbors’ exit. First, as a mea-
sure of own experience, we use the sum of years the farmer participated up to
time t divided by t, the number of years of supermarket exposure 1, for example,
T∑
t=1
t = 1 in 2001,
T∑
t=1
t = 2 in 2002, etc.:
S it =
T∑
t=1
(ait|ait = 1)
T∑
t=1
t
(4.6)
Second, as a measure of farmer’s own exit, zit is equal to one in the year of
exit and all subsequent years and zero before and during participation. The zi’s
are summed over t and divided by t to yield Zit:
Zit =
T∑
t=1
(zit|zit = 1)
T∑
t=1
t
(4.7)
As a measure of neighbors’ experience, we use the sum of all neighbors’
years of experience in the supply chain divided by the number of neighbor-
observation years at time t. These are the tenure-weighted measures of neighbor
experience. For community j with a size n supplier population:
1Years of supermarket exposure is defined as the years elapsed since Nicaragua’s period of
supermarket intensfication began in 2001.
128
S −it =
n∑
k,i
T∑
t=1
(akt|akt = 1)
(n j − 1)
T∑
t=1
t
(4.8)
Cumulative neighbor exits in community j are constructed just as experience
was. As with the measure of individual exit, neighbors’ exit z−it is equal to one
in the year of exit and all subsequent years:
Z−it =
n∑
k,i
T∑
t=1
(zkt|zkt = 1)
(n j − 1)
T∑
t=1
t
(4.9)
We also construct and present in the last rows of Table 4.1 measures of expe-
rience and exit which disregard the tenure of neighbors’ experience in the sup-
ply chain. In these non-tenure-weighted measures each neighbors’ entry and
exit from the supply chain is counted once, rather than weighted by the length
of his relationship with the supermarket or the time since exit. These sums are
normalized by the total number of suppliers in the community, rather than the
total number of supplier-years.
The difference between the two sets of experience variables is that the non-
tenure-weighted measures give relatively more informational weight to farmers
with short spell length. The non-tenure-weighted neighbor experience will ap-
proach the community participation share in 2008 (the community mean value
in Table 4.1 is 0.55), and the non-tenure-weighted exit variable will approach the
proportion of exits in 2008. The correlations between these variables decrease
over time (as the number of participation years grows). The neighbors’ expe-
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rience variables are equivalent in t = 1 and the correlation decreases to 0.23 in
2008. The exit variable correlation is 0.86 in 2008.
Tenure-weighted measures are a continuous measure of neighbor experience
and capture mean neighbor spell-length in the supply chain. If both a neigh-
bor’s entry and length of supply relationship provide information to the farmer
than the number of total neighbor farmer-years in the supply chain will be a
better measure of the farmer’s full information set. We therefore run the estima-
tions with both sets of experience variables, tenure-weighted and not.
Also Table 4.1 includes annual mean asset holdings and irrigation. Assets
are compiled into an index using factor analysis, (Sahn and Stifel, 2000); we
include details regarding computation of the asset index in the first appendix.
Mean values suggest a pattern of asset and irrigation accumulation among par-
ticipants between 2001 and 2008. Note that because we report mean values, the
mean of own experience, assets, and irrigation are nearly equivalent to neigh-
bors’ experience, assets, and irrigation.
4.5 Estimation method
We are interested in the likelihood of participation, which depends on farmer
observed and unobserved characteristics as well as community characteristics.
If the unobserved farmer characteristics are uncorrelated with the set of ob-
served explanatory variables, they are in the error term. If, however, the unob-
served and the independent variables have some correlation, the omitted vari-
ables will bias the parameter estimates. In the case of market participation, it
is likely that there is some relationship between ability or risk preferences or
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unobserved social connections that is associated also with asset or irrigation
holdings and participation. The trouble is that we cannot use fixed effects in
binary panel data. Because the logit model is non-linear, fixed effects lead to
inconsistent estimation of the coefficients.
Chamberlain (1984), proposed a method for fixed effects in logit models that
involves maximizing a conditional likelihood function. Using this conditional
logit model we can control time-constant unobserved farmer heterogeneity. The
logit distribution for participation is written:
P(ait = 1|β, γ, xit, zit, δi) = exp(β
′xit + γ′zit + δi)
1 + exp(β′xit + γ′zit + δi)
(4.10)
Where ait is a binary variable equal to one if farmer i decides to participate
in the market at time t and equal to zero otherwise. The estimable coefficients β
and γ are vectors, xit is a matrix of observed variables that influence participa-
tion, zit are our own and neighbors’ experience variables of interest, and δi is a
time-invariant unobserved individual-specific parameter that influences partic-
ipation.
Chamberlain (1984) argues that a sufficient statistic for the farmer effect, δi,
is
T∑
t=1
ait, the farmer proportion of observed positive outcomes. Here, we are
conditioning on the number of years that an individual farmer participated in
the supply chain. The δ estimated determines the overall proportion of partici-
pation years for any farmer, and β, γ, z and x determine the years in which the
farmer’s participation is most likely.
Following Madalla (1987), consider the case of the fixed effects logistic func-
tion where the number of time periods equals T = 2. Four patterns of partici-
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pation in the supermarket supply chain are possible: the farmer can participate
and then not participate (1,0), not participate and then participate (0,1), or par-
ticipate or not participate in both periods (1,1) or (0,0), respectively. Cases in
which participation does not change over the full tenure of the observations,
where
∑
ait = T or
∑
ait = 0, don’t contribute any information to the conditional
likelihood function and are discarded.
It can be shown (Maddala, 1987) that for T = 2:
P(0, 1) =
1
1 + exp(β′xi1 + γ′zi1 + δi)
∗ exp(β
′xi2 + γ′zi2 + δi)
1 + exp(β′xi2 + γ′zi2 + δi)
(4.11)
P(1, 0) =
exp(β′xi1 + γ′zi1 + δi)
1 + exp(β′xi1 + γ′zi1 + δi)
∗ 1
1 + exp(β′xi2 + γ′zi2 + δi)
(4.12)
And that the conditional probability when T = 2:
P[(1, 0)|(1, 0) or (0, 1)] = P(1, 0)
P(1, 0) + P(0, 1)
=
exp[β′(xi1 − xi2) + γ′(zi1 − zi2)]
1 + exp[β′(xi1 − xi2) + γ′(zi1 − zi2)]
(4.13)
Maddala (1987) presents the T = 3 case. Two participation sets must be
considered,
T∑
t=1
ait = 1 and
T∑
t=1
ait = 2. For a general T, one considers the sets
T∑
t=1
ait = 1, 2, ...(T − 1). For example, for the set
T∑
t=1
ait = 1, when an individual
participates in one of three years we derive:
P(1, 0, 0 |
T∑
t=1
ait = 1) =
exp[β′(xi1 − xi3)]
1 + exp[β′(xi1 − xi3)] + exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)]
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P(0, 1, 0 |
T∑
t=1
ait = 1) =
exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)]
1 + exp[β′(xi1 − xi3)] + exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)]
and P(0, 0, 1 |
T∑
t=1
ait = 1) =
1
1 + exp[β′(xi1 − xi3)] + exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)]
And for the set
T∑
t=1
ait = 2,
P(0, 1, 1 |
T∑
t=1
ait = 2) =
exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)]
1 + exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)] + exp[β′(xi2 − xi1)]
P(1, 0, 1 |
T∑
t=1
ait = 2) =
exp[β′(xi2 − xi1)]
1 + exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)] + exp[β′(xi2 − xi1)]
and P(1, 0, 1 |
T∑
t=1
ait = 2) =
1
1 + exp[β′(xi2 − xi3)] + exp[β′(xi2 − xi1)]
The estimating equation for the general case is:
P(ai = 1|xit−1, xit, zit−1, zit,∑ ait = 1) =
G[β(xt−1− xt)+γ1(S it−1−S it)+γ2(S −it−1−S −it)+γ3(Z−it−1−Z−it)+γ4(Zit−1−Zit)] (4.14)
where G is the logistic distribution. In equation 4.14, we break the experience
vector z into its components: own experience, S it, neighbor experience, S −it, own
exit, Zit, and neighbor exit, Z−it. The x vector includes annual own and neigh-
bors’ mean asset and irrigation stocks; β1 and β2 are estimated coefficients on
own and neighbor assets and β3 and β4 are estimated coefficients on own and
neighbors’ irrigation.
Given that participation status changed for farmers between 2001 and 2008,
this model can explain the probability that the farmer joined the supply chain.
We estimate the parameters of interest on neighbors’ experience and exit,
purged of bias resulting from any time-invariant omitted variables.
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The dependent variable, farmer participation in year t, is equal to one if he
or she sold to the supermarket during a given year and zero otherwise. We
use annual dummy variables for the years 2001 to 2008 to capture changes in
supermarket purchasing trends and strategies over the sample period. We also
condition on prior period t − 1 participation status.
Based on the predictions from the lifecycle model in Section 4.3 we use the
T = 7 expansion of equation 4.14 to test the following hypotheses:
1. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by own
experience:
H0 : γ1 = 0 vs. HA : γ1 > 0
2. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by
neighbors’ cumulative participation:
H0 : γ2 = 0 vs. HA : γ2 > 0
3. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by
neighbors’ cumulative exits from the supply chain:
H0 : γ3 = 0 vs. HA : γ3 < 0
4. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by his
own exits from the supply chain:
H0 : γ4 = 0 vs. HA : γ4 < 0
5. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by his
asset holdings:
H0 : β1 = 0 vs. HA : β2 < 0
6. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by
neighbors’ mean asset holdings (evidence of strategic delay):
H0 : β2 = 0 vs. HA : β2 < 0
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7. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is positively influenced by his
irrigation:
H0 : β3 = 0 vs. HA : β3 < 0
8. Farmers’ participation in the supply chain is negatively influenced by
neighbors’ mean irrigation (evidence of strategic delay):
H0 : β4 = 0 vs. HA : β4 < 0
9. On the margin, observing a neighbors’ exit from the supply chain is
a stronger influence on farmer participation than observing additional
neighbors’ participation:
H0 : |γ3| = |γ2| vs. HA : |γ3| > |γ2|
Using interaction terms, we can also test whether the relative marginal effect
of observing neighbor entrance versus exit is stronger for a farmer already par-
ticipating than a farmer yet to enter the supply chain. We use quadratic terms
to test for diminishing returns to farmer observations of neighbors’ and own
experience and exits, S it, S −it, Zit, and Z−it.
4.6 Results
Resultsfrom all models suggest a strong significant influence of neighbors’ exit
on farmers’ participation decision. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the results from the
six specifications of the fixed effects conditional logit models. Results are largely
consistent across the six specifications. Neighbors’ exit in time t − 1 is a strong
negative predictor of the farmer’s participation in time t. Likewise mean neigh-
bor assets in time t−1 are a strong negative predictor of a farmer’s participation
in time t, evidence of strategic delay. On the margin, observing a neighbors’ exit
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from the supply chain is a stronger influence on farmer participation than ob-
serving additional neighbors’ participation and we reject the hypothesis that the
absolute values of γ2 and γ3 are equal (χ2= 0.34). Surprisingly, a farmer’s own
experience is an overall negative predictor of participation in the following pe-
riod. This may reflect the fact that the likelihood of farmer exit is increasing in
years of experimentation and may be evidence of the decreasing profitability of
the supply relationship as more farmers in the community and/or region enter
the supply channel.
Model (1) uses the tenure-weighted neighbor experience variables. In Model
(2) we test for the presence of quadratic effects on all experience variables; we
find strong evidence of diminishing effects of neighbors’ exit on the farmer’s de-
cision to enter. In all models, we reject the hypothesis that the absolute values
of the coefficients on neighbors’ exit and neighbors’ experience are equivalent.
In all models, neighbors’ exit is a significantly stronger determinant than neigh-
bors’ experience. Model (3) adds the effects of interactions between neighbor
participation and exit with the farmer’s t − 1 participation status. Model (3)
therefore permits comparison of the effect of viewing additional neighbors’ ex-
perience or neighbor exits on farmers who have not yet entered the channel vs.
the effect of those variables on farmers who are already in the supply chain.
Models (4), (5), and (6) rerun Models (1), (2), and (3) but using the non tenure-
weighted neighbor experience variables.
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Because the conditional logit fixed effects results are based only on the sam-
ple of farmers who joined the marketing channel between 2001 and 2008 but
excludes those who do not change their participation status over this period
(primarily those who never join as there are very few farmers who supply con-
tinuously between 2001 and 2008), the coefficients are relevant to a model of the
likelihood of participation among farmers who have joined the supply chain.
The sample excludes (and we do not observe) farmers who are dissuaded by
their observations of neighbors’ participation, outcomes, and exits, from ever
joining. Because we do not observe farmers who saw the exits and experiences
of neighbors in the community and never adopted, the total negative effect from
learning neighbors’ exit in the community may be larger than estimated here.
Is the effect of viewing a neighbor exit the supply chain stronger for a farmer
who is already selling to a supermarket or for a farmer contemplating entry?
Our results indicate that a farmer takes more seriously a neighbors’ exit if the
farmer is already himself in the channel. Interactions in Models (3) and (6) allow
us to compare the relative influence of neighbors participation and exit depend-
ing on whether the deciding farmer is in or out of the supply chain. In both
models we find evidence of a significantly stronger negative effect of neighbor
exit on the participation of farmers in the supply chain than on farmers out of
the supply chain. If a farmer is in the channel, a neighbor’s exit yields an ad-
ditional change in the log odds of participation in the subsequent year of 0.014
over the 0.001 base. This means that a farmer in the channel is ten percent less
likely, relative to a farmer who is not in the channel, to participate in the sup-
ply chain if he witnesses an increase in the proportion of neighbors who have
exited.
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The year dummy variables are positive and significant, increasing in mag-
nitude over time, demonstrating the aggregate growth in the number of total
suppliers employed by the supermarket over the sample period.
Evidence of strategic delay, that farmer’s own participation in t is signifi-
cantly negatively influenced by his neighbors’ mean asset levels, suggests fur-
ther evidence that the effect we measure is a social process rather than a firm
strategy of contract dissemination. In our analysis of farmer participation in
the supply chain in Chapter 3 of this dissertation we find no evidence of selec-
tion of farmers on assets, suggesting that the firms are not targeting wealthier
farmers first, delaying or withholding contracts to their poor neighbors. There
is therefore no clear explanation of a significant negative relationship between
farmer market participation and neighbor assets if the participation dynamics
we document are exclusively firm-mediated.
4.7 Discussion and conclusions
This research investigates the existence of social influences on farmers’ partici-
pation in modern markets. We use a panel of 397 farmers over seven years to
control for farmer fixed effects in a conditional logit model of adoption. Con-
sistent with the recent literature on social processes in technology adoption, our
results support the hypotheses that farmers learn from neighbors’ experience in
and exit from a new marketing channel, not only regarding their initial adop-
tion decision but even once they are already in the supply channel. That is, their
subsequent decision whether to continue with the marketing channel once they
have already entered is strongly influenced by the decision of their neighbors
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to exit or continue. Farmers may be persuaded by their neighbors’ exit that the
channel is not as remunerative as expected or they may find in the subsequent
period that there were scale economies in production or post-harvest process-
ing that can no longer be realized with a smaller n. Evidence that likelihood
of participation increased with the exit of neighbors would suggest that there
were local gains to a neighbor’s exit through increased own supply quantities
for example. Our evidence does not support this hypothesis.
While data limitations require that we remain agnostic regarding whether
the social phenomenon we document is social learning or mimicry, our results
provide clear evidence that farmers’ participation in modern markets is influ-
enced through social processes. An implication both of the presence of strategic
delay and of non-contracting farmers (who we do not observe) staying out of the
modern channel based on the observed experiences of their neighbors is that, if
there is a net cost to entry and exit, some farmers may pay a price for early
experimentation. Our analysis cannot explain initial farmer entry into the sup-
ply chain and further study characterizing the participation of the first-adopter
and the sequence of adoption would be interesting. A related issue for future
study is whether farmers with limited community social connections might be
excluded from information networks that would inform them about the prof-
itability of a new marketing opportunity.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF ASSET INDICES
Construction of an index of household assets requires reduction of the di-
mensionality of the asset portfolio. With household-specific data on asset prices
that would capture quality differences, one might weight each household’s as-
sets by the household-specific vector of asset prices and sum weighted compo-
nents of the portfolio of assets into a single measure. In the absence of such data,
economists have turned to principal components analysis (Filmer and Pritchett,
2001; McKenzie, 2005; Moser and Felton, 2009; Vyas and Kumaranayake, 2006)
and factor analysis (Naschold, 2009; Sahn and Stifel, 2000) to derive weights for
an asset index.
The primary difference between principal components analysis and factor
analysis is that principal components analysis assumes that all variability in an
asset should be used in the analysis. In factor analysis, the relevant variance in
an asset holding across households is only the variance that it shares with other
assets. For this reason, factor analysis is often a preferred method for detecting
structure among variables.
Lacking data on the quality of assets, we apply factor analysis to house-
hold asset holdings to derive two indices of asset holdings for two different
years: productive assets in 2000 and 2007 and consumer durables in 2000 and
2007. Following Sahn and Stifel (2000), we assume the existence of a single com-
mon factor representing welfare that determines the variance in asset holdings
across households. We use these indices in the analysis both as controls for 2000
wealth in the placement, selection, and welfare equations and as measures of
2007 household welfare themselves.
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Factor analysis in the construction of asset indices is most effective when
there is a high degree of correlation between assets but also variation in the dis-
tribution of correlated holdings across households. Therefore, to increase ana-
lytical and interpretive precision we break a households’ assets in two classes:
productive assets and consumer durables, calculating separate indices for each
asset class. In this way we can differentiate household wealth in two dimen-
sions in the analysis. Productive assets in the index are listed in Table A.1 and
consumer durables in Table A.2. Productive assets include productive agricul-
tural assets – durable assets of use in agricultural production or marketing such
as farm tools, transportation, and communications technologies. Consumer
durables includes the remainder of household durable assets. We exclude out
durable assets for which we only observe 2007 levels – primarily information
regarding conditions of the home such as number of rooms and the sources of
water, light and and sanitation. Because we include landholdings and irriga-
tion in 2000 and 2007 separately in the regressions they are not included in the
construction of the asset indices.
Households in the sample exhibit a high range in portfolios of productive as-
sets (Tables A.1 and A.2). The majority of households have at least one portable
sprayer and many households report ownership of cellular phones and bicy-
cles in 2007. However, some households have multiple forms of four-wheeled
motorized transport, tractors, or grain storage silos.
To permit comparison of the indices across time, we pool observations on as-
sets from 2000 and 2007. We find factor scores are positive for all durable assets.
Results from the first factor of the factor analysis are presented in the far right
column in Tables A.1 and A.2. Note that we present asset descriptive statistics
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Table A.1: Results of principal components analysis, productive assets
Variable Mean Std. deviation min max Factor score
Tractor, 2007 0.045 0.234 0 3 0.047
Tractor 0.031 0.199 0 3
Ox plow, 2007 0.248 0.504 0 4 0.129
Ox plow 0.107 0.341 0 4
Ox cart, 2007 0.140 0.412 0 6 0.076
Ox cart 0.066 0.283 0 4
Portable sprayer, 2007 0.999 1.038 0 6 0.154
Portable sprayer 0.373 0.748 0 6
Motorized sprayer, 2007 0.089 0.423 0 6 0.079
Motorized sprayer 0.019 0.151 0 2
Chainsaw, 2007 0.042 0.232 0 3 0.128
Chainsaw 0.012 0.127 0 2
Irrigation pump, 2007 0.260 0.570 0 5 0.087
Irrigation pump 0.050 0.223 0 2
Electric generator, 2007 0.028 0.165 0 1 0.066
Electric generator 0.002 0.048 0 1
Motorized transport*, 2007 0.127 0.452 0 7 0.108
Motorized transport 0.042 0.232 0 3
Livestock corral, 2007 0.173 0.405 0 3 0.155
Livestock corral 0.111 0.332 0 3
Pilas, 2007 0.182 0.506 0 4 0.121
Pilas 0.083 0.347 0 4
Bodegas, 2007 0.067 0.309 0 5 0.217
Bodegas 0.039 0.252 0 5
Grain storage silo, 2007 0.280 0.844 0 8 0.097
Grain storage silo 0.138 0.657 0 8
Irrigation well, 2007 0.104 0.361 0 4 0.046
Irrigation well 0.059 0.272 0 3
Represas, 2007 0.032 0.346 0 8 0.175
Represas 0.024 0.331 0 8
Bicycle, 2007 0.468 0.707 0 4 0.073
Bicycle 0.067 0.285 0 3
Motorcycle, 2007 0.059 0.268 0 3 0.045
Motorcycle 0.007 0.083 0 1
Telephone, 2007 0.037 0.201 0 2 0.045
Telephone 0.007 0.096 0 2
Cellular phone, 2007 0.480 0.749 0 5 0.108
Cellular phone 0.008 0.132 0 3
*sum of all 4-wheeled vehicles including trucks, commercial trucks, and cars
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Table A.2: Results of principal components analysis, consumer durables
Variable Mean Std. deviation min max Factor score
Radio, 2007 0.459 0.512 0 3 0.023
Radio 0.144 0.354 0 2
Television BW, 2007 0.139 0.362 0 3 0.020
Television BW 0.042 0.217 0 3
Television Color, 2007 0.560 0.573 0 4 0.672
Television Color 0.094 0.336 0 3
Refrigerator, 2007 0.252 0.450 0 3 0.703
Refrigerator 0.051 0.225 0 2
Mixer, 2007 0.208 0.415 0 3 0.629
Mixer 0.0451 0.208 0 1
Iron, 2007 0.429 0.520 0 3 0.587
Iron 0.098 0.302 0 2
Grinder, 2007 0 .292 0.467 0 3 0.108
Grinder 0.089 0.285 0 1
Tape recorder, 2007 0.164 0.380 0 2 0.228
Tape recorder 0.035 0.183 0 1
Stereo equipment, 2007 0.247 0.437 0 2 0.632
Stereo equipment 0.029 0.174 0 2
Electric fan, 2007 0.175 0.460 0 3 0.542
Electric fan 0.025 0.197 0 3
Blender, 2007 0.177 0.394 0 2 0.675
Blender 0.034 0.180 0 1
Toaster, 2007 0.013 0.112 0 1 0.205
Toaster 0.002 0.048 0 1
Oven, 2007 0.017 0.131 0 1 0.204
Oven 0.006 0.076 0 1
Microwave, 2007 0.035 0.183 0 1 0.407
Microwave 0.002 0.048 0 1
Rice-maker, 2007 0.036 0.192 0 2 0.384
Rice-maker 0.005 0.068 0 1
Washing machine, 2007 0.019 0.143 0 2 0.266
Washing machine 0.001 0.034 0 1
Sewing machine, 2007 0.095 0.320 0 3 0.201
Sewing machine 0.032 0.177 0 1
Boat, 2007 0.009 0.118 0 2 0.032
Boat 0.002 0.048 0 1
CD player, 2007 0.126 0.353 0 4 0.441
CD player 0.002 0.048 0 1
Books, 2007 1.30 34.187 0 1000 0.066
Books 1.28 34.186 0 1000
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disaggregated by years but because the year observations are pooled in the cal-
culation of the index, the factor score is for the asset with years pooled and is
not year-specific. The eigenvalue for the first factor of the productive asset fac-
tor analysis is 2.46 and explains 69.4 percent of the variation. For the consumer
durables, the corresponding eigenvalue is 3.61, explainging 85.6 percent of the
variation. Retention of only the first factor is necessary for computation of the
index but here passes the Kaiser criterion (1960), which requires that all factors
with eigenvalues greater than one be retained.
Table A.3: Correlations among computed asset indices, 2000 and 2007
Productive Productive Consumer durables
assets, 2007 assets, 2000 2007
Productive assets, 2007
Productive assets, 2000 0.781
Consumer durables, 2007 0.416 0.319
Consumer durables, 2000 0.342 0.357 0.545
Table A presents the correlation coefficients between productive and con-
sumer durables indices for 2000 and 2007. As should be expected, there are
strong correlations between household productive asset holdings between 2000
and 2007 as well as consumer durables indices across years. Relationships be-
tween consumer durables and productive assets for a given year are weaker.
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APPENDIX B
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
In this appendix we include in Tables B.1, B.2, and B.3 the results of the
second stage instrumental variables regressions with different permutations of
the instrumental variables set in the three first-stage regressions.
Each table includes in the first column the coefficient estimates from the
instrumental variables welfare effects equations in Chapter 3. Subsequent
columns run the same second stage regressions, with the same second and first
stage controls, but iteratively subtract instruments from the set to check the sen-
sitivity of the findings. The magnitude and sign of the significant coefficients ex-
hibit minimal change and results from the three welfare effects estimations are
found to be robust to variation in the set of instrumental variables employed.
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APPENDIX C
REGRESSION RESULTS: FARMER INVESTMENT IN LAND, CONSUMER
DURABLES (2008–2000) AND LIVESTOCK HOLDINGS (2007)
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Table C.1: Results of OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions,
effect of supplier-status on consumer durables accumulation,
2000-08
Consumer
durables
index, ∆ 2008–2000
(1) (2)
Explanatory variables OLS IV
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1), level effect 0.19 -0.29
(0.17) (0.32)
α Relationship tenure (years), growth effect -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.05)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) 0.11 0.32
(0.15) (0.33)
Supermarket supplier*Basic grains before supplier -0.06 -0.34
(0.23) (0.29)
Relationship tenure*Basic grains before supplier -0.03 0.09
(0.06) (0.08)
Discontinued supplier*Basic grains before supplier -0.08 -0.68**
(0.19) (0.35)
Supermarket supplier*NGO assisted -0.07 -0.13
(0.22) (0.27)
Relationship tenure*NGO assisted 0.02 0.06
(0.06) (0.07)
Discontinued supplier*NGO assisted 0.34 0.01
(0.24) (0.35)
Productive Assets, 2000 0.22** 0.22*
(0.10) (0.11))
Consumer durables, 2000 -0.03 -0.89
(0.07) (0.08)
Land, 2000 0.001 0.08
(0.002) (0.002)
n 849 849
R2 0.227
Note: Errors are clustered at the community level and IV standard errors (2) are bootstrapped.
Household demographic, community, regional, and crop controls are included regressors in all
models.
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Table C.2: Results of OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions, ef-
fect of supplier-status on land accumulation, 2000-08
Landholdings change
2008–2000
(3) (4)
Explanatory variables OLS IV
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1), level effect 0.71 -1.15
(1.02) (2.23)
α Relationship tenure (years), growth effect 0.10 0.22
(0.20) (0.33)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) 1.35 1.16
(1.23) (2.15)
Supermarket supplier*Basic grains before supplier -1.90 -0.57
(1.43) (1.24)
Relationship tenure*Basic grains before supplier 0.50 0.30
(0.51) (0.46)
Discontinued supplier*Basic grains before supplier -0.11* -2.92
(1.17) (1.97)
Supermarket supplier*NGO assisted -0.27 0.33
(1.85) (1.36)
Relationship tenure*NGO assisted -0.20 0.37
(0.40) (0.56)
Discontinued supplier*NGO assisted -1.25 -2.29
(0.92) (2.18)
Productive Assets, 2000 0.15 0.22
(0.49) (0.51)
Consumer durables, 2000 0.35 0.25
(0.61) (0.63)
Land, 2000 -0.05** -0.05**
(0.02) (0.02)
n 830 830
R2 0.342
Note: Errors are clustered at the community level and IV standard errors in (4) are bootstrapped.
Household demographic, community, regional, and crop controls are included regressors in all
models.
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Table C.3: Results of OLS and instrumental variables (IV) regressions, ef-
fect of supplier-status on 2007 livestock tropical livestock units
(TLUs)
Dependent variable: Livestock TLU, 2007
(1) (2)
OLS IV
β1 Supermarket supplier (0/1) 1.91 1.29
(1.34) (2.90)
α Relationship tenure (years) -0.41* -0.20
(0.24) (0.39)
β2 Discontinued supplier (0/1) 0.66 0.002
(1.36) (3.24)
Supermarket supplier*Basic grains before supplier -2.95* -0.67
(1.60) (1.90)
Relationship tenure*Basic grains before supplier 0.60 0.14
(0.43) (0.50)
Discontinued supplier*Basic grains before supplier 2.53 0.37
(1.79) (3.14)
Supermarket supplier*NGO assisted -1.92 -0.28
(1.40) (1.91)
Relationship tenure*NGO assisted -0.03 -0.06
(0.44) (0.54)
Discontinued supplier*NGO assisted 1.81 -2.50
(2.27) (4.22)
Productive Assets, 2000 3.86*** 3.92***
(0.62) ( 0.84)
Consumer durables, 2000 0.24 0.17
(0.62) (0.76)
Land, 2000 0.23*** 0.22***
(0.04) (0.04)
n 840 840
R2 0.451
Note: Errors are clustered at the community level and IV standard errors (2) are bootstrapped.
Household demographic, community, regional, and crop controls are included regressors in all
models.
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 2 
SECCIÓN  2.  INGRESOS NO AGROPECUARIOS 
 
2A. Trabajo Asalariado Temporal o Permanente 
 
2.1 ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún miembro del hogar trabajó para otra persona, finca o empresa - o permanente o 
temporalmente?  
 
Sí………. 1  ! REGISTRE LOS DATOS DE CADA ACTIVIDAD EN EL CUADRO 2A 
No……… 2  ! PASE A LA PREGUNTA 2.2 
 
 !MENCIONE EL NOMBRE DE CADA MIEMBRO MAYOR DE 12 AÑOS 
!  REGISTRE CUALQUIER ACTIVIDAD PARA LA CUAL RECIBIO UN PAGO.  SE INCLUYE, POR 
EJEMPLO, TANTO EL MIEMBRO QUE TRABAJO TRES JORNALES EN EL CORTE DE CAFE COMO EL 
MIEMBRO QUE TRABAJO TODO EL AÑO COMO MEDICO. 
  
Cuadro 2A.  Trabajo Asalariado  (Venta de fuerza de trabajo por salario o por tarea) 
1. 
No. de 
Orden 
 
 
 
 
[C2AYB_P1] 
2. 
Código 
Personal 
 
(de la página 
1) 
 
[C2AB_P2] 
3. 
Tipo de 
Trabajo 
 
1=Obrero agrícola 
2=Obrero no agrícola 
3=Profesional 
      [C2A_P3] 
4. 
¿Cuántos meses 
trabajó en los 
últimos 12 meses? 
(en este trabajo) 
 
meses 
[C2A_P4] 
5. 
¿Cuánto ganó en promedio  
por  mes? 
 
(incluya pago en efectivo, especie, y 
mano vuelta) 
                        C$ 
                 [C2A_P5] 
6.  
Ingreso total en los 
ultimos 12 meses: 
 
(4 X 5) 
 
              C$ 
        [C2A_P6] 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
 
2B. Trabajo por Cuenta Propia 
 
2.2 ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún miembro del hogar ha manejado un negocio o trabajado por cuenta propia? 
 
Sí………. 1  ! REGISTRE LOS DATOS DE CADA ACTIVIDAD EN EL CUADRO 2B 
No……… 2  ! PASE A LA PREGUNTA 2.3 
 
Cuadro 2B.  Trabajo por Cuenta Propia 
1. 
No. de 
orden 
2. 
Tipo de 
negocio/ 
actividad 
3. 
¿Quién 
maneja este 
negocio/activi
dad? 
4. 
Además de esta 
persona: ¿Cuántos 
otros miembros del 
hogar trabajan 
regularmente en 
este negocio? 
5. 
¿En cuántos de los 
últimos 12 meses 
se realizó esta 
actividad/negocio? 
En el último mes que se realizó esta 
actividad; 
 ¿Cuáles fueron las: 
8. 
¿Las 
ganancias de  
ese mes 
fueron: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[C2AYB_P
1] 
 
Clave 1 
 
 
 
[C2B_P2] 
 
(Código 
personal) 
 
 
 
[C2AYB_P2] 
 
 
 
 
 
[C2B_P3] 
 
 
 
 
 
[C2B_P4] 
6.  
¿Ventas 
Brutas? 
 
C$ 
 
[C2B_P5] 
7. 
¿Ganancias? 
(ventas brutas menos 
costos globales) 
             
              C$ 
         [C2B_P6] 
1. Normales 
2. Menos de 
normal 
3. Más de 
normal 
 
     [C2B_P7] 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
 
Clave 1: 
1. COMERCIO: Actividades donde se REVENDE cualquier producto. Es decir, que la persona que realiza la actividad no transforma el producto, 
sólo realiza actividades de compra o venta: pulpería, ferretería, abarrotes, venta de ropa,  etc 
2. SERVICIO: Actividades a través de las cuales se presta un servicio a la comunidad: servicios de reparación, transporte, belleza, costura, 
jardinería, lavado y planchado, etc 
3. PROCESAMIENTO DE ALIMENTOS: Actividad donde la persona que la realiza transforman los alimentos: nacatamales, rosquillas, fritanga, 
comiderías, cuajada, queso, etc 
4. PEQUEÑA INDUSTRIA: Actividad donde la persona que la realiza transforman los productos: cloro, jabón, bloques, ladrillos, verjas, etc 
5. ARTESANIAS: Al igual que en la industria la persona que realiza la actividad transforma la materia prima, pero de forma manual y rústica: 
canastos, sombreros, hamaca, productos de madera, barro, etc 
6. OTRAS ACTIVIDADES: Cualquier actividad que no pueda ser incluída en las anteriores categorías. 
NOTA: Si tiene dudas de una actividad, ponga el nombre y luego la persona que codifique la encuesta le pondrá la clave correspondiente 
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2C. Transferencias Recibidas e Ingreso por Alquiler 
 
2.3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún miembro del hogar recibió alguno de los siguientes tipos de ingreso:  
1. Pensión o jubilación 
2.  Asistencia del:  gobierno, iglesia, u otro grupo 
3. Herencia  
              4. Ingreso por alquiler de un predio no agrícola, cuarto, maquinaria u otro bien? 
  
Sí………. 1  ! REGISTRE LOS DATOS DE CADA TRANSFERENCIA O ALQUILER EN EL CUADRO 2C 
No……… 2  ! PASE A LA PREGUNTA 2.4 
 
 
Cuadro 2C.  Transferencias e Ingreso por Alquiler 
1. 
No. de 
Orden 
 
 
 
[C2C_P1] 
2. 
Tipo de 
Transferencia 
 
 
Clave 1 
[C2C_P2] 
3. 
¿Quién la recibió? 
 
 
 
Código Personal 
             [C2C_P3] 
4. 
¿Cuántas veces la recibió  
en los últimos 12 meses? 
 
 
 
[C2C_P4] 
5. 
¿Cuánto recibió cada vez? 
                        C$ 
 
(si recibió en comida o bienes,  
indique el valor aproximado)  
[C2C_P5] 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
10     
Clave 1  
1.Pensión de  jubilación 
2.Pensión de discapacidad 
3.Pensión de viudez 
4.Pago de  jubilado pagado por empleador privado 
5.Compensación de trabajador lastimado 
 
6.Donación  de orfandad (<18) 
7.Donación estatal para madre y niños 
8. Asistencia de la iglesia 
9. Asistencia de otro grupo 
10.Pagos de intereses de valores  u otros 
bienes 
 
11.Dinero heredado 
12,Comida suplementaria 
gubernamental  
13.Asistencia a veteranos o por 
muerto en combate 
14. Alquiler de predio o casa 
15. Alquiler de maquinaria u otro 
bien 
16.Otro 
(especifique):__________________
___ 
 
  
 
2D. Remesas Y Contribuciones Recibidas por el Hogar 
 
2.4. Hay familiares u otras personas que no son residentes del hogar quienes mandan dinero, comida o otro tipo de 
contribución a este hogar? (ES DECIR, RECIBIDO POR UN MIEMBRO RESIDENTE DEL HOGAR) 
Sí………. 1  !  REGISTRE LOS DATOS DE CADA REMITENTE EN EL CUADRO 2D 
No……… 2  !  PASE A LA SECCION 3 
 
Cuadro 2D.  Remesas Recibidas   (NOTE: DINERO O PRESTAMOS DE BIENES QUE SE ESPERAN QUE 
SERAN REPAGADOS DEBERIAN DE INCLUIRSE EN SECCION 8, NO AQUI) 
1 2. 3. 4. 5. En los últimos 12 meses: 
 
¿Cuál fue el total 
recibido de esta persona 
en efectivo? 
 
 
¿Cuál fue el total 
recibido de esta persona 
en comida o bienes? 
C$ 
              
No. de 
Orden 
 
 
 
 
 
[C2D_P
1] 
Nombre de la 
persona que 
envía dinero o 
productos 
 
 
 
 
[C2D_P2] 
¿Dónde se 
encuentra 
[…] ahora? 
 
 
Clave 1 
 
  [C2D_P3] 
¿Quién en el 
hogar recibió 
la remesa? 
  
 
-Código 
personal 
-00 si a todos 
 
[C2D_P4] 
¿Qué 
relación 
tiene  el 
remitente 
con el jefe 
del hogar? 
 
Clave 2 
[C2D_P5] 
6. 
¿Cuántas 
veces 
recibieron 
envíos de 
esta 
persona? 
 
 
 
[C2D_P6] 
7. 
Monto 
 
[C2D_P7] 
8. 
Moneda 
1. C$ 
2. USD$ 
[C2D_P7b] 
9. 
Monto 
 
[C2D_P8] 
10. 
Moneda 
1. C$ 
2. USD$ 
[C2D_P8b] 
 
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
Clave 1 Clave 2 
1 Managua 
2 En el mismo departamento 
3 Fuera de departamento 
4 Costa Rica. 
5 Otro País en América Central 
6 México 
7 USA 
8. Canada 
9.Otro País en América 
Latina 
10  Europa 
11 Otro continente 
1. Jefe 
2. Cónyuge 
3. Hijo/a 
4. Padre/madre 
5. Abuelo/abuela 
6. Hermano/a 
7. Otro familiar 
8. No familiar 
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d
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1
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. K
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u
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e tierra 
p
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 1
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S
u
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2
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6. 
¿E
n
 q
u
é añ
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q
u
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7. 
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so p
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d
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d
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 7 
SECCION 4.  ACTIVIDAD AGRICOLA 
 
Producción y Destino de Cultivos Anuales y Permanentes 
 
 Puede decir cuales cultivos sembró el año pasado (ciclo agícola 2007-2008)?  
SI NO SEMBRO CULTIVOS, PASE A 4E 
 
Cuadro 4A.  Producción y Destino de Cultivos Anuales en el ciclo agícola 2007-2008. 
PRIMERA (1) [CICLO] 
4.  
U/M 
 
 
 
6.  
Cantidad que 
vendio en 2007 
7.  
U/M 
 
8. 
Precio 
9. 
 
Total 
1. 
Nombre de 
cultivo 
 
Clave 1 
2. 
Area 
Sembrada 
 
 
Mzs. 
3. 
Producción  
Total Obtenida 
 
Cantidad 
Clave 2 
5. 
Año en que usted 
empezo a cultivar 
este cultivo en la 
temporada 
primera Cantidad Clave 2 $C $C 
[C4A_P1] [C4A_P2] [C4A_P3] [C4A_P4] [C4A_P5] [C4A_P6] [C4A_P7] [C4A_P8] [C4A_P9] 
          
          
          
          
          
          
POSTRERA (2) 
U/M 
 
Año en que usted 
empezo a cultivar 
este cultivo en la 
temporada 
prostrera 
 
Cantidad que 
vendio en 2007 
 
U/M 
 
 
Precio 
 
 
Total 
Nombre de 
cultivo 
 
Clave 1 
Area 
Sembrada 
 
 
Mzs 
Producción  
Total Obtenida 
 
Cantidad 
Clave 2  Cantidad Clave 2 $C $C 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
APANTE (3) 
U/M 
 
Año en que usted 
empezo a cultivar 
este cultivo en la 
temporada apante 
 
Cantidad que 
vendio en 2007 
 
U/M 
 
 
Precio 
 
 
Total 
Nombre de 
cultivo 
 
Clave 1 
Area 
Sembrada 
 
 
Mzs 
Producción  
Total Obtenida 
 
Cantidad 
Clave 2  Cantidad Clave 2 $C $C 
         
         
         
         
         
Clave 1: Nombre de Cultivo 
1. Maiz     2. Frijol   3. Arroz  4. Sorgo Industrial  5. Sorgo Millon  6. Sorgo Blanco  7. Sorgo Escobero  8. Ajonjolí  9. Maní  10. Soya  11. Café  12. Cacao 
13. Yuca  14. Malanga  15. Quesquisque  16. Musaceas  17. Cebolla 18. Chiltoma  19. Zanahoria  20. Ayote  21. Papa  22. Jengibre  23. Chile  24. Tomate 
25. Pipian  26. Ajo  27. Sandía  28. Otras Frutas  29. Pitahaya  30. Cítricos  31. Repollo  32. Caña de azucar  33. Piña  34. Aguacate  35. Tempate 
36. Tamarindo  37. Especias maderables  38. Otro, especifique 
 
Clave 2: Unidad de Medida 
 1. QQ   2. Unidad   3. Canasta   4. Docenas   5. Miles   6. Vara   7. Medios de 14 Lbs.   8. Medio de 25 Lbs.   9. Caja de 25 Lbs.   10. Libras   11. Racimos 
12. Sacos   13. Latas   14. Miles   15. Flete   16. QQ oro    17. QQ uva   18. QQ pergamino húmedo   19. QQ pergamino seco   20. Otro, especifique    
21. Otro, especifique 
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4B. Costos de producción de PRIMERA, ciclo agícola de 2007-2008 
!  SI TUVO COSTOS DE PRODUCCION DE PRIMERA, LLENE CUADROS 4B1 Y 4B2 
!  SI NO, PASE AL SECCION 4C 
“Me dijó Ud. que en la primera del 2007-2008, cultivó los sigueintes cultivos ….. . “ 
(EL ENCUESTADOR DEBE REFERIR A LOS CULTIVOS NOMBRADOS EN EL CUADRO 4A).  
“Primero me gustaría preguntarle sobre todos los costos que tuvo Ud. relacionados a su cultivo de [….]. 
¿Tuvo más de una parcela de […] en la primera?”  En caso afirmativo: “Prefiero preguntarle sobre cada parcela 
separado.  Pero si Ud. prefiere, podemos hablar de todas las parcelas de […] a la vez.  ¿Cómo hacemos?” 
 
4B1. Gastos que son para MAS DE UN CULTIVO en la PRIMERA – preparación del suelo, por ejemplo 
2. 
¿Por Cuales 
Cultivos? 
 
    3. 
¿Por 
cuantas 
mzas? 
6. 
Costo 
Total 
1. 
Actividad 
Codigo de 
Cultivos 
 
Clave 1 
 
[C4B_P1_1-
P1_3] 
 
mzas 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de Obra 
Temp. 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro [ _P2B] 
 
[C4B_P2]  
4. 
Cantidad 
 
Numero de Unidades 
 
 
 
 
 
[C4B_P3] 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[C4B_P4] 
 
4 X 5=6 
 
 
C$ 
 
[C4B_P5] 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal para mas de un cultivo? hombres dias mzs  $C/mz  
    ________ X  ____  X ______  X _______=  
    ________ X  ____  X ______  X _______=  
    ________ X  ____  X ______  X _______=  
    ________ X  ____  X ______  X _______=  
    ________ X  ____  X ______  X _______=  
    ________ X  ____  X ______  X _______=  
¿Tuvó costos de INSUMOS para mas de un cultivo?   Cantidad/mza  mzs  
             _____________X  ________=  
             _____________X  ________=  
             _____________X  ________=  
             _____________X  ________=  
             _____________X  ________=  
 
INSTRUCTIVO AL ENCUESTADOR: SE DEBE SOLICTAR TODOS LOS COSTOS RELACIONADOS A CADA 
PARCELA/CULITVO ANTES DE PASAR A LA PROXIMA PARCELA/CULTIVO.  DESPUES DE TERMINAR 
CON CADA CULTIVO, PASE AL PROXIMO CULTIVO REGISTRADO EN EL CUADRO 4A  
Cuadro 4B2.  Costos de Producción de PRIMERA [CICLO] 
2. 
Por Cultivo 
 
 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
 
6. 
Costo Total 
1. 
Actividad 
Cod de Cult. 
Clave 1 
 
[C4B_P1_1-P1_3] 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de 
Obra Temp. 
 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro  
 
[C4B_P2] 
4. 
Cantidad 
 
 
Numero 
de 
Unidades 
[C4B_P3] 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
 
 
 
[C4B_P4] 
 
4 X 5=6 
C$ 
 
[C4B_P5] 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de PRESIEMBRA por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de PREPARACION DEL SUELO Y SIEMBRA  por su cultivo 
de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de COSECHA Y POST-COSECHA  por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
      
Clave 1: Nombre de Cultivos 
1. Maiz    
2. Frijol   
3. Arroz    
4. Sorgo 
Industrial   
5. Sorgo 
Millon 
6. Sorgo Blanco   
7.Sorgo Escobero   
8. Ajonjolí   
 9. Maní    
10. Soya 
 
11. Café    
12. Cacao   
13. Yuca    
14. Malanga   
15.Quesquisq
ue 
16. Musaceas   
17. Cebolla   
18. Chiltoma   
19. Zanahoria   
20. Ayote 
21. Papa.   
22. Gengibre 
23. Chile. 
24.  Tomate.   
25. Pipian 
26.Ajo    
27. Sandía/Melon   
28. Otras Frutas   
 29. Pitahaya   30. 
Cítricos 
31. Repollo   
32. Caña de 
Azuca    
33. Piña    
34. Aguacate   
35. Tempate 
36. Tamarindo   
37 Especias 
maderables 
38. Otro, esp: 
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4C. Costos de producción de POSTRERA, ciclo agícola de 2007-2008 
 
!  SI TUVO COSTOS DE PRODUCCION DE POSTRERA, LLENE CUADROS 4C1 Y 4C2 
!  SI NO, PASE AL SECCION 4D 
 
“Me dijó Ud. que en la Postrera del 2007-2008, cultivó los sigueintes cultivos ….. . “ 
 
(EL ENCUESTADOR DEBE REFERIR A LOS CULTIVOS NOMBRADOS EN EL CUADRO 4A).  
 
“Primero me gustaría preguntarle sobre todos los costos que tuvo Ud. relacionados a su cultivo de [….]. 
¿Tuvo más de una parcela de […] en la Postrera ?”  En caso afirmativo: “Prefiero preguntarle sobre cada parcela 
separado.  Pero si Ud. prefiere, podemos hablar de todas las parcelas de […] a la vez.  ¿Cómo hacemos?” 
 
4C1. Gastos que son para MAS DE UN CULTIVO en la POSTRERA – preparación del suelo, por ejemplo 
2. 
¿Por Cuales 
Cultivos? 
 
    3. 
¿Por 
cuantas 
mzas? 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
6. 
Costo Total 
1. 
Actividad 
Codigo de 
Cultivos 
Clave 1 
 
 
mzas 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de 
Obra Temp. 
 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro  
4. 
Cantidad 
 
 
Numero 
de 
Unidades 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
  
4.X5.=6. 
 
 
C$ 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos que es para mas de un cultivo? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
 
INSTRUCTIVO AL ENCUESTADOR: SE DEBE SOLICTAR TODOS LOS COSTOS RELACIONADOS A CADA 
PARCELA/CULITVO ANTES DE PASAR A LA PROXIMA PARCELA/CULTIVO.  DESPUES DE TERMINAR 
CON CADA CULTIVO, PASE AL PROXIMO CULTIVO REGISTRADO EN EL CUADRO 4A  
Cuadro 4C2.  Costos de Producción de POSTRERA  [CICLO] 
2. 
Por Cultivo 
 
 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
 
6. 
Costo Total 
1. 
Actividad 
Cod de Cult. 
Clave 1 
 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de 
Obra Temp. 
 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro  
4. 
Cantidad 
 
 
Numero 
de 
Unidades 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
  
4.X5.=6. 
 
 
C$ 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de PRESIEMBRA por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de PREPARACION DEL SUELO Y SIEMBRA  por su cultivo 
de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de COSECHA Y POST-COSECHA  por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
      
Clave 1: Nombre de Cultivos 
1. Maiz    
2. Frijol   
3. Arroz    
4. Sorgo 
Industrial   
5. Sorgo 
Millon 
6. Sorgo Blanco   
7.Sorgo Escobero   
8. Ajonjolí   
 9. Maní    
10. Soya 
 
11. Café    
12. Cacao   
13. Yuca    
14. Malanga   
15.Quesquisq
ue 
16. Musaceas   
17. Cebolla   
18. Chiltoma   
19. Zanahoria   
20. Ayote 
21. Papa.   
22. Gengibre 
23. Chile. 
24.  Tomate.   
25. Pipian 
26.Ajo    
27. Sandía/Melon   
28. Otras Frutas   
 29. Pitahaya   30. 
Cítricos 
31. Repollo   
32. Caña de 
Azuca    
33. Piña    
34. Aguacate   
35. Tempate 
36. Tamarindo   
37 Especias 
maderables 
38. Otro, esp: 
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4D. Costos de producción de APANTE, ciclo agícola de 2007-2008 
 
!  SI TUVO COSTOS DE PRODUCCION DE APANTE , LLENE CUADROS 4D1 Y 4D2 
!  SI NO, PASE AL SECCION 4E 
 
“Me dijó Ud. que en la Apante  del 2007-2008, cultivó los sigueintes cultivos ….. . “ 
 
(EL ENCUESTADOR DEBE REFERIR A LOS CULTIVOS NOMBRADOS EN EL CUADRO 4A).  
 
“Primero me gustaría preguntarle sobre todos los costos que tuvo Ud. relacionados a su cultivo de [….]. 
¿Tuvo más de una parcela de […] en la Apante ?”  En caso afirmativo: “Prefiero preguntarle sobre cada parcela 
separado.  Pero si Ud. prefiere, podemos hablar de todas las parcelas de […] a la vez.  ¿Cómo hacemos?” 
 
4D1. Gastos que son para MAS DE UN CULTIVO en la APANTE  – preparación del suelo, por ejemplo 
2. 
¿Por Cuales 
Cultivos? 
 
    3. 
¿Por 
cuantas 
mzas? 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
6. 
Costo Total 
1. 
Actividad 
Codigo de 
Cultivos 
Clave 1 
 
 
mzas 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de 
Obra Temp. 
 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro  
4. 
Cantidad 
 
 
Numero 
de 
Unidades 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
  
4.X5.=6. 
 
 
C$ 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos que es para mas de un cultivo? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
 
INSTRUCTIVO AL ENCUESTADOR: SE DEBE SOLICTAR TODOS LOS COSTOS RELACIONADOS A CADA 
PARCELA/CULITVO ANTES DE PASAR A LA PROXIMA PARCELA/CULTIVO.  DESPUES DE TERMINAR 
CON CADA CULTIVO, PASE AL PROXIMO CULTIVO REGISTRADO EN EL CUADRO 4A  
Cuadro 4D2.  Costos de Producción de APANTE   [CICLO] 
2. 
Por Cultivo 
 
 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
 
6. 
Costo Total 
1. 
Actividad 
Cod de Cult. 
Clave 1 
 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de 
Obra Temp. 
 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro  
4. 
Cantidad 
 
 
Numero 
de 
Unidades 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
  
4.X5.=6. 
 
 
C$ 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de PRESIEMBRA por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de PREPARACION DEL SUELO Y SIEMBRA  por su cultivo 
de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de COSECHA Y POST-COSECHA  por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
      
Clave 1: Nombre de Cultivos 
1. Maiz    
2. Frijol   
3. Arroz    
4. Sorgo 
Industrial   
5. Sorgo 
Millon 
6. Sorgo Blanco   
7.Sorgo Escobero   
8. Ajonjolí   
 9. Maní    
10. Soya 
 
11. Café    
12. Cacao   
13. Yuca    
14. Malanga   
15.Quesquisq
ue 
16. Musaceas   
17. Cebolla   
18. Chiltoma   
19. Zanahoria   
20. Ayote 
21. Papa.   
22. Gengibre 
23. Chile. 
24.  Tomate.   
25. Pipian 
26.Ajo    
27. Sandía/Melon   
28. Otras Frutas   
 29. Pitahaya   30. 
Cítricos 
31. Repollo   
32. Caña de 
Azuca    
33. Piña    
34. Aguacate   
35. Tempate 
36. Tamarindo   
37 Especias 
maderables 
38. Otro, esp: 
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4E. Costos de producción de CULTIVOS PERMANENTES ciclo agícola de 2007-2008 
 
¿Puede contarnos sobre los cultivos permanentes y semipermanentes que tiene?  
-SI NO TIENE CULTIVOS PERMANENTES, PASE A LA CUADRA 4F. 
 
Cuadro 4E1.  Producción y Destino de Cultivos Anuales en el ciclo agícola 2007-2008. 
1. 
Clave de 
cultivo 
 
Clave 1 
2.  
Area Sembrada 
 
Mzs 
3. 
Producción  
Total Obtenida 
 
cantidad 
4. 
U/M 
 
 
 
5. 
 
Cantidad que 
vendio 
6. 
 
U/M 
 
 
 
7. 
 
Precio 
 
 
C$ 
8.  
 
Total 
 
 
C$ 
9. 
 
¿En total, 
cuántos 
arboles 
tiene? 
[C4G1_P1] [C4G1_P2] . [C4G1_P3] . [C4G1_P4] [C4G1_P5] [C4G1_P6] [C4G1_P7] [C4G1_P8] [C4G1_P9] 
  .  .       
  .  .       
  .  .       
  .  .       
  .  .       
  .  .       
 
!  SI TUVO COSTOS DE PRODUCCION CULTIVOS PERMANENTES, LLENE EL CUADRO 4G 
!  SI NO, PASE AL CUADRO 4H 
!  EL ENCUESTADOR DEBE REFERIR A LOS CULTIVOS NOMBRADOS EN EL CUADRO 4G.1 
 
“Primero me gustaría preguntarle sobre todos los costos que tuvo Ud. relacionados a su cultivo de [….]. 
¿Tuvo más de una parcela de […] en la primera?”  En caso afirmativo: “Prefiero preguntarle sobre cada parcela 
separado.  Pero si Ud. prefiere, podemos hablar de todas las parcelas de […] a la vez.  ¿Cómo hacemos?” 
 
INSTRUCTIVO AL ENCUESTADOR: SE DEBE SOLICTAR TODOS LOS COSTOS RELACIONADOS A CADA 
PARCELA/CULITVO ANTES DE PASAR A LA PROXIMA PARCELA/CULTIVO.  DESPUES DE TERMINAR 
CON CADA CULTIVO, PASE AL PROXIMO CULTIVO REGISTRADO EN EL CUADRO 4A  
 
Cuadro 4E2  Costos de Producción de CULTIVOS PERMANENTES 
3. 
Tipo de costo 
 
6. 
Costo Total 
 
Actividad 
1. 
¿Pedazo en que se 
encuentra el 
cultivo/la parcela? 
 
Número de pedazo 
del Cuadro 3A o 3B 
99=pedazos 
multiples 
2. 
Cultivo 
 
Cod de Cult. 
Clave 1 
 
99=Cultivos 
multiples 
 
1.Tractor. 
2.Bueyes 
3.Mano de 
Obra Temp. 
 
4. Insumo 
5. Otro  
4. 
Cantidad 
 
 
Numero 
de 
Unidades 
5. 
Precio 
Unitario 
 
 
 
4.X5.=6. 
 
 
C$ 
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de VIVERO/SEMILLERO/INSTALACION por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
¿Tuvó costos de maquinaria, mano de obra temporal, o insumos en los labores de COSECHA Y POST-COSECHA  por su cultivo de […]? 
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
    _________ X  ________=  
Clave 1: Nombre de Cultivos 
1. Maiz    
2. Frijol   
3. Arroz    
4. Sorgo 
Industrial   
5. Sorgo Millon 
6. Sorgo 
Blanco   
7.Sorgo 
Escobero   
8. Ajonjolí   
 9. Maní    
10. Soya 
 
11. Café    
12. Cacao   
13. Yuca    
14. Malanga   
15.Quesquisque 
16. Musaceas   
17. Cebolla   
18. Chiltoma   
19. Zanahoria   
20. Ayote 
21. Papa.   
22. Gengibre 
23. Chile. 
24.  Tomate.   
25. Pipian 
26.Ajo    
27. Sandía/Melon   
28. Otras Frutas   
 29. Pitahaya   30. 
Cítricos 
31. Repollo   
32. Caña de 
Azuca    
33. Piña    
34. Aguacate   
35. Tempate 
36. Tamarindo   
37 Especias 
maderables 
38. Otro, esp: 
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4F. Utilización y costo de insumos claves. 
! SI EL ENTREVISTADO UTILIZÓ SEMILLA MEJORADA, SEMILLA CERTIFICADA, UREA O 
FERTILIZANTE “COMPLETO” EN SU PRODUCCION, LLENE EL CUADRO 4F) 
!  SI NO, PASE A LA PREGUNTA 4.2 
 
Cuadro 4F. Utilización y Costo de Insumos Claves 
Tipo de insumo 
 
[TIPO] 
1.  
Nombre de cultivo 
Clave 1 
 
[C4F_P1] 
2.  
Cantidad Comprada 
 
# 
[C4F_P2] 
3.  
Unidad de Medida 
1. QQ 
2.Libra 
3. Kilo 
[C4F_P3] 
4.  
Precio Unitario 
 
C$ 
 
[C4F_P4] 
1. Semilla mejorada 1     
2. Semilla mejorada 2     
3. Semilla certificada 1     
4. Semilla certificada 2     
5. Urea     
6. Completo     
Clave 1: Nombre de Cultivo 
1. Maiz   2. Frijol   3. Arroz   4. Sorgo Industrial   5. Sorgo Millon        6. Sorgo Blanco   7.Sorgo Escobero   8. Ajonjolí   9. Maní   10. Soya 
11. Café   12. Cacao  13. Yuca   14. Malanga   15.   Quesquisque        16. Musaceas   17. Cebolla   18. Chiltoma   19. Zanahoria   20. Ayote   21. 
Papa.   22. Gengibre…23. Chile.   24.  Tomate.   25. Pipian   26.Ajo   27. Sandía/Melon   28. Otras Frutas   29. Pitahaya   30. Cítricos        31. 
Repollo   32. Caña de Azuca   33. Piña   34. Aguacate   35. Tempate   36. Tamarindo   37 Especias maderables 
38. Otro, esp: [C4H_P1B] 
 
Gastos de Mantenimiento de Equipo Agícola 
4.2.¿Ud. tuvo gastos de mantenimiento de equipo o pagó/alquiló agua en el ciclo agícola de Marzo2007-Marzo2008?  
__[P4_2]__ 
SI!LLENE EL CUADRO 4G      NO !PASE A 4.3 
 
Cuadro 4G. Gastos en  Mantenimiento de Equipo Agrícola y Agua de Riego 
1.  
Tipo de Gasto 
2. Costo total en 2007-2008 
C$ 
Combustible y lubricantes                                                        [C4G_P1]  
Electricidad                                                                               [C4G_P2]  
Reparación significativa de equipo                                          [C4G_P3]  
Agua de riego                                                                           [C4G_P4]  
Otros                                                                                         [C4G_P5]  
 
4.3. ¿De todos estos insumos y costos ya mencionados, aproximadamente que parte recibió a crédito? __[P4_3]__ 
1. Más de la mitad  2. La mitad  3. Menos de la mitad  4.  Muy poco  5. Nada 
 
4.4 ¿Ud. utilizó asistencia técnica profesional en 2007? __[P4_4] __ 
SI! LLENE EL CUADRO 4.H   NO! PASE  A LA PREGUNTA 4.5 
 
Cuadro 4H. Naturaleza de la Asistencia Técnica   
 
 
¿De qué se trató la asistencia técnica? 
 
            TIPO DE SERVICIO 
1. 
¿Recibió 
Asistencia 
Técnica en 
este concepto? 
1. Si  2. No 
2. 
¿Cuánto pagó 
por Asistencia 
Técnica? 
 
C$ 
3. 
Quién la 
proporcionó 
 
Clave 1 
 
 
1. Conservación del suelo [C4H_P1A] [C4H_P1B] [C4H_P1C] 
2. Selección y mejoramiento de semilla [C4H_P2A] [C4H_P2B] [C4H_P2C] 
3. Selección y mejoramiento de ganado [C4H_P3A] [C4H_P3B] [C4H_P3C] 
4. Manejo de la post-cosecha [C4H_P4A] [C4H_P4B] [C4H_P4C] 
5. Abono orgánico [C4H_P5A] [C4H_P5B] [C4H_P5C] 
6. Introducción nevos cultivos [C4H_P6A] [C4H_P6B] [C4H_P6C] 
7. Nuevo paquete técnico [C4H_P7A] [C4H_P7B] [C4H_P7C] 
8. Reforestación [C4H_P8A] [C4H_P8B] [C4H_P8C] 
9. Control de plagas y enfermedades [C4H_P9A] [C4H_P9B] [C4H_P9C] 
10. Sanidad animal [C4H_P10A] [C4H_P10B] [C4H_P10C] 
11. Otro (especifique) [C4H_P11A] [C4H_P11B] [C4H_P11C] 
Clave 1:  
 
 
1. Gobierno  
2. ONG/Proyecto  
3. Privado  
4.Asociación de 
productores 
5.Otro___________ 
 
SALTE HASTA LA PREGUNTA 4.6 
 
4.5 Porque, no recibió asistencia técnica? ___ [P4_5] ______ 
1. No la necesita 
2. Cuesta demasiado 
3. No tiene tiempo 
4. No se ofrece  
5. Calidad de la asistencia no es buena 
6. Otra razon (especifique)_____ [P4_5B] ______________ 
 
4.6 ¿Va a sembrar frijol este año? [P4_6] 
 SI!  PASE A PREGUNTA 4.7      NO !  PASE A SECCION 5 
 
4.7 ¿Cuántas manzanas de frijol va a sembrar… 
 a. en la Primera? [P4_7A] 
1. NINGUN                 2. __________________  mzs 
 b. en la Prostrera? [P4_7B] 
1. NINGUN                 2. __________________  mzs 
 c. en el Apante? [P4_7C] 
1. NINGUN                 2. __________________  mzs 
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SECCIÓN 5F. PRECIOS EN MERCADOS 
 
5.4. ¿Desde el año 2003, cual es el producto que le ha generado lo mas ganancias? _____________[P5_4] 
5.5  ¿Cuál es la medida que usan para vender (U/M) _______________[P5_5]___ 
5.6 ¿Cuáles son los dos mercados donde más ha vendido este producto desde 2003?   [P5_6] 
 ! CIRCULE DOS ABAJO, LUEGO LLENA 5.7 Y 5.9 CON LAS RESPUESTAS 
a. en finca                                      
              b. en el mercado local. Cual: ____________  [P5_6a]    
              c. en el mercado regional. Cual: _________   
d. en el mercado de Managua        
e. a un exportador/procesador         
 f. a un supermercado 
g. otro       [P5_6b] 
 
5.7. MERCADO 1 _____________________  [P5_6] 
Si vende este producto a un comprador en este mercado, cual es el precio mas alto, mas bajo y mas 
probable que recibiera en cada temporada del año (2007)? 
 
Cuadro 5IA.  Precios de venta durante el año en el Mercado 1 
! HAY QUE LLENAR TODAS LAS TEMPORADAS, AUNQUE EL PRODUCTOR NUNCA HA 
VENDIDO EN UNA(S) DE LAS TEMPORADAS 
 
 
 
Primera 
[C5IA_P1] 
Postrera 
[C5IA_P2] 
Apante 
[C5IA_P3] 
a.  Precio máximo 
 
[C5IA_P1a] [C5IA_P2a] [C5IA_P3a] 
b. Precio mínimo 
 
[C5IA_P1b] [C5IA_P2b] [C5IA_P3b] 
c. Precio mas 
probable 
[C5IA_P1c] [C5IA_P2c] [C5IA_P3c] 
 
Cuadro 5IB         5.8. En cuales meses ha vendido el producto alguna vez usted en mercado 1? 
 
5.9. MERCADO 2 _____________________ 
Si vende este producto a un comprador en este mercado, cual es el precio mas alto, mas bajo y mas 
probable que recibiera en cada temporada del año (2007)? 
 
Cuadro 5JA.  Precios de venta durante el año en el Mercado 2 
! HAY QUE LLENAR TODAS LAS TEMPORADAS, AUNQUE EL PRODUCTOR NUNCA HA 
VENDIDO EN UNA(S) DE LAS TEMPORADAS 
 
 
 
Primera 
[C5JA_P1] 
Postrera 
[C5JA_P2] 
Apante 
[C5JA_P3] 
a.  Precio máximo 
 
   
b. Precio mínimo 
 
   
c. Precio mas 
probable 
   
 
Cuadro 5JB           5.10. En cuales meses ha vendido [5A1] alguna vez usted en este mercado? 
 
Cuadro 5K. ¿Para vender el producto [4A1], cual es el mercado que tiene… 
 
 
 
En 
finca 
Local Regional Managua Supermercado Otro 
   …El precio mas alto             
[C5K_P1] 
      
…El precio mas bajo 
[C5K_P2] 
      
…El precio mas estable 
[C5K_P3] 
      
…El precio mas inestable 
[C5K_P4] 
      
..Requisitos para el 
productomas exigentes 
[C5K_P5] 
      
...Requisitos para el producto 
menos exigentes [C5K_P6] 
      
 Enero Feb Mar Abril Mayo Junio Julio Ago Sep Oct Nov Dic 
1. Si 
2. No 
[C5IB_...] 
 
..P1] ..P2] ..P3] ..P4] ..P5] ..P6] ..P7] ..P8] ..P9] ..P10] ..P11] ..P12] 
Mercado [5A3B] 
 
Enero Feb Mar Abril Mayo Junio Julio Ago Sep Oct Nov Dic 
3. Si 
4. No 
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     PRODUCCION LECHERA Y VENTAS DE LÁCTEOS 
 
       6.2  En el último año, en su hogar hubo producción de leche y/o venta de lácteos? __ [P6_2] ___     
       1. SI….!  LLENE EL CUADRO 6B    2. NO….!PASE A LA PREGUNTA 6.3.  
 
    Cuadro 6D  Producción y Venta de Productos Lácteos 
Verano (1) Invierno (2) 
 unidad 1. 
Cantidad  
Producida 
 
 
 
[C6D_P1A] 
2. 
Cantidad 
consumida o 
procesada 
en 
Casa 
 
 
[C6D_P1B] 
3. 
Cantidad 
Vendida 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
Precio 
unitario 
 
C$ 
 
 
 
1. 
Cantidad 
Producida 
 
 
 
 
[C6B_P1E] 
2. 
Cantidad 
consumida o 
procesada 
en casa 
 
 
[C6B_P1F] 
3. 
Cantidad 
Vendida 
 
 
 
 
 
4. 
Precio 
unitario 
 
C$ 
 
 
 
(1)Leche gln/día   [C6D_P1C] [C6D_P1D]   [C6D_P1G] [C6D_P1H] 
(2)Queso lb/semana   [C6D_P2C] [C6D_P2D]   [C6D_P2G] [C6D_P2H] 
(3)Cuajada lb/semana   [C6D_P3C] [C6D_P3D]   [C6D_P3G] [C6D_P3H] 
(4)Mantequilla lb/semana   [C6D_P4C] [C6D_P4D]   [C6D_P4G] [C6D_P4H] 
(5)Crema lb/semana   [C6D_P5C] [C6D_P5D]   [C6D_P5G] [C6D_P5H] 
 
       6.3 ¿Ud tuvo algún gasto asociado a la actividad pecuaria en el año pasado?  _____  [P6_3]  
 
1. SI….... !  REGISTRE LOS COSTOS TOTALES DEL ÚLTIMO AÑO EN EL CUADRO 6D   
2. NO….. !  PASE A LA PREGUNTA 6.4. 
 
        Cuadro 6E. COSTOS PECUARIOS DURANTE EL ULTIMO AÑO 
1. 
Tipo de gasto 
Gasto Total 
C$  
(1) Mano de Obra Contratada Temporalmente 
(EXCLUYE MANO DE OBRA PERMANENTE—MAYOR DE 6 MESES 
CONTINUOS)) 
[C6E_P1] 
(2) Insumos pecuarios [C6E_P2] 
(3) Alimentación Complementaria [C6E_P3] 
(4) Transporte [C6E_P4] 
(5) Materiales [C6E_P5] 
(6) Servicios veterinarios [C6E_P6] 
 
        MANO DE OBRA PERMANENTE 
 
            5.4. ¿Durante el año pasado Usted empleó trabajadores permanentes para ayudarle en cualquier trabajo de su finca (agrícola o               
                                 pecuaria)?  ___[P6_4]__ 
 
1. SI….... !  LLENA EL CUADRO 6E  
 2. NO….. !  PASA A LA SECCION 7  
 
ASEGURE QUE LA MANO DE OBRA REGISTRADA EN ESTE CUADRO NO FUE INCLUIDA ANTES 
CUANDO SE REGISTRÓ MANO DE OBRA TEMPORAL. 
CUADRO 6F.  Gastos en mano de obra permanente 
1. 
Tipo de Trabajador 
2. 
¿Cuántos meses trabajó en el último año? 
 
3. 
¿Cuál es el salario mensual 
 
(NUMERO DE TRABAJADORES) 
 
 
01 Administrador [C6F_P1A] [C6F_P1B] [C6F_P1C] 
02 Contador [C6F_P2A] [C6F_P2B] [C6F_P2C] 
03 Secretaria [C6F_P3A] [C6F_P3B] [C6F_P3C] 
04 Bodeguero [C6F_P4A] [C6F_P4B] [C6F_P4C] 
05 Conductor [C6F_P5A] [C6F_P5B] [C6F_P5C] 
06 Mandador [C6F_P6A] [C6F_P6B] [C6F_P6C] 
07 Capataz [C6F_P7A] [C6F_P7B] [C6F_P7C] 
08 Cocinera [C6F_P8A] [C6F_P8B] [C6F_P8C] 
09 Operador de riego [C6F_P9A] [C6F_P9B] [C6F_P9C] 
10 Campistos [C6F_P10A] [C6F_P10B] [C6F_P10C] 
11 Ordeñadores [C6F_P11A] [C6F_P11B] [C6F_P11C] 
12 Otros (especifique) [C6F_P12A] [C6F_P12B] [C6F_P12C] 
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                                                           SECCION 7 MAQUINARIA Y EQUIPO 
 
Cuadro 7A  Inventario y Compras de Maquinaria y Equipos Agropecuarios 
  ¿Que cantidad de […]  
tenía en el año .. 
 Tipo de 
Maquinaria/Equipo 
[C7A_... 
¿En cuánto podría 
vender hoy día, 
todos estos 
[EQUIPOS] en el 
estado en que se  
encuentran? 
  
                                                
1. 
1996? 
2. 
2000? 
3. 
2001? 
4. 
2002? 
5. 
2003? 
6. 
2004? 
7. 
2005? 
8. 
2006? 
9. 
2007? 
 
10. 
2008? 
 
11.     
C$ total 
  ..P96] ..P00] ..P01] ..P02] ..P03] ..P04] ..P05] ..P06] ..P07] ..P08] [C7A_P3] 
1.  Tractor             
2.  Arado de tractor            
3.  Arado de bueyes             
4.  Grada de tractor            
5.  Grada de bueyes            
6.  Sembradora de tractor            
7.  Sembradora de bueyes            
8.  Pulverizador para tractor            
9.  Rastra de tractor            
10.  Carreta de  bueyes            
11.  Bomba mochila            
12.  Fumigadora de motor            
13.  Picadora de pastos            
14.  Cosechadora            
15.  Trapiche            
16.  Descremadora            
17.  Despulpadora            
18.  Motosierra            
19.  Ordenadora mecánica            
20.  Bomba de riego            
21.  Generador eléctrico            
22.  Camioneta            
23.  Camiones            
24.  Corral para ganado            
25. Gallinero            
26. Corral para aves            
27. Chiqueros            
28. Pilas            
29. Baño garrapaticida            
30. 3
0 
Establos            
31.  Silo forrajero            
32.  Desfibradora            
33.  Empacadora/ 
seleccionadora 
           
34.  Beneficio de café/cacao            
35.  Molino            
36.  Bodegas            
37.  Silo para granos            
38.  Horno            
39.  Patio de secado            
40.  Galerón            
41.  Pozo para riego            
42.  Represas            
43.  Pivote Central            
44.  Otro:  [C6A_P1B]            
45.  Riego de Gravedad 
(Superficie) (mzs) 
           
46.   Riego de Aspersión (mzs)            
47.   Riego de Pivote Central 
(mzs) 
           
48.   Riego de Goteo (mzs)            
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llo
   3
2
. C
a
ñ
a
 d
e A
zu
ca
   3
3
. P
iñ
a
   3
4
. A
g
u
a
ca
te   3
5
. T
em
p
a
te   3
6
. T
a
m
a
rin
d
o
   3
7
 E
sp
ecia
s m
a
d
era
b
les 
3
8
. O
tro
, esp
...  
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3
 
 
S
E
C
C
IÓ
N
 10. R
E
L
A
C
IO
N
E
S
 E
X
T
E
R
N
A
S
 Y
 C
A
P
IT
A
L
 S
O
C
IA
L
 
 
2. 
¿P
erten
ece algú
n
 
m
iem
b
ro d
el h
ogar a 
algu
n
a organ
ización
? 
 
c
a
so
 sí, p
o
n
g
a
 e
l c
ó
d
ig
o
 
p
e
rso
n
a
l. 
c
a
so
 to
d
a
 la
 fa
m
ilia
, 
p
o
n
g
a
 0
0
 
3 
¿E
n
 2000 p
erten
ecía 
algú
n
 m
iem
b
ro d
el h
ogar 
a algu
n
a organ
ización
 
 
c
a
so
 sí, p
o
n
g
a
 e
l c
ó
d
ig
o
 
p
e
rso
n
a
l. 
c
a
so
 to
d
a
 la
 fa
m
ilia
, 
p
o
n
g
a
 0
0
 
1. 
T
ip
o d
e G
ru
p
o 
            
[P
10_1] 
P
ers. 1
 
    [P
10_2A
] 
P
ers. 2
 
    [P
10_2B
] 
P
ers. 1
 
    [P
10_3A
] 
P
ers. 2
 
    [P
10_3B
] 
4. 
¿P
ara U
d
., es [.…
] u
n
a fu
en
te 
d
e servicios p
rod
u
ctivos 
com
o: 
 1
.C
a
p
a
cita
ció
n
/A
sist. T
écn
ica
 
2
.C
réd
ito
 
3
.In
su
m
o
s A
g
ro
. 
4
.M
a
q
. 
5
.P
ro
cesa
m
ien
to
 
6
.T
ra
n
sp
o
rte d
e p
ro
d
u
cto
s 
7
.V
en
ta
 d
e p
ro
d
.?
      
                  S
í!
¿C
u
ales? 
C
ó
d
ig
o
s 
[P
10_4A
]  P
10_4B
]   [P
10_4C
] 
5. 
¿C
u
ál es la 
com
p
osición
 
d
el gru
p
o? 
  
1
.  S
ó
lo
 
h
o
m
b
res 
2
.  S
ó
lo
 
M
u
jeres 
3
.  A
m
b
o
s 
      [P
10_5] 
6. 
¿E
s n
ecesario 
p
agar d
in
ero 
p
ara p
od
er  
en
trar  en
 el 
gru
p
o? 
 
 0
. N
o
; 
ca
so
 sí, p
o
n
g
a
 
el m
o
n
to 
C
$
 
     [P
10_6] 
7. 
¿T
ien
e q
u
e 
p
agar d
in
ero 
cad
a m
es 
com
o 
m
iem
b
ro d
el 
gru
p
o? 
 
0
. N
o
; 
ca
so
 sí, p
o
n
g
a
 
el m
o
n
to
  
C
$
/m
es 
    [P
10_7] 
8. 
¿H
ace cu
án
tos 
añ
os se form
ó 
este gru
p
o? 
  
1
. D
e 0
 - 5
 a
ñ
o
s 
2
. D
e 6
-2
0
 a
ñ
o
s 
3
. M
á
s q
u
e 2
0
 
     
[P
10_8] 
9. 
¿P
or cu
án
tos 
añ
os h
a 
p
erten
ecid
o 
U
d
. o 
m
iem
b
ros d
e 
su
 fam
ilia a 
este gru
p
o? 
     
A
ñ
o
s 
        [P
10_9] 
10. 
¿Q
u
é p
asa 
cu
án
d
o u
n
a 
p
erson
a viola 
los 
reglam
en
tos 
d
el gru
p
o? 
 
1
.T
ien
e q
u
e 
sa
lir d
el g
ru
p
o
 
2
. T
ien
e q
u
e 
p
a
g
a
r u
n
a
 
m
u
lta
 
3
.N
a
d
a
 p
a
sa
 
  [P
10_10] 
11. 
¿D
e las reu
n
ion
es d
el 
gru
p
o, a cu
án
tas asiste el 
m
iem
b
ro/los m
iem
b
ros 
d
el h
ogar? 
  1
. N
in
g
u
n
a
 
2
. P
o
ca
s 
3
. A
lg
u
n
a
s 
4
. M
u
ch
a
s 
5
. T
o
d
a
s 
      
  A
h
ora             en
 2000 
[P
10_11A
]      [P
10_11B
] 
12. 
P
or lo m
ás, ¿cóm
o 
fu
n
cion
a el gru
p
o? 
   1
. M
u
y D
éb
il 
2
. D
éb
il 
3
. R
eg
u
la
r 
4
. F
u
erte 
5
. M
u
y F
u
erte 
    A
h
ora          en
 2000 
[P
10_12A
]  [P
10_12B
] 
(1
)C
o
o
p
erativ
a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2
)O
rg
. G
rem
ial 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3
)G
ru
p
o
 In
fo
rm
al d
e 
P
ro
d
u
cto
res 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4
)O
N
G
/P
ro
y
ecto
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5
)T
ien
d
a C
am
p
esin
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6
)S
eg
u
ro
s M
u
tu
as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7
)C
lu
b
 D
ep
o
rtiv
o
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(8
)O
rg
. P
o
lítica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(9
)O
rg
. p
ara p
ro
v
eer 
serv
icio
s (escu
ela, ag
u
a, 
…
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
0
)Ig
lesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
1
)O
rg
 M
u
jer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
2
)O
tro
 (esp
ecifiq
u
e)  
[P
1
0
_
1
B
]_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
3
)O
tro
 (esp
ecifiq
u
e) 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 [P
10_1a] 
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S
E
C
C
IÓ
N
  11.  E
N
T
O
R
N
O
 E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
O
 
 C
u
ad
ro 11A
. In
fraestru
ctu
ra  
     F
avor in
d
iq
u
e ...      
 
  
        1. 
 
F
avor in
d
iq
u
e a q
u
é 
d
istan
cia en
 k
ilóm
etros 
se en
cu
en
tra la 
in
stalación
 o 
in
fraestru
ctu
ra m
ás 
cercan
a 
 
         2.  
  C
u
al M
ercad
o? 
     
3. 
C
u
án
to tiem
p
o se 
n
ecesita p
ara llegar a 
la in
stalación
 o 
in
fraestru
ctu
ra m
ás 
cercan
a 
(m
in
u
to
s)  
4. 
P
or cu
al tip
o 
d
e tran
sp
orte? 
 
C
la
ve 1
 
otro: 
[C
11A
_P
2A
c-
P
2K
c] 
5. 
C
u
án
to cu
esta 
id
a y vu
elta el 
viaje? 
 
C
$
 
 
C
en
tro d
e acop
io 
[C
11A
_P
1A
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2A
] 
[C
11A
_P
2A
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2A
d
] 
D
istrib
u
id
or d
e in
su
m
os 
[C
11A
_P
1B
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2B
] 
[C
11A
_P
2B
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2B
d
] 
G
asolin
era 
[C
11A
_P
1C
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2C
] 
[C
11A
_P
2C
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2C
d
] 
M
ercad
o 
[C
11A
_P
1D
] 
[C
11A
_P
1D
a] 
[C
11A
_P
2D
] 
[C
11A
_P
2D
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2D
d
] 
S
u
cu
rsal b
an
caria 
 
[C
11A
_P
1E
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2E
] 
[C
11A
_P
2E
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2E
d
] 
C
oop
erativa d
e créd
ito 
[C
11A
_P
1F
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2F
] 
[C
11A
_P
2F
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2F
d
] 
U
n
a oficin
a d
e gob
iern
o 
q
u
e ofrece créd
ito o u
n
a 
O
N
G
 q
u
e ofrece 
créd
ito? 
[C
11A
_P
1G
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2G
] 
[C
11A
_P
2G
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2G
d
] 
C
en
tro d
e salu
d
 
[C
11A
_P
1H
] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2H
] 
[C
11A
_P
2H
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2H
d
] 
E
scu
ela p
rim
aria 
 
[C
11A
_P
1I] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2I] 
[C
11A
_P
2Ib
] 
[C
11A
_P
2Id
] 
E
scu
ela secu
n
d
aria 
[C
11A
_P
1J] 
 
[C
11A
_P
2J] 
[C
11A
_P
2Jb
] 
[C
11A
_P
2Jd
] 
C
arretera p
avim
en
tad
a 
[C
11A
_P
1K
] 
  
[C
11A
_P
2K
] 
[C
11A
_P
2K
b
] 
[C
11A
_P
2K
d
] 
 C
la
ve 1
:       1
.P
ie         2
.B
icicleta
           3
.M
o
to
         4
.T
ra
n
sp
o
rte p
u
b
lico
         5
.C
a
rro
 p
riva
d
o
          6
. A
n
im
a
l       7
. O
tro
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 C
u
ad
ro 11B
. C
aracterísticas d
e la C
om
u
n
id
ad
  
5. 
¿D
e q
u
e p
rofu
n
d
id
ad
 es el 
p
oso?     
 
6. 
¿Q
u
e p
rofu
n
d
id
ad
 tu
viera 
q
u
e cavar p
ara en
con
trar 
agu
a?     
1. 
¿E
n
 q
u
e añ
o en
tró la red
 d
e 
C
laro en
 la com
u
n
id
ad
? 
  
[C
11B
_P
1] 
2. 
¿E
n
 q
u
e añ
o en
tró la red
 d
e 
M
ovistar en
 la com
u
n
id
ad
? 
  
[C
11B
_P
2] 
3. 
¿H
ay acceso d
e agu
a en
 la 
com
u
n
id
ad
 tod
o el añ
o p
ara 
cu
ltivar? 
 
[C
11B
_P
3] 
4.  
¿T
ien
e p
oso p
ara riego 
u
sted
? 
1
. 
 S
i !
 P
A
S
E
 A
 5
 
2
. 
N
o
 !
 P
A
S
E
 A
 6
 
 [C
11B
_P
4] 
D
ista
n
cia
 
 
[C
11B
_P
5] 
1
. m
ts 
2
. vrs 
[C
11B
_P
5b
] 
D
ista
n
cia
 
 
[C
11B
_P
6] 
1
. m
ts 
2
. vrs 
[C
11B
_P
6b
] 
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5
 
 C
u
a
d
r
o
 1
1
C
. C
a
r
a
c
te
r
ístic
a
s d
e
l H
o
g
a
r
  
1
. 
¿
Q
u
é m
a
teria
l p
red
o
m
in
a
 en
 
la
s p
a
red
es d
e su
 v
iv
ien
d
a
?
 
 1
. 
L
a
d
rillo
 o
 b
lo
q
u
e d
e b
a
rro
 
2
. 
B
lo
q
u
e d
e cem
en
to
 
3
. 
A
d
o
b
e o
 ta
q
u
eza
l 
4
. 
P
ied
ra
 ca
n
tera
 
5
. 
N
ica
lit 
6
. 
B
a
m
b
ú
 o
 ca
ñ
a
  
7
. 
M
a
d
era
 
8
. 
R
ip
io
 o
 d
esech
o
 
9
. 
M
in
ifa
ld
a
 (m
a
d
era
 y 
b
lo
q
u
e o
 la
d
rillo
) 
1
0
. 
O
tro
  [C
1
1
D
_
P
1
b
] 
           
2
. 
¿
Q
u
é m
a
teria
l 
p
red
o
m
in
a
 en
 el p
iso
 d
e 
su
 v
iv
ien
d
a
?
 
 1
. 
T
ierra
 
2
. 
M
a
d
era
 
3
. 
E
m
b
a
ld
o
sa
d
o
 
4
. 
L
a
d
rillo
 
5
. 
O
tro
 
      
3
. 
¿
C
u
á
n
to
s 
cu
a
rto
s 
d
o
rm
ito
rio
s 
 tien
e la
 
ca
sa
?
 
 
#
 
        
4
. 
¿
C
ó
m
o
 o
b
tien
en
 a
g
u
a
 
p
o
ta
b
le?
 
 1
. 
R
ed
 p
ú
b
lica
 
2
. 
P
u
esto
 
3
. 
C
a
m
ió
n
, ca
rreta
 o
 p
ip
a
 
4
. 
P
o
zo
 
5
. 
R
ío
, q
u
eb
ra
d
a
 u
 o
jo
 d
e 
a
g
u
a
 
6
. 
O
tro
 
     
5
. 
¿
A
 q
u
é está
 co
n
ecta
d
o
 el 
d
esa
g
ü
e d
e la
 v
iv
ien
d
a
?
 
 1
. 
R
ed
 
2
. 
P
o
zo
 sép
tico
 
3
. 
P
o
zo
 cieg
o
 o
 su
m
id
ero
 
4
. 
N
o
 tien
e 
        
            6
. 
¿
Q
u
é tip
o
 d
e 
a
lu
m
b
ra
d
o
 tien
e?
 
 1
. 
S
ervicio
 eléctrico
 
2
. 
C
a
n
d
il, g
a
s 
3
. 
P
la
n
ta
 eléctrica
 
4
. 
N
in
g
u
n
o
 
                  
7
.  
¿
S
i U
d
. a
lq
u
ila
ra
 
esta
 ca
sa
 a
 o
tra
 
p
erso
n
a
, a
 q
u
é 
p
recio
 p
o
d
ría
 
a
lq
u
ila
rlo
?
 
  
$
C
 
       
8
. 
¿
S
i U
d
. v
en
d
iera
 
esta
 ca
sa
, a
 q
u
é 
p
recio
 p
o
d
ría
 
v
en
d
erlo
?
 
   
$
C
 
       
9
. 
¿
T
ien
e o
tra
 ca
sa
 o
 
p
ro
p
ied
a
d
 en
 o
tro
 
lu
g
a
r?
 
 
 1
. 
S
í !
 P
A
S
E
 A
 1
0
 
2
. 
N
o
 !
  P
A
S
E
 A
L
 
C
U
A
D
R
O
 1
1
D
 
       
1
0
. 
¿
C
u
á
l es el 
v
a
lo
r 
a
p
ro
x
im
a
d
o
 d
e 
la
 o
tra
 ca
sa
 o
 
p
ro
p
ied
a
d
?
 
  
C
$
 
     
  
[C
1
1
D
_
P
1
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
2
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
3
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
4
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
5
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
6
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
7
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
8
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
9
] 
[C
1
1
D
_
P
1
0
] 
 C
u
a
d
r
o
 1
1
D
.  B
ie
n
e
s D
e
l H
o
g
a
r
  
 
¿
Q
u
e
 ca
n
tid
a
d
 d
e […
]ten
ía
 en
 a
ñ
o
 .. 
[C
1
1
D
…
 
 
  [C
1
1
D
_
P
1
] 
2
. 
1
9
9
6
?
 
_
P
9
6
] 
3
. 
2
0
0
0
?
 
_
P
0
0
] 
4
. 
2
0
0
1
?
 
_
P
0
1
] 
5
. 
2
0
0
2
?
 
_
P
0
2
] 
6
. 
2
0
0
3
?
 
_
P
0
3
] 
7
. 
2
0
0
4
?
 
_
P
0
4
] 
8
. 
2
0
0
5
?
 
_
P
0
5
] 
9
. 
2
0
0
6
?
 
_
P
0
6
] 
1
0
. 
2
0
0
7
?
 
_
P
0
7
] 
1
1
. 
2
0
0
8
?
 
_
P
0
8
] 
1
2
. 
¿
E
n
 cu
á
n
to
 p
o
d
ría
 v
en
d
er 
h
o
y
 d
ía
, to
d
o
s esto
s [E
Q
U
IP
O
] 
en
 el esta
d
o
 en
 q
u
e se 
en
cu
en
tra
n
? 
C
$
  en
 to
ta
l     [C
1
1
D
_
P
2
] 
1
 
R
ad
io
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
T
elev
iso
r B
/N
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
T
elev
iso
r co
lo
r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
 
R
efrig
erad
o
r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 
 
C
o
cin
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
 
P
lan
ch
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
 
M
áq
u
in
a d
e m
o
ler 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
 
R
ad
io
g
rab
ad
o
ra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 
 
E
q
u
ip
o
 d
e S
o
n
id
o
/M
in
i 
co
m
p
o
n
en
te 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
0
 
 
A
b
an
ico
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1
 
 
L
icu
ad
o
ra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
 
 
T
o
stad
o
ra 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
3
 
 
H
o
rn
o
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
4
 
 
H
o
rn
o
 d
e m
icro
o
n
d
a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
5
 
 
A
rro
cera 
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1
6
 
 
L
avadora 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
7
 
 
A
ire acondicionado  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
8
 
 
M
áquina de coser 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
9
 
 
M
áquina de escribir 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0
 
 
C
om
putadora 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
1
 
 
V
ehículo (que no sea 
cam
ioneta ni cam
ión) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
2
 
 
B
ote 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
3
 
 
B
icicleta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
4
 
 
M
otocicleta 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
5
 
 
C
D
 player/D
V
D
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
6
 
T
eléfono (no celular) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
7
 
C
elular 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
8
 
L
ibros 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
9
 
O
tro   [C
1
1
D
_
P
1
A
] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !
 S
I L
A
 C
A
S
A
 T
IE
N
E
 C
E
L
U
L
A
R
, P
R
E
G
U
N
T
E
 L
O
 S
IG
U
E
N
T
E
 
1
1
.1. ¿C
uanta gasta el hogar por sem
ana en saldo (tarjetas para celulares)? ____________   [P
1
1
_
1
] 
 1
1
.2
 
E
n el ciclo pasado (M
arzo2007 – M
arzo2008) ¿buscó tierras adicionales para agricultura o ganadería? _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 [P
1
1
_
2
] 
 
S
Í !
 1
1
.3
   
N
O
 !
 P
A
S
E
 A
 L
A
 P
R
E
G
U
N
T
A
 1
1
.4
 
 1
1
.3
 ¿
E
n
c
o
n
tr
ó
 to
d
a
 la
 tie
r
r
a
 q
u
e
 q
u
e
r
ía
?
  [P
1
1
_
3
]                             1
1
.4
  ¿
P
o
r
 q
u
é
 n
o
?
 _
_
_
[P
1
1
_
4
] _
_
_
_
_
 
0
.     N
O
                                                                                                            6
.     N
o
 n
ecesita
b
a
  m
á
s tierra
s 
1
. 
S
I, p
ero
 el co
sto
 d
e a
lq
u
iler era
  m
u
y a
lto
                                                7
.      S
í la
 q
u
ería
, p
ero
 n
o
 ten
ia
 el ca
p
ita
l p
a
ra
 cu
ltiva
r m
á
s              
2
. 
S
I,  p
ero
 n
o
 ten
ía
 el ca
p
ita
l p
a
ra
 cu
ltiva
r m
á
s                                         8
.      S
í la
 q
u
ería
, p
ero
 n
o
 q
u
ería
 el riesg
o
 d
e cu
ltiva
r m
á
s 
3
. 
S
I,  p
ero
 o
tra
 ra
zó
n
 (esp
ecifiq
u
e)_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
                     9
.      S
í la
 q
u
ería
, p
ero
 n
o
 h
u
b
o
 tierra
s d
isp
o
n
ib
les 
4
. 
S
I,  p
ero
 o
tra
 ra
zó
n
 (esp
ecifiq
u
e) _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 [P
1
1
_
3
B
]                 1
0
.     O
tro
 (esp
ecifiq
u
e) _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 [P
1
1
_
4
B
] 
5
.    S
I,  p
ero
 o
tra
 ra
zó
n
 (esp
ecifiq
u
e)_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
 1
1
.5. M
e gustaría preguntarle sobre su historia com
o productor y com
o llegó a su situación actual. M
e gustaría saber un poco sobre la experiencia de sus padres en el agro: 
¿C
ual fue la ocupación principal de sus padres? [P
1
1
_
5
] ___________ (C
la
v
e
: 1
. A
g
rícu
ltu
ra
; 2
. C
o
m
ercio
; 3
. T
ra
b
a
jo
 n
o
 a
g
ríco
la
; 4
. P
ro
fesio
n
a
l; 5
. O
tro
 _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 [P
1
1
_
5
B
] 
 !
 S
I L
A
 R
E
S
P
U
E
S
T
A
 E
S
 “
1
—
A
G
R
IC
U
L
T
U
R
A
”
, S
IG
A
 C
O
N
 L
A
 P
R
E
G
U
N
T
A
 1
1
.5
.1
;    S
I N
O
, P
A
S
E
 A
 L
A
 P
R
E
G
U
N
T
A
 1
1
.6
 
11.5.1. ¿C
uántas tierras trabajaban sus padres cuando U
d. em
pezó a trabajar por su propia cuenta? ____________
 M
zs. [P
1
1
_
5
_
1
] 
 11.5.2. ¿C
uántas m
anzanas fueron propias?  _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_M
zs. [P
1
1
_
5
_
2
] 
 1
1
.6 ¿E
n que año em
pezo usted a trabajar su propia finca? __________________  [P
1
1
_
6
] 
1
1
.7 ¿A
ntes de em
pezar a trabajar  su  propia finca, ¿qué tipo de trabajo realizaba? ______________
[P
1
1
_
7
]  
(C
la
ve: 1
. O
b
rero
 a
g
ríco
la
; 2
. C
o
m
ercia
n
te; 3
. O
b
rero
 n
o
 a
g
ríco
la
; 4
. P
ro
fesio
n
a
l; 5
. S
iem
p
re cu
ltiva
b
a
 tierra
 p
ro
p
ia
 o
 fa
m
ilia
r; 6
. Jefe d
e ca
m
p
o
; 7
. N
o
 tra
b
a
ja
b
a
; 8
. O
tro
  [P
1
0
_
2
B
] ) 
193
 37 
SECCIÓN 12. GASTOS EN ALIMENTOS EN LOS ULTIMOS 7 DIAS 
 
1) ESTA SECCIÓN SE DEBE CONTESTAR  LA PERSONA EN EL HOGAR RESPONSABLE PARA LA 
PREPARACION DE LA COMIDA 
2) PRIMERO, HAGA PREGUNTA 1. PARA CADA TIPO DE COMIDA EN LA LISTA.  
3) SEGUNDO, PARA CADA COMIDA CON RESPUESTA “SÍ” HAGA LA PREGUNTA 2. 
 
12.1 ¿Se hacen tortillas en la casa o la compra? _____________[P12_1] 
 
CUADRO 12A  Gastos en alimentos 1. 
¿Durante los últimos 7 días, 
¿comió [ .. ] en este hogar? 
2. 
¿Cuál era el valor de [ .. ] que 
comieron de sus compras en 
los últimos 7 días? 
Alimento Cod. Sí        No               C$ 
Maiz 1  [C12A_P1] [C12A_P1a] 
Frijoles 2  [C12A_P2] [C12A_P2a] 
Arroz 3  [C12A_P3] [C12A_P3a] 
Azucar 4 [C12A_P4] [C12A_P4a] 
Aceite vegetal 5  [C12A_P5]  [C12A_P5a] 
Sal 6 [C12A_P6] [C12A_P6a] 
Plátano verde/maduro, Guineo cuadrado 7  [C12A_P7]  [C12A_P7a] 
Papas 8 [C12A_P8] [C12A_P8a] 
Pastas alimenticias, spaguetti, fideos, etc. 9  [C12A_P9]  [C12A_P9a] 
Pan Simple; Pan Dulce 10 [C12A_P10] [C12A_P10a] 
Manteca de cerdo 11  [C12A_P11]  [C12A_P11a] 
Tomate 12 [C12A_P12] [C12A_P12a] 
Cebolla, Chiltoma 13  [C12A_P13]  [C12A_P13a] 
Hueso de res/cerdo  14 [C12A_P14] [C12A_P14a] 
Huevos de gallina 15  [C12A_P15]  [C12A_P15a] 
Tortillas 16 [C12A_P16] [C12A_P16a] 
Carne de res 17  [C12A_P17]  [C12A_P17a] 
Carne de cerdo/salchichas 18 [C12A_P18] [C12A_P18a] 
Pollo 19 [C12A_P19] [C12A_P19a] 
Pescado 20 [C12A_P20] [C12A_P20a] 
Camarones/Atún/Sardina 21 [C12A_P21] [C12A_P21a] 
Queso, Cuajada, Crema 22 [C12A_P22] [C12A_P22a] 
Manzana, Limón agrio, naranja,agria, naranja dulce, 
mandarina, y otras frutas 23 [C12A_P23] [C12A_P23a] 
Zanahoria/Remolacha 24 [C12A_P24] [C12A_P24a] 
Mantequilla/Margarina Crema 25 [C12A_P25] [C12A_P25a] 
Leche en polvo/ Leche pasteurizada/vaca 26 [C12A_P26] [C12A_P26a] 
Jugos 27 [C12A_P27] [C12A_P27a] 
Salsa de tomate/ 28 [C12A_P28] [C12A_P28a] 
Mayonesa/Mostaza 29 [C12A_P29] [C12A_P29a] 
Miel 30 [C12A_P30] [C12A_P30a] 
Comidas preparados fuera del hogar  (ej., restaurante) 31 [C12A_P31] [C12A_P31a] 
Gaseosas 32 [C12A_P32] [C12A_P32a] 
Golosinas 33 [C12A_P33] [C12A_P33a] 
Otros gastos para comida 34 [C12A_P34] [C12A_P34a] 
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